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“You know the old joke,” begins David Dayen of The Nation. 
“How do you make a killing on Wall Street and never risk a loss? 
Easy— use other people’s money” (13). Dayen’s article is about J. P. 
Morgan’s settlement on a case of misconduct when they “robo- 
signed” possibly thousands of foreclosures after the housing crisis 
of 2008. By “robo- signed,” Dayen means that J. P. Morgan did not 
investigate the contents of the foreclosure documents. In a 2013 
settlement, J. P. Morgan was required to forgive $4.2 billion worth 
of foreclosures and pay another $4 billion in consumer relief for 
deceiving mortgage investors. In order to comply with the settle-
ment, however, J. P. Morgan “was forgiving loans on properties it no 
longer owned” (13; original emphasis). J. P. Morgan had sold tens of 
thousands of toxic loans years before at bargain rates in order to 
get the loans off its balance sheet (1st Fidelity Loan Services is the 
buyer that Dayen focuses on in a deal arranged by Nationwide Title 
Clearing, associated with, weirdly enough, the Church of Scientol-
ogy) and yet had not taken the properties out of its secret “dump” of 
distressed properties and had not even provided full documenta-
tion on the properties to those who bought the loans, even admit-
ting that they were still collecting payments on those properties. 
4 P r o m i s s o ry  n ot e s
They then proceeded to “forgive” the loans they no longer owned 
in order to honor the mortgage forgiveness requirements in the 
settlement. Dayen concludes that the Justice Department under 
the Trump administration is unlikely to pursue litigation.
The issue here is not only that bankers have been profiting from 
using other people’s money by expanding debt. Dayen’s story also 
shows that bankers have taken over the sovereign state’s role of 
creating money by creating characters who hold the same money 
that they do at the same time as they do1— this made it possible for 
them to own the same money twice. In other words, the old joke 
really is that bankers are making money by using nobody’s money or, 
rather, using no thing that still has the name of money in order to 
create more money for themselves under a different name. That is, 
bankers are profiting from using their own money multiple times 
by distributing the same money to multiple fictional entities with 
multiple fictional personalities under multiple fictional names: 
they are, in essence, sharing the profits from their properties with 
multiple versions of themselves. J. P. Morgan could then claim (e.g., 
if a payment came in) that they were the owners of the loans even 
while they could also claim (e.g., if there were an enforcement issue 
or an associated cost) that another company was responsible. The 
practice of expanding the money supply by expanding debt— that 
is, of expanding the money supply by representing money in mul-
tiple money endeavors at once— is not aberrant or criminal but 
quite simply the rule of capital.
J. P. Morgan was the company that came up with the idea of 
what is now broadly called the credit default swap (also known as 
“synthetic collateralized debt obligations” or “securitization”). The 
credit default swap is an instrument that furthered the excesses 
that most people believe led to the 2008 financial crisis. It basically 
allowed financial companies to reduce their reserves and transfer 
the risks of the loan to another company. According to British nov-
elist John Lanchester in his nonfiction account of the crisis, I.O.U., 
in 1989, Exxon needed to open up a credit line to fund cleanup 
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after the Exxon Valdez spill. J. P. Morgan had a long- standing rela-
tionship with Exxon and wanted to help them out, but the money 
could be better spent elsewhere, since the cleanup was not likely 
to be lucrative. So J. P. Morgan came up with the idea of selling 
the loan to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment for a fee. That way, J. P. Morgan did not need to hold reserves 
against the loan and could still use their reserves to loan out the 
same money to someone else, and the regulators looked the other 
way because the banks could say they were maintaining the legal 
level of reserves (remember, all this was to cover the costs of a sink-
ing ship, so to speak). “J.P. Morgan,” concludes Lanchester, “had 
found a way to shift risk off its books, while simultaneously gen-
erating income from that risk and freeing up capital to lend else-
where” (70). This mechanism could succeed in a time of growth, 
but if money were receding, the banks could not pay because they 
were overleveraged.
Eventually, the third- party bank that held the loan was replaced 
by financial instruments that bundled up the loans, mixing differ-
ent levels of risk assessed not by evaluating a person or company’s 
financial records and histories2 but rather through complex math-
ematical models that referred to constructed averages, composites, 
and bell curves rather than to actual financial actors. The bundles 
of loans absorbed risk by dispersing it throughout the system to a 
variety of named entities.3
These J. P. Morgan incidents divulge a trend in financial meth-
ods: that is, finance is indebted to literary practices. In this instance, 
profits are made by constructing believable characters who transact 
on a believable financial stage. They are made as characters by hold-
ing money, as their personalities are built on traditions of securing 
value that literature has developed as well as on literary traditions 
that envision characters as a composite of social positions and aver-
ages so that they seem compelling, identifiable, and sympathetic 
across a broad array of types of readers. Similar to the way J. P. Mor-
gan created shells to hold value, for nineteenth- century novelists 
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like Anthony Trollope, for example, mentioning the value of a per-
son’s assets and annual income did a lot of the work of establish-
ing character traits, often stood in for explaining the character’s 
moral positions, and also revealed the character’s social networks 
and place in the community (in terms not only of class but also of 
influence, trustworthiness, political potential, and connections). 
“The revenues from the Scotch estate,” The Eustace Diamonds nar-
rator tells us about the recently widowed Lizzie Eustace, “— some 
£4000 a year— were clearly her own for life” (52), whereas her some-
times lover Frank Greystock, “at present . . . was almost nobody;— 
because he was so poor, and in debt” (255), and her one- time fiancé 
Lord Fawn “had declared to his future bride that he had half five 
thousand a year to spend” (114). Additionally, nineteenth- century 
writers like Trollope were interested in how new forms of property 
ownership, not based in land or objects but rather in finance, might 
require new types of narrative framing and characterization, which 
destabilized the “intrinsik value” in things (established in their 
price), just as J. P. Morgan was able to untether value from actual 
things by transferring that value onto an imaginary elsewhere: a 
bank or, later, a bundle of debts. In fact, what J. P. Morgan and 
Trollope share is a grappling with the question of the imaginary 
as necessary for constructing real value. Promissory Notes focuses 
on a historical relation between fiction and finance, where the line 
between them is blurry. In effect, it considers how financial instru-
ments appropriate techniques of fiction and literary representation 
to build the representations of value that organize their systems.
There is no doubt that the beginning of the twenty- first century 
was marked by crises of debt. Student debt is the highest in history, 
reaching $1.3 trillion in 2017, according to Zack Friedman of Forbes. 
As Maurizio Lazzarato notes of US universities, “This temple for the 
transmission and production of Western knowledge is also a model 
of the financial institution, and, with it, of the debt economy . . . 
On the one hand, the American university is the ideal realization of 
the creditor- debtor relationship. On the other hand, the American 
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student perfectly embodies the condition of the indebted man by 
serving as paradigm for the conditions of subjectivation of the debt 
economy one finds throughout society” (Governing 64). In addi-
tion, according to Jessica Silver- Greenberg and Stacy Cowley in 
the New York Times, outstanding credit card debt in 2017 reached 
its highest point in history at $1 trillion, with more Americans 
holding credit cards than ever before. Though Republicans (and 
many Democrats) have been campaigning against national deficit 
spending for decades, the tax reform bill they passed at the end 
of 2017 is predicted to raise the deficit by more than $1 trillion, 
according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
reaching record highs. Debt in neoliberalism underlies what Laz-
zarato identifies as “an asymmetrical class struggle” (Governing 12): 
“What is expropriated by credit/debt,” he continues, “is not only 
wealth, knowledge, and the ‘future,’ but more fundamentally the 
possible” (Governing 23). Such national debts are paid for with aus-
terity policies, cuts to safety nets and education, and cuts in wages 
and benefits. In an interview with Jeremy Scahill of The Intercept, 
geographer David Harvey has called these practices “debt peonage” 
and their enforcement “the militarization of social control, and the 
intense militarization and the super- militarization of it”: “One of 
the ways in which social control is exercised,” he asserts, “is to get 
people so deep in debt they cannot imagine anything in the future 
other than simply living in such a way as to pay off their debt.”
Literature has played a historical role in defining and teaching 
debt to the public. Realism in the novel developed in the nine-
teenth century alongside the standardization of such monetary 
instruments as paper currency, coin, balance sheets, stocks, and 
credit bills and shared with credit culture the need to produce 
a belief in something that, by definition, is not there. For exam-
ple, in Anthony Trollope’s 1873 novel The Eustace Diamonds, the 
plot begins with a debt that takes the form of a necklace whose 
ownership and value cannot be traced. Much of the plot of 
The Eustace Diamonds focuses on how legal language unsuccessfully 
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describes what objects such as the diamonds— like debt, of nega-
tive content— are within a property framework based in concrete 
materials. The loss of value in landed properties meant that the 
source of value, like meaning in language, came to seem shifty 
as value was increasingly transferred onto moveable objects or 
investment speculation such as the diamonds. In The Eustace Dia-
monds, nineteenth- century Britain witnesses a transition from an 
eighteenth- century idea of property, where value is intrinsic to the 
object, to an idea of property whose value is representational and 
whose representation can lie or prove empty, without reference. 
Dependent effectively on establishing connections between fiction 
and belief, literature adds credibility to finance: finance’s elusive-
ness requires the types of speculative narrative, readers, predict-
able characters, and abstract social worlds developed in realist and 
postrealist forms. The nineteenth- century British realist novel was 
often a place where the effects of these changes on social relations 
could be considered, experimented with, and tested and where 
readers could be taught to believe.
Indeed, literary figuration is central to testing, teaching, and 
recognizing the political imposition of debt. Early twentieth- 
century literary writers recognized debt as a fiction wielded to 
extend imperial power and exposed such practices, creating a new 
awareness and somewhat of a backlash leading to new legislation, 
federal personnel changes, and even some criminal charges. In 
1932, for example, the African American poet Langston Hughes 
wrote a newspaper polemic about the early twentieth- century 
crisis and military occupation of Haiti, explaining, “You will dis-
cover that the Banque d’Haiti, with its Negro cashiers and tellers 
is really under control of the National City Bank of New York. You 
will become informed that all the money collected by the Haitian 
customs passes through the hands of an American comptroller.” 
With an even greater impact, in 1920, African American author and 
educator James Weldon Johnson wrote a four- part series of articles 
for The Nation in which he spotlighted the military invasion and 
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occupation of Haiti as defending the interests of the National City 
Bank of New York, which controlled the ports, the treasury, the 
issuance of bonds, and the importation and exportation of cur-
rency. Leading into the third article, which recounts the history 
of the New York Bank taking over the Haitian public and private 
financial system, Johnson writes, “This Government forced the 
Haitian leaders to accept the promise of American aid and Ameri-
can supervision. With that American aid the Haitian Government 
defaulted its external and internal debt, an obligation, which 
under self- government the Haitians had scrupulously observed. 
And American supervision turned out to be a military tyranny sup-
porting the program of economic exploitation” (38– 39).
The practice continues. Just to mention a few titles published in 
the wake of the 2008 crisis, Jess Walter’s 2009 novel The Financial 
Lives of the Poets tells of a financial reporter / poet who loses his 
newspaper job as well as his own blog site/start- up business (which 
he calls “money- lit” [48] because it uses poetry to explain finance) 
just when his house goes underwater. His cool, sardonic narrative 
voice— as well as his adventurous exploits, upon unemployment, as 
a pot dealer who eventually falls in with large suppliers and grow-
ers and then with the FBI as an informant— turns what should 
realistically be a tragic tale of national need and instability into a 
comedic jostle through drugged- up desperation and adorable fail-
ure. Martha McPhee’s 2010 novel Dear Money features a formerly 
semisuccessful novelist who, when her house quite literally goes 
underwater (“Water from the storm that had draped Connecticut 
in glistening beauty on our return had penetrated the roof of our 
apartment building and dripped through the ceiling and onto, and 
then into, our mattress” [67]), is seduced by a bond trader who solic-
its her to work for his Wall Street firm. The novel has interspersed 
informational asides that explain from the future the development 
of shady financial instruments, often punctuated by the narrator’s 
own cute naïveté as an outsider to the industry, like this one: 
“Most of all the idea of pooling people, of trying to understand how 
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they operated psychologically . . . as a collective lot . . . was better 
than the plot of any story I’d read in a while . . . This was imagination 
at work, imagination with consequences— nothing less” (48).
Some postcolonial literature has also taken on narratives of 
debt, teasing out the conventions of imaginative writing embed-
ded in the social relations of debt emerging in postcolonial space 
and evolving into neoliberal globalization. Indeed, The Eustace 
Diamonds compares the diamonds to the status of India in a sub-
plot about the legitimacy of its principality after the 1857 Indian 
Mutiny. As with the diamonds and debt, such a formulation of 
colonized space as particularly exploitable due to its alienated, fic-
tional, or negative status in relation to legal norms repeats today. 
As the late nineteenth century started to experience an unraveling 
of the moral logic of the British Empire, it is hardly surprising that 
the alienated legal framework of Victorian possessions acquired a 
place in the fictions of dispossession produced by Britain’s former 
imperial possessions.
“Third World” literatures of debt are very aware that the abstract 
worlds developed in imperial finance are disconnected from the 
social and cultural experiences they are said to reference. Moshin 
Hamid’s 2013 novel How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia is a mock- up 
of a financial self- help book with no advice and no address. The 
“you” the text speaks to is not the reader but rather a fictional “you” 
with a life story of his own, a dialogical doubling of the author: 
“We are nearing our end,” the narrator warns, “you and I, and this 
self- help book too” (177). The story is not a “self- help” after all but 
rides a fictional plotline, where the “you” is given someone else’s 
story, gaining leverage by borrowing against physical reality: “ ‘If we 
don’t borrow,’ he says, ‘we’ll die’ ” (178). Teddy Wayne’s 2010 novel 
Kapitoil relates the story of a coder from Qatar who, working in a 
New York bank and deciphering Jackson Pollock’s philosophy, dis-
covers an algorithm for investment returns that would also serve 
as an algorithm to end disease in the “Third World.” His boss tries 
to entice him into signing over his intellectual property rights in 
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order to bank on the algorithm’s supercompetitive profit margins, 
but the coder refuses and returns to Qatar. Amitav Ghosh’s 2008 
novel Sea of Poppies recounts how the British Empire forced opium 
production on Asia by forcing debt onto their local rulers. “Your 
debts to my company,” says the British merchant Mr. Burnham to 
the Raja, “would not be covered even by the sale of the estate” (119). 
In these novels, finance is what splits and alienates the subject, the 
point of irresolvable antagonism between the direction of profit 
and the space from where profit is drawn as debt, between the 
realities of the built world and the fictions of its promise.
“Third World” debt literature, though, does not begin post- 
2008. Wole Soyinka’s 1965 play The Road, for example, tells of a 
group of Nigerian drivers, or touts, who steal the sign “BEND” by 
the side of the road and then resell the items left behind by those 
who crash and die as a result of the sign’s removal. As with the 
legal protocols surrounding the property of Lizzie’s diamonds, 
the sign is removed as a descriptor of the territory, and without 
that marking, the road itself becomes unpredictable, and life itself 
is indebted to the controllers of symbols. Whereas The Road is 
about the loss of metaphysical belonging with the postcolonial 
state corrupted by development, Kenyan Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s 2006 
novel Wizard of the Crow refashions The Road’s nationalist critique 
into a neoliberal mythology. Wizard is a comedy of errors telling of 
a fictional “Third World” nation trying to debt finance a large but 
useless project to build a replica of the biblical Tower of Babel in 
order to commemorate the corrupt Ruler and attract foreign inves-
tors. This novel mocks governance in the neoliberalized indebted 
nation by showing its state bureaucracies standing on fictions of 
power produced by the financial take-over of its sovereign institu-
tions: the nation as such, like the sign “BEND” in The Road, is in a 
sense emptied of meaning and therefore agency as well. Straddling 
a time when finance was turning away from investments in pro-
duction in order to focus on representations of value outside of 
production, these texts explore the nexus between increasing debt 
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and the shrinking credibility of the promise of the material world, 
its cultures, and the lives of its producers.
J.  P. Morgan’s practice of putting the costs of accumulation 
onto a fictional character might apply not only to shell companies. 
Finance also depends on creating a character out of the “Third 
World” that would hold negative value as the “dump” of toxic value. 
The creation of the “indebted character” of the “Third World” is 
tied to a nineteenth- century construction of indebted persons 
as sitting in an off- kilter relation to the legal parameters of the 
citizen- persona most often marked by race or culture. My point 
in crossing from the Victorian novel into inflections of finance in 
a more contemporary novel and a play is to show how the “Third 
World” is constructed within narratives of debt as an unsignifi-
able object, a negative identity. Historian Peter James Hudson4 has 
documented how Wall Street dominated the Caribbean, “guaran-
teed by force” (21), operating in a zone beyond legal reference that 
Hudson calls “racial capitalism,” where “banking and finance cap-
italism also emerged as an attack on black bodies” (256). “Racial 
capitalism” developed first in the “loose regulatory environment” 
(25) of the American west, with high- risk investments fraudulently 
secured through land theft and dispossessions enabled by juris-
dictional gaps and regulatory ambiguities. Banks acquired land by 
emptying it of its aboriginal inhabitants, using mortgages on the 
“financialized space” (24), operating between legality and illegality 
and guaranteeing the acquisitions through force. Just as financial 
abstractions such as mortgages were used to displace aboriginal 
holdings on land, the North American Trust Company, preceding 
the National City Bank, “leveraged the Cuban government depos-
its to finance personal enterprises” (39) and preempted Cuban sov-
ereignty by rewriting Cuban constitutional law while supporting 
possibly illegal regimes.
“Third World” as an identity can be said to be retrofitted into 
the negativity of financial representations of value that debt intro-
duces. Because the benefits of capital accumulation are removed 
13i n t r o d u c t i o n
and alienated from the place of their extraction, debt is what Lazza-
rato calls “asignifying semiotics,” which “function whether or not 
they signify something for someone” (Governing 24). As Lazzarato 
goes on to explain, “In capitalism, sign flows (money, logarithms, 
diagrams, equations) act directly on material flows, bypassing sig-
nification, reference, and denotation, all of which are linguistic 
categories incapable of accounting for the operations of the cap-
italist machine” (Governing 24). That is to say that finance follows 
the logic of the “signifying economy” as analyzed by a whole host of 
structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers, such as Saussure, Lacan, 
Lévi- Strauss, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Foucault, and Deleuze 
(Lazzarato’s analysis builds mostly on the work of these final two). 
This critique taught generations of literary and cultural scholars 
that linguistic signs— words but also syntax, form, concept, and 
structure— were defined in relation to their difference from other 
linguistic signs rather than in relation to social relations in the world. 
Signs deferred engaging in objects indefinitely, postponing and then 
postponing again decisions on definitive, enduring meanings. The 
economic turn of this deferral of attributing absolute meaning or 
value is particularly evident in a neoliberal era, when institutions 
of state sovereignty, with their impetus toward development and 
their promise of progress, are being turned into financial products 
by financial actors and sold off to other financial bidders whose 
interests lie elsewhere. As in Cuba and Haiti, Hudson resumes, in 
Puerto Rico, “the City Bank served as the depository of government 
funds while hampering the development of a truly national institu-
tion” (265). Neoliberalism can be understood as a historical stage of 
capitalism that has turned away from workers, local cultures, and 
the commodity form, including social safety- net policies that sup-
port working lives, avoiding the slowdowns and stoppages entailed 
when capital needs workers to reproduce themselves for produc-
tion. Neoliberalism thus forces debt on the “Third World” by its 
disinvestments in reproduction that make “Third World” countries 
into high- risk areas, increasing profitability.
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David Harvey has dated this shift toward neoliberalism from 
the 1970s with the bankruptcy of New York City. Before then, dein-
dustrialization, says Harvey, and the consequent depletion of the 
economic base (giving rise to the term the urban crisis) led to social 
unrest that was met with public spending to solve the problems. 
Richard Nixon, however, declared the end to the crisis in the early 
1970s and diminished federal aid to the city. Though at first the 
banks were willing to cover the differences that ensued between 
spending and revenues, in 1975 Citibank decided to push the city 
into bankruptcy and then bailout, and other banks followed suit. 
The terms of the bailout were that the bankers “had first claim 
on city tax revenues in order to first pay off bondholders . . . The 
effect was to curb the aspirations of the city’s powerful municipal 
unions, to implement wage freezes and cutbacks in public employ-
ment and social provision (education, public health, transport ser-
vices), and to impose user fees (tuition was introduced into the 
CUNY [City University of New York] university system for the first 
time)” (Harvey 45). According to Harvey, “the Chicago boys” who 
followed Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago looked at 
this response to New York City’s crisis in order to build the blue-
print for their brand of neoliberalism. New York City’s bankruptcy 
inspired the similar market fundamentalist reforms implemented 
in Chile under the regime of Augusto Pinochet, which would 
be the first iteration of Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s. 
It also underlaid the market restructuring of New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and of Iraq after the US invasion of 
2003. And, I would add, it closely resembles the transformations 
in sovereign control of institutions happening currently in the 
corporate- managerial take-over of Detroit’s and Puerto Rico’s gov-
ernance. Promissory Notes explores the case of Puerto Rico to show 
how debt’s construction of the “Third World” as a negative identity 
gives rise to material effects of neoliberal debt.
At the same time in the early 1970s, in the wake of successful 
decolonization struggles and national liberation movements in 
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the 1960s, global economic relations were entering a new phase 
of capitalist organization. As economist Samir Amin argues, this 
new phase witnesses “the erosion of three subsystems that formed 
the basis of postwar [World War II] growth (the national welfare 
state in the West, the national bourgeois project of Bandung in 
the Third World, and Sovietism in the Eastern bloc)” (34). In all 
three of these geopolitical scenes, state power was considerably 
weakened, particularly in what is generally called its “soft arm,” 
or its reproductive functions, in favor of its “strong arm,” or mili-
tary and security functions, including its functions in securing and 
strengthening the economic base of the political elites through 
the polarization of national income. This transfer of more of the 
national wealth toward the wealthy (through cuts to welfare and 
education, for example, and increases to military technologies, as 
well as tax policies and the like) resulted in a stagnation of wages 
across the spectrum and— at least in the West— an explosion of 
debt as workers made up for their loss of real income by borrowing.
The depletion of state reproductive power in the neoliberal 
West and in the US “urban crisis” thus paralleled the depletion 
of state power in the developmental state. As workers in the 
West borrowed against the losses of their share of the national 
wealth in the form of decreases to social spending, aid and assis-
tance to social and government projects in formerly colonized 
states, states of the Global South, or (labor and raw material) 
supplier states also borrowed, often with strings attached to the 
loans that demanded even more austerity.5 The emptying out of 
New York City’s governing power by predatory financial profit 
seekers coincides with the same sorts of rearrangement of state 
redistribution in other places, and particularly in the “Third 
World,” with the end of the development state and the rise of 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) designed to manage debt, 
even at the expense of the population’s economic well- being. 
Samir Amin enumerates the effects of structural adjustment as 
“a sharp increase in unemployment, a fall in the remuneration of 
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work, an increase in food dependency, a grave deterioration of 
the environment, a deterioration in healthcare systems, a fall 
in admissions to educational institutions, a decline in the pro-
ductive capacity of many nations, the sabotage of democratic 
systems, and the continued growth of external debt” (13). These 
are also structural adjustment’s causes: the apparent expansion 
of the needs of the population fuels the claim of their exorbi-
tant cost and the necessity of reining in the public spending on 
their behalf, even when the absence of capital investments or 
fair division of the profits produced the need for public spending 
in the first place. Neoliberalism’s culture of debt appropriates 
increasingly more of the workers’ share of the profits of their 
production: through debt, financial institutions are, more or less, 
charging workers for the right to collect their own wages.
Promissory Notes does not set out to blame literature for the 
financial crisis. It does, however, show literature’s relevance to 
the political- economic situation that makes sense of debt. In a 
post- Saussurian, post- Lacanian understanding of the literary text, 
representation is put under the spotlight not as a worldly reflection 
but rather as, on the one hand, distanced from the world of social 
relations that is, on the other, pointing toward the creation of a 
world of social relations that could be. Marx explains that under 
capitalism, the product of production— which has in it a part of 
the life of the worker— is taken away from the producer, and this 
might be particularly true in neoliberal finance. Literature forces 
us to be wary of the way representation is removed from the con-
text it affects, how it speaks and who controls that speaking, and 
how representation divides the sayable from the unsayable as well 
as the possible from the impossible. While politicians and pun-
dits alike are telling us that the economy is a field that requires 
expertise to understand, that the only ones smart enough to fix 
the economic debacle are the same ones who were smart enough 
to have caused it, literature can play a pedagogical role through 
its deep, self- reflective analysis of representational abstraction 
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and linguistic play as a technique of power. Literature teaches us, 
in fact, that representational forms, as sites of struggle (not just 
expertise), produce the worlds of social relations that they seem 
to reflect and that those with control over the representational 
instruments are the ones who get to decide what the future of 
social relations will be.
CHAPTER 1
FUTURES AND FICTIONS
The Right to Make Promises and the Object That Never Was
Nietzsche teaches us that indebted men are not born but bred. 
Being bred “with the right to make promises” (57), indebted men are 
made to promise a “future in advance” (58) that is governed by the 
seeming “certainty” of calculation. Yet, for Nietzsche, debt intro-
duces an epistemological uncertainty into the science of “certainty,” 
because debt is antilife: it subordinates life to the “exceptional con-
ditions” (76) of the law, and it punishes people for reasons that are 
“totally indefinable” and for outcomes that “elude definition” (80). 
Because of debt’s relation to uncertainty, it is less a response to 
systems and more an excuse for power. In this view, debt is not an 
agent of need, a boost to development, or a reciprocal response 
to exchange (a system of equivalents) but rather a primary and 
unequalizing force that manufactures fear and guilt toward the 
ends of control, obedience, and subjection. As Maurizio Lazzarato 
interprets Nietzsche, “The importance of the debt economy lies in 
the fact that it appropriates and exploits both chronological labor 
time and action, non- chronological time, time as choice, decision” 
(Indebted Man 55), and, let us add, as theory (i.e., a reflection on the 
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relationship between what is and what appears, between what we 
know about what is and what we experience, or between the “is” of 
describing the world and the “ought” of what could be).
In 2015, weeks before what was then a potential Puerto Rican 
massive loan default (the largest public loan default in history), Juan 
González delivered a speech at Columbia University (later replayed 
on Democracy Now!) in which he called PREPA— the Puerto Rican 
electric company1— “the Crown Jewels of Puerto Rico.” What made 
González compare a public utility company to such reverenced, 
exclusive Victorian diamonds? In this chapter, I interpret Anthony 
Trollope’s 1873 novel The Eustace Diamonds as giving a picture of 
financial representation as it applies to imperial culture at the 
historical moment just before the United States acquired Puerto 
Rico from Spain. I claim that Puerto Rico has a legal legacy in con-
versation with Victorian diamonds in that they both are objects 
around which circulates the irreconcilable question of debt. In 
other words, the Victorian diamond, like Puerto Rico, is a visible 
object— an asset— representing the possibility of a value that is less 
than nothing at a time when people were skeptical about trusting 
money as a representation of value referring to no material thing.2 
Fiction plays a historical role in creating belief in imaginary objects 
that do not exist, compelling a representational system divorced 
from correspondence to things and events while still producing 
value. Building on Mary Poovey’s term fictionalization, whereby 
“the reader must be willing to extend to these [financial] abstrac-
tions a variant of the belief that she would extend to a fictional 
character” (Genres 142), I mean by fictional capital a genre of non-
empirical but realistic representation, where the representational 
structure itself borrows from imaginative techniques, making the 
line between the actual legitimate or conventional imaginative 
projection and the deliberatively fake appearance of value blurry 
or altogether obsolete. Like fiction, money is just coming to be 
thought of as a thing representing something that, by definition, 
is not, never was, and might never be there.
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Fictional capital today has become much more normalized, 
no longer needing pedagogical interventions most of the time. 
Or maybe people are learning to accept intermittent crises and 
the ensuing economic remedies— more deregulation, more 
austerity— that clear the ground for more upward redistribu-
tions of wealth, often under the guise of “job creation.” As British 
novelist John Lanchester notes in his nonfiction book about the 
2008 crisis, I.O.U., “When I first began to study the world of 
the City, I found it hard to come to grips with the idea that finan-
cial instruments are ‘invented,’ cooked up in the same ways as 
works of art” (57).3 This is true not only of financial power but also 
of legislative and juridical power as it determines how value can 
be extracted from assets. A US example is the landmark 2010 case 
Citizens United vs. FEC (Federal Election Committee), when the US 
Supreme Court decided to reconfirm the idea that corporations 
were like legal people, subject to the same civil rights and prop-
erty protections as ordinary citizens, including freedom of speech 
and, by extension, freedom of religious belief. In the same gesture, 
the Supreme Court defined money as speech and spending money 
as exercising a First Amendment right. In other words, corpora-
tions have been legally established, as they first were in the late 
nineteenth century, as characters, often with imagined composite 
personalities and participating in narratives of aggrievement, lan-
guage acquisition, and subject construction.
This is not the only place where the economy functions through 
characterization and narrativization. As Lanchester explains, the 
credit default swaps (CDS), or “synthetic collateralized debt obli-
gations,” which played such a heavy role in the 2008 financial cri-
sis, also operated by creating a false company identity. In these 
trades, the bank issuing the loan would set up an offshore shell 
company, or special purpose vehicle (SPV), that would assume the 
risk, insuring the loan so that the bank would be able to remove 
the loan from its balance sheets, increasing the bank’s lever-
age and reducing its tax burden. Banks that, by the Basel rules, 
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were obligated to maintain a certain percentage of reserves against 
total loan amounts, could extend more credit. “You could use your 
capital very effectively over and over again,” concludes Lanchester, 
“because you needed to post only part of the capital as collateral 
against the risk of default” (73). By creating these fictional perso-
nas, the bank was able to issue loans at no risk while diminishing 
its public responsibilities. In addition, underlying credit swaps was 
a system of insurance whose prices were set according to inade-
quate correlative data (or measurements of how their prices rose 
and fell in relation to others in securities markets) rather than 
on the historical data— whether or not, for example, the bundled 
mortgages were likely to be paid back. This meant that the uncer-
tainties of what the future might bring were filled in by bell curve 
calculations and, as Lanchester continues, “mathematical models 
[that] simply didn’t work in a crisis” (162). Such securitization was 
premised, therefore, on making loans to people not by determining 
the quality of their character, credibility, past behavior, and likeli-
hood of payback but rather by insinuating composite probabilities 
as character construction, where risk assessments could be divided 
up into particular product lines and combined into financial risk 
patterns or personalities and then ranked accordingly.
The history of Puerto Rico’s financial colonization follows a 
course where aspects of cultural character are projected onto the 
island and measured against stock characters of probable credit-
worthiness. Evolving as a political and legislative entity inside the 
history of financial authority’s ascendance, Puerto Rico assumes a 
fictional character as investment risk. Puerto Rico’s case is certainly 
one where a character was produced that would augment the level 
of risk to make it a “good investment” and a site of excessive profits.
The contemporary situation of debt in Puerto Rico reveals that 
debt is a product of legalistic maneuvering rather than a result of 
irresponsible spending. Puerto Rican debt was blown out of pro-
portion after the expiration of a 2006 tax abatement policy when 
936 firms left the island, and investors convinced the government 
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to issue municipal bonds— some with the highest yields— to make 
up the difference, often bypassing legal limits. PREPA, González 
continues, is able to issue billions of dollars in private bonds to 
investors living outside of Puerto Rico. Under the provisions of 
Puerto Rico’s 1952 Constitution, available resources would go to 
servicing debt obligations first, making every single person on 
the island responsible for paying the debt through austerity cuts. 
PREPA- issued bonds are backed as well by other public entities 
like the Government Development Bank and the Highways and 
Transportation Authority, creating a situation in which “every-
thing in Puerto Rico is bonded and is owed to someone— to some-
one outside the country,” says González. A default could mean a 
loss in funding for roads and schools, as that public money would 
be transferred to the private investors as a priority in times of cri-
sis. The economic setup— where Puerto Rico is kept permanently 
in debt because the more it collects, the more it owes to private 
investors living elsewhere— means Puerto Rico is permanently and 
essentially made unequal as a matter of its existence, as the debt 
structuring prohibits its sovereign control over its own financial 
governance. The United States controls Puerto Rico’s borders and 
tariffs because it is part of the United States but only confers partial 
citizenship and property rights because it is not a state. How did 
this situation come about?
Puerto Rico has a special status that is both inside and outside 
US law. This is González’s point. Its colonial legacy gives it that 
special status, where its fit with US civil rights, commercial, and 
sovereign protections has always been highly contested. Puerto 
Rico, says González, is in a “unique situation” because it is sub-
jected to unique and unprecedented legislation: unlike US states, 
it has no congressional representation; unlike US municipalities, it 
has— since legislation passed in 1984— no Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
provisions, while it offers insured and “triple tax- exempt bonds,” 
which means exemption from paying local, state, and federal taxes 
on income from bonds, an instrument, unavailable anywhere else 
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in the United States, that helps divest the Puerto Rican treasury. As 
Mary Williams Walsh in the New York Times explains, no one “can 
tax the interest that Puerto Rico pays its investors” because of a law 
from 1917 that was meant to push internal development in order to 
show Puerto Rico as outshining Soviet- backed Cuba. Puerto Rico 
is exceptional: “If it is neither a state nor an independent nation,” 
González queries, “what exactly is Puerto Rico?”
González argues that Puerto Rico achieves this special status 
through its colonial history, and to back this argument, he cites 
US Court of Appeals judge Juan Torruella, the only Hispanic judge 
ever to serve on the First Circuit. Torruella notes that the debate 
over Puerto Rican annexation after the Spanish- American War 
made the application of US law irregular, where Puerto Rico’s 
relation to the name “America” was set in disarray on the basis of 
racial difference. Where one side argued that US law applied to all 
those on US territory and that there was therefore a constitutional 
obligation to make territories into states, the other side— citing the 
famous 1857 Dred Scott case, in which it was decided that former 
slaves could not be US citizens or stand in court— declared the per-
manent inequality of the island’s inhabitants due to their inability 
to assimilate the values and conduct assumed to be shared by all 
US citizens as their identity. “The inhabitants are of wholly differ-
ent races of people from ours,” Thomas Spight, representative of 
Mississippi, reasoned. “They have nothing in common with us and 
centuries can not assimilate them . . . They can never be clothed 
with the rights of American citizenship” (as cited in Torruella 35). 
The customs of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, thought a con-
tributing professor in the Harvard Law Review comparing the case 
to Florida, were not translatable into the language of the Bill of 
Rights: “Those ten amendments as a whole are so peculiarly and 
so exclusively English that an immediate and compulsory applica-
tion of them to ancient and thickly settled Spanish colonies would 
furnish striking proof of our unfitness to govern dependencies, or 
to deal with alien races” (as cited in Torruella 27). As the debate 
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shows, the law maneuvers maladroitly to create a representation of 
difference within but outside the universalizing abstraction of citi-
zenship. The debate also suggests that categories for knowing and 
experiencing social existence— like “America”— do not necessarily 
have obvious social referents or a secure framing of belonging.
According to González, this special in- between status— being 
both inside and outside the law’s abstractions— weakens Puerto 
Rico’s sovereign claim over its borders and productive enterprises 
and allows the rules of capital accumulation to be set by those 
outside the island who serve to profit but who have no reason to 
be responsive or sympathetic to local needs. For example, shipping 
in and out of Puerto Rico, unlike any of the neighboring islands, 
is restricted by the 1920 Jones Act (protecting the US merchant 
marine within US waters) to US- constructed ships, costing Puerto 
Rico, says González, $567 million extra a year, even though the 
companies are using Greek and Cypriot crews that have low labor 
costs. “Only those parts of the Constitution apply in U.S. territo-
rial possessions that Congress chooses to apply,” González summa-
rizes. “Puerto Rico . . . belonged to but was not part of the United 
States.” Puerto Rico is set up as unequal by its uncertain, fictional 
relation to a legal system meant to assume that all are equals before 
its law. As Nelson Denis writes in The Nation, “This is where our 
Commonwealth relationship to the United States has gotten us: 
an island of beggars and billionaires, owned by absentee landlords, 
fought over by lawyers, clerked by politicians.” Puerto Rico is being 
punished for the inequality imposed on it from the start.
Debt in Puerto Rico, as González describes its history, is cre-
ated by an uncertain relation to the law or to the status of the law 
and its application, and it actually produces uncertainty as part 
of the legal structure to accommodate a necessary inequality. If 
the law is meant to apply to all equally, then raising the question 
of to whom it applies presumes an embedded inequality. If the 
word citizen is meant to refer to an actual body- in- the- world, then 
questioning its referential application also serves to question that 
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body’s existence for that world. Because of the question of whether 
law applies, the law can apply selectively to an imagined general 
or ideal designation, or the law can be decided singularly, for this 
case only. That is, debt is attributed to objects whose uncertain 
legal categorization makes them possibly subject to authoritative 
controls, decision making, and opportunistic gaming rather than 
bureaucratic regulation or universalist abstract principles, as lib-
eralism would warrant or as the category of “citizen” implies. I am 
not insinuating that debt has no material effects— on the contrary! 
Puerto Rico— like the category “students,” for example— is identi-
fied and maintained as indebted, permanently, in the very way it 
enters into social, symbolic, and political relations. Debt is part of 
Puerto Rico’s historical identity, its (post)coloniality.
González’s use of Victorian diamonds as a metaphor for this 
situation of debt is revealing. In this chapter, I argue that Trollope’s 
diamonds appeared as an incoherence in the legal coding at the 
time— between heirloom and commodity, between material object 
and financial product— in ways similar to the Puerto Rico that 
González describes. In such situations, authorities take control of 
time via representation: that is, they take control of the uncertain-
ties by securitizing them in stable representations of future profits 
in the present.
Though much scholarship traces the political and cultural his-
tory of Latin America from Spanish conquest, interpreting con-
quest as the rupture out of which modern identities and class 
relations were forged, Torruella and González read the history 
of the Spanish Caribbean— particularly Cuba and Puerto Rico— 
and the Philippines as it starts to be inscribed in US constitutional 
law after the Spanish- American War in 1898, in the time of finan-
cialization. In this historical lineage, the rupture was not a one- time 
event that transformed what came after but rather is ongoing and 
continually reinstituted, even in everyday practices, whenever US 
laws move to reinscribe these colonies/protectorates for policies 
of deeper economic accumulations. As mandated by the Treaty of 
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Paris, the legal, civil, and political status of Puerto Rican territory 
“shall be determined by Congress” (qtd. in Torruella 24). In a debate 
that ensued the year after the Treaty of Paris in the Harvard Law 
Review, experts pointed out that unlike in European conquests, US 
expansion should be guided by the Constitution. The “temporary” 
denial of citizenship rights to territories was therefore considered 
“abnormal” (25); moving expediently toward statehood was there-
fore necessary. Today, statehood is still on hold.
The US institutionalization of Puerto Rico, as it starts at the turn 
of the twentieth century, might therefore be recognized in parallel 
to a moment when British Victorians were starting to take account, 
at the end of the nineteenth century, of a burgeoning financializa-
tion that had not yet acquired a matching legal structure. Anthony 
Trollope’s 1873 The Eustace Diamonds was a pedagogical or infor-
mational novel that sought to teach its readers how to negotiate a 
financial system that was yet unfamiliar and increasingly confusing 
in the mid- to late nineteenth century. The reason to write on The 
Eustace Diamonds now is that it is all about money, and it is about 
money at a particular time when money was coming to be under-
stood as a means to finance4 but also as something that needed to 
be explained. Representative of a transition in what was understood 
as a legal form of property, Trollope’s diamonds fall both inside and 
outside the contemporaneous terms by which property could be 
recognized, known, determined, regulated, valued, and therefore 
owned and exchanged, like Puerto Rico today (also like credit default 
swaps and mortgage- backed securities today). Also like Puerto Rico, 
the inequality of the diamonds to legal property descriptors and cat-
egories invites legalistic maneuvering to control, through authority, 
the terms of ownership and future possession. Without determi-
nation as a type of property recognizable within property law, the 
diamonds— or Puerto Rico— can be treated as a legal exception, a 
negative value, an inequality, an uncertainty, a risk, or debt.
Caught in a transitional moment when property as land is 
beginning to be overshadowed by financial capital— mobile 
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instruments of value capture dependent on conventions of rep-
resentation: balance sheets, bank accounts, coins, paper, stocks, 
letters of exchange, bills, contracts, checks, and so on— The Eustace 
Diamonds traces a concept of the economy dependent on informa-
tion, where types can be recognized because they can be equated 
with other types, as abstractions. Yet the abstracted informational 
codes are often inadequate for identifying the particular objects 
to be owned and valued. The Eustace Diamonds makes debt into 
an object, but an indeterminate one, specific but undefinable and 
unnamable. Like Puerto Rico and its relation to the category of 
“citizen,” the diamonds as debt cannot be equalized with sym-
bolic representations of existing types of possessions; proving the 
law as un- universalizable, they mark the ones who hold them as 
untrustworthy and not wholly what they seem to be. Debt reveals 
the limitations of property in the language that determines it 
as property— that is, in the language of money. Like González’s 
questions about Puerto Rico, The Eustace Diamonds, then, asks, If 
they can’t be owned or traded, if they are neither land nor mov-
able commodities, if they are neither heirlooms nor gifts nor gold 
nor paraphernalia, if they cannot be said definitively to belong to 
anyone in particular, if they therefore have a negative value for 
those in possession of them, then what exactly are the Eustace 
diamonds?
Authoritarian imposition was exactly what became transpar-
ent in Puerto Rico when an unelected emergency manager control 
board— referred to as “La Junta”— was appointed by Congress under 
Title III, with a law titled PROMESA5 meant to reassure hedge 
funds, vulture funds, and other investors who thought Chapter 9 
was unfavorable to them. Drafted by Republican Speaker of the 
House Paul Ryan, Title III— or PROMESA— only applies to Puerto 
Rico as an exception. What Ed Morales of The Nation has called a 
“throwback to the early days of US colonial rule, when the governor 
was a US military officer appointed by the president,” PROMESA 
passed with bipartisan support under the Obama administration 
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and with continued support under Trump and gives Puerto Rico’s 
elected governor no control over the restructuring, the largest in 
history— nine times larger than Detroit’s. Except for one resident 
member, the board would be staffed principally by non– Puerto 
Rican businesspeople living off the island— six of the seven cho-
sen by Congress— to redistribute Puerto Rico’s assets so that the 
debts could be paid, taking money from teacher and state worker 
pensions, Medicare, university budgets, schools, health care, hous-
ing, and the like (e.g., the minimum wage would be reduced to 
$4.25/hour). As David Graeber reflects, “Debt peonage continues 
to be the main principle of recruiting labor globally: either in the 
literal sense, in much of East Asia or Latin America, or in the sub-
jective sense, whereby most of those working for wages or even 
salaries feel that they are doing so primarily to pay off interest- 
bearing loans” (368– 69). This is particularly true, he continues, for 
countries and regions under the control of International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) austerity policies. Debt interrupts the uncertainty 
opened in the present by the future— the potential for public roads 
and schools, the lives extended by health care— by subjecting it 
to the demands of the present, as the command of payback takes 
back authority over the uncertain, the undefinable, the risky, and 
the theoretical.
DIAMONDS
The Eustace Diamonds treats as narrative a transition in the con-
cept of property the necklace foregrounds: types of property 
that depend on a distance or noncomplicity between the object 
and its representation (as with credit, currency, and debt). These 
instruments are based on fictions of value— belief systems and 
trust— rather than on inheritance6 or referentiality.7 “If a thing is a 
man’s own,” contemplates the main character, Lizzie Eustace, “he 
can give it away;— not a house, or a farm, or a wood, or anything 
like that; but a thing he can carry with him— of course he can give 
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it away” (Trollope, Eustace 94). Well, it is not that simple, as Lizzie 
learns in the course of the novel. The Eustace Diamonds is Lady 
Lizzie Eustace’s story, with Lizzie’s character modeled on Becky 
Sharp of Thackeray’s 1848 satiric novel Vanity Fair (though Trol-
lope’s hatred of satire is well known). When her father the admi-
ral dies and leaves her in debt, caused in part by her obsession 
with wearing fake jewelry, Lizzie resolves her financial burdens by 
marrying Sir Florian Eustace, who dies a year later, bequeathing a 
lifetime income to her and his heir. Part of Eustace’s possessions 
had been a diamond necklace that he may have given to Lizzie as 
a gift but did not mention in his will, yet she claims it as hers. The 
Eustace estate lawyers try to take it back into the family estate. 
For this, they need to determine if it could be said to be a family 
heirloom, a chattel, a gift, or a piece of paraphernalia; whether she 
could legally sell the diamonds off; and whether her son’s rights to 
property limit her own. The novel obsesses over the status of the 
diamonds— a status that remains categorically indeterminable and 
is never resolved.
The question the diamonds pose is if, without referring to an 
object in a line of exchange, money can lie. Lizzie is the character 
in which this question is most prevalent because her class back-
ground jars heavily against her class aspirations, so she is always 
in the process of appearing to be of greater value than she is by 
her lying. As readers, we are supposed to hate everything about 
Lizzie: her tenacity about having the diamonds as much as her 
taste for what Trollope sees as the false floweriness of lyric poetry 
like in Byron, Shelley, and Tennyson: she, like the capital she rep-
resents, is shallow, crafty, clever, and deceptive. Her claim to her 
fortune is, for the most part, a pretense against which she over-
spends, and displaying the diamonds, she overstates her wealth to 
lure a series of indebted men into making marriage offers, just as 
Romantic poetry overstates its value. “She would tell any number 
of lies to carry a point,” Trollope begins his description. “It was 
said of her that she cheated at cards. In backbiting no venomous 
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old woman between Bond Street and Park Lane could beat her” 
(Eustace 42), and Trollope’s venom continues relentlessly. Lizzie’s 
financial failings contribute to Trollope’s depictions of her moral 
failings.8 Though, as Alan Roth writes in the Stanford Law Review, 
“professors will never concoct a fact pattern so compelling” (879) 
as The Eustace Diamonds, much of what obscures the factual attri-
bution of the diamonds as property is Lizzie’s lying: for example, 
the diamonds are more likely to be “chattels” if given to her in Scot-
land with the rest of the properties in the Eustace Scottish castle, 
so she says that they were, and the writing in the jeweler’s ledger 
is smudged so the potential lie cannot be proven right or wrong. 
As Walter Kendrick expresses it, Lizzie “is Trollope’s attempt to 
represent realistically the opposite of realism, to appropriate and 
condemn a way of using language which is inimical to that of the 
Trollopian novel” (137). She even steals her own diamonds the first 
time and then lies to the police (and everybody else); when the 
diamonds disappear the second time, she again lies to the police. 
Lizzie’s falsifications about the diamonds— their whereabouts, 
whether they have been promised, whether she has them— make 
the diamonds into pure representation, with their reference point 
and terms of possession in constant movement. Contingently, 
her fictional claims threaten to expose as false (or moveable) the 
authority, morals, and social understanding to which she— as well 
as the social class to which she aspires— pretends. As an imposter, 
she implies they all are imposters and that the objects that confer 
their status are, possibly like the diamonds, just paste.
Like financial capital as well, Lizzie— who is an orphan and then a 
widow— gets passed from hand to hand without anyone being 
able to hold onto her. Interpreting her as free of immediate kin-
ship and so with more than normal social agency than allotted 
to other women, Kathy Psomiades summarizes, “Lizzie is bad not 
only because she openly places her charms on the marriage market, 
but because she doesn’t have the value she claims to have. Her value 
is exchange value” (95). She is the prototype of what Marx describes 
31F u t u r e s  A n d  F i c t i o n s
as debt: carried by “dissimulation, hypocrisy and sanctimonious-
ness,” she makes herself into “counterfeit coin” to “obtain credit by 
stealth, by lying” (“Comments on James Mill”) or by fiction. Lizzie’s 
character is contrasted with her nemesis and childhood friend, 
Lucy Morris— referred to at multiple points as “good as gold” (e.g., 
Trollope, Eustace 305, 309, 314) or a “firm rock” (151)— who, like-
wise orphaned, is ugly and poor though virtuous and trustworthy 
and whose sincere and worthy engagement to Frank Greystock, a 
Conservative member of Parliament, Lizzie nearly ruins. In con-
trast to Lizzie, Lucy seems true because her value does refer to 
an object, and one that is most solid: “There was a reality and 
a truth about her [Lucy],” Frank meditates, “which came home 
to him and made themselves known to him as firm rocks which 
could not be shaken” (151). As Lizzie ruminates, she “knew that she 
was paste and knew that Lucy was real stone” (628). Unlike Liz-
zie, we can trust what Lucy says and sympathize with it. “If Lucy 
Morris ruled the world,” Kendrick concludes, “there would be no 
novels in it” (156). A lawyer, Greystock himself had risen to polit-
ical prominence by “saving” the gold standard against encroach-
ments that the City of London was trying to inflict through legal 
action; he defends the Bank of England by reconstructing its bul-
lion cellars (67). Much of the novel takes place in the suspension 
of Frank’s promise to Lucy Morris, a promise that— like debt or 
credit— inserts a delay or anticipation about whether his word is 
real and he will return to her, as, the novel keeps reminding us, he 
clearly should (and eventually does a good seven hundred pages 
later). Trollope directly labels Frank’s promise to Lucy as a debt: 
“Whatever might be his future lot in life, he owed it to her to 
share it with her, and if he evaded his debt, he would be a traitor 
and a miscreant” (573). Yet unlike Lizzie’s debt, Frank returns to 
Lucy after a time; though not heroic, he eventually proves himself 
true. Whereas Frank fulfills this promise by returning to a future 
with Lucy, Trollope leaves Lizzie in a debt whose future promise 
is unforeseeable.
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The issue for Trollope is the troublesome relationship between 
fiction and finance. Fiction can be two things. It can be deliberate, 
where reality is intentionally distorted through false representa-
tion and fraud, or it can be nondeliberate, where the representation 
is excessive to its intention because the reality that the represen-
tation is meant to capture does not rest easily or exhaust itself 
within the representation’s referential structure. Mary Poovey is 
concerned with attempts leading up to the age of finance to dis-
tinguish between the modern fact— true to nature, focused on 
particulars— and what she sometimes calls “figurative language” 
or rhetoric and other times calls theory, generalized abstractions, 
systems, or models (Modern Fact 6). Finance also demanded an 
accounting of types of financial fiction that shared figuration but 
had different intentions and effects: credit, fraud, and risk, for 
example. The potential that value could be imaginary— not held in 
things but projected through representations— means that future 
value cannot totally be captured and controlled in the present. 
Financiers, of course, want to minimize potential loss or risk by 
setting up secure fictional representations of debt in a way that 
limits their own responsibility and extends the debtor subject and 
the creditor- debtor relationship, as represented in the present, 
into the future as far as possible. As Trollope shows in the char-
acter of Lizzie Eustace, however, Victorians were not totally con-
vinced of securing all future possibility.
In finance, representations of value refer to other representa-
tions. If, as Poovey contests, the credit economy of the nineteenth 
century “did not explicitly or consistently differentiate between 
objective data, which seemed simply to reflect the natural world, 
and imaginative or rhetorical representations, which clearly elab-
orated or transformed the observable world” (Genres 90), then how 
can the necessary fictions of financial capital— the tools for repre-
senting value as data or things— be distinguished from pure fraud 
and deceit? Through Lizzie, Trollope marks a confusion between 
representations that are deliberatively deceitful and appropriative, 
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such as fraud, and those that are sympathetic and truthful and 
therefore good for the right kind of finance. She is then punished 
in order to set her apart as bad fiction, as debt, and to clarify that 
these untruthful fictions are different from fictions of real value 
even as they appear, formally, the same.9 My contention here is that 
Lizzie, like the diamonds, shares the theoretical character of money 
as debt; she is debt: she introduces and emphasizes the idea that 
money is not what it seems (it might not be anything), that (unlike 
Frank) it cannot fulfill its promise by returning to partnership with 
the object, that it could be exposed as mere representation— as 
fiction— and that its representation can only be made a credible 
and real value through an authoritative imposition, often violent.
In The Eustace Diamonds, Trollope creates a plot around the 
problem of property in relation to a rising awareness that value 
is tied to imaginative representations— or figuration— rather than 
things. Though some of the characters seek to ground the neck-
lace’s value in the rock- hard solidity of the family name to which it 
belongs, the necklace cannot sustain a connection to that name.10 
The necklace moves among national locations, definitions, legal 
interpretations, settings, pawnshops, politics, allegations of forg-
ery, and holders’ intents, acquiring different types of meaning in 
different contexts and in relation to different symbols. “Would the 
Law do a service, do you think,” asks the legal expert Dove, rhetor-
ically, “if it lent its authority to the special preservation in special 
hands of trinkets only to be used in vanity and ornament? Is that 
a kind of property over which an owner should have a power of 
disposition more lasting, more autocratic, than is given him even 
in regard to land? The land, at any rate, can be traced. It is a thing 
fixed and known. A string of pearls is not only alterable, but con-
stantly altered, and cannot easily be traced” (Trollope, Eustace 295). 
Yet the lawyers never fully ascertain that the diamonds are not that 
kind of property. Like land, the diamonds seem to be weighty, as 
when the tall footman lifts the iron box made to keep the necklace, 
he buckles “as though it were a thing so heavy that he could hardly 
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stagger along with it” (435). Fastening the necklace around her 
companion Miss Macnulty’s neck, Lizzie says, “How do you feel, 
Julia, with an estate upon your neck? Five hundred acres at twenty 
pounds an acre” (323). Lizzie, on the other hand, hangs “them loose 
in her hand” and tosses them around like “any indifferent feminine 
bauble” (322). We soon learn, when the box is stolen and forced 
open, that— heavy or light— the box is empty.11 While traveling, 
Lizzie carries the box holding the diamonds sometimes on her lap, 
sometimes under her feet, where it is an obstruction to her com-
fort, or hypervisible and drawing attention, although the box is 
meant to make the diamonds invisible and unattainable. Then the 
diamonds disappear, and the plotline seems unsure about how to 
proceed, eventually proceeding as though they are still there and 
then as though they are not there. Are the diamonds an object of 
value or are they an empty representation? As a hardened represen-
tation of an absence or transparent lack of substance— the main 
character’s debt— the necklace suggests a persistent impossibility 
of identity between value and its representation as well as between 
Lizzie and the class to which she seeks to belong.
Critics have noted this problem of “class imposter” also being 
a theme in Trollope’s 1876 novel The Prime Minister. A foreigner 
with no known parentage or country of origin, Ferdinand Lopez 
tries to break his way into English elite society by speculating on 
risky financial enterprises that fail. Lopez even succeeds in mar-
rying one of the daughters of these elite classes. “A trope for the 
market” (79), as Audrey Jaffe calls him, Lopez’s “admission to polite 
society threatens its solid values: not because that society doesn’t 
‘know’ . . . what kind of a man he is, but rather because it cannot 
locate the line he has crossed, nor can it draw one that will keep 
him out” (78). The difference with The Eustace Diamonds, which 
comes out three years earlier, is that finance does not appear as 
shady transactions on the exchange but rather as an object— an 
object that is simultaneously visible and invisible, an object that 
appears solid when it is not, an object whose value oscillates and 
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whose ownership is multiple,12 an object made untrustworthy 
because of its association with a woman with no relatives whose 
social position is never quite clear. The diamonds seem to be a 
device that calls out for a literary narrative to develop in order to 
stabilize its many meanings within a context where many contra-
dicting interests are staking a claim.
The necklace adopts so many guises that characters question 
if its substance is original, bought and passed down by the grand-
father Eustace; a fake, “no more than paste” (Trollope, Eustace 
495); or replaced since the original acquisition. The question of 
how to establish value without referring to a specific, clear sub-
stance is thus the quest and the central question of the novel. The 
desire that language— in this case, the name— should be golden or 
solid as land (i.e., that it should secure the status of the object, its 
value and credibility in the object) is not confined to the constant 
scolding of Lizzie for not being true or for being too engaged in 
poetic literature. The novel’s technique is to merge its fictional 
narration into other forms of writing, forms of writing that refer 
to actual objects in the world, an extranovelistic social world of 
correspondences, pamphlets, court cases, legal decisions, everyday 
communications, and informational exchanges: letters, reports, 
legal opinions, and so on. Information is diegetic, a plot device 
that explicates the economy of the intrigue and bleeds into the fic-
tional narration to make it seem the style of a narrator with expert 
knowledge of the objects of his study. The disembodied narrative 
voice is able to blend into a bureaucratic voice and then extricate 
itself into a type of fiction that looks at the actions from outside, 
explaining and commenting.
The informational prose is differentiated from the romance or 
the flourishes of lyric poetry that Lizzie attributes to the literary/
poetic but also integrated into the prose structure of Trollope’s 
narrative, both being voices that explain. The factual, commer-
cial, or informational often is invoked through mentioning names, 
years, prices, geographical places, legal precedents, or numbers 
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referring to weighty objects: for example, “In 1674, Lord Keeper 
Finch declared that he would never allow paraphernalia, except 
to the widow of a nobleman. But in 1721 Lord Macclesfield gave 
Mistress Tipping paraphernalia to the value of £200” (Eustace 
263). This turn toward the informational reveals two assumptions: 
(1) that Trollope is aware that the turns and twists of a novel about 
finance are not automatically understood by his readers so that 
they need signposts and pedagogical guidance that contextualize 
and explicate the plot to make readers see the diamonds as value 
of a certain complicated sort and (2) that Trollope understands 
the direct referential quality of information to be not the only 
producer of value in finance.
Informational realism, or direct reference, is insufficient to its 
task of representing value in objects in the logic of The Eustace Dia-
monds. Even so, Lucy wants to trust it: “There wasn’t a word in it 
[Greystock’s speech in Parliament, in favor of the Indian Sawab] that 
didn’t seem to me to be just what it ought to be” (Trollope, Eustace 
103). Lucy, however, does not convince even herself: “Was there any 
difference between a lie and an untruth?” she asks (299) in response 
to Lord Fawn’s criticism of the speech (more on the Sawab below). 
The word lie, she thinks, implies an intention or an interest, yet 
could she consider that there was something intentionally deceptive 
in what Lord Fawn had just said? If she used the word the way “the 
world” (299) used it, could she trust the word? Suggested in Lucy’s 
own thoughts is a conviction that language itself could be deceptive 
or fictional— especially when considering that it exists in a world of 
social transactions— and that the intention of the language would 
therefore not necessarily be the same as the speaker’s intention. 
Ironically, Greystock’s speech is a historical text that— unlike letters 
and lawyers’ opinions and requests for money— is not reproduced as 
part of the narrative, so a major moment referred to in the text’s eval-
uation of the truth in representation is missing, like the diamonds.
The narrative voice repeats Lucy’s gesture of question-
ing the relationship among an object, its value, the truth of its 
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representation, and the credibility of the informational language in 
which that representation is embedded. “We will tell you the story 
of Lizzie Greystock [Lizzie’s family name— she is Frank’s cousin] 
from the beginning,” begins the novel in the narrator’s voice, “but 
we will not dwell over it at great length, as we might do if we loved 
her” (39). Then, for some seven hundred pages, the narrator dwells 
over Lizzie as though “we” loved her. Here, the problem is pushed 
out to systemic levels, modeling its realism on the economic logic 
of sympathy that “portrays the real as both fictive and sympathetic” 
(Greiner 10), making the community of “we” from an imaginative 
projection. According to Rae Greiner, in the nineteenth century, 
literature evolved from the cognitive model of Adam Smith’s moral 
philosophy of sympathy, involving an “exchange of imagined feel-
ing” (4) that depended on a distance from identification. “These 
writings form a tradition,” writes Greiner, “that portrays sympathy 
as a mental action involving the creation and exchange of imagined 
feeling, a way of sharing attitudes and modes of thought indepen-
dent of the need to verify another’s feeling” (4). The narrative voice 
of sympathy works because other people’s feelings can be equal 
to his own, but as a form of representation, the narrative voice 
of sympathy is unequal to its representations, blocked from total 
identification. Trollope’s narrative voice in The Eustace Diamonds 
shares the form of property law, as Dove describes it, trying to find 
similarities between the abstractions and categories for property 
and the property to be known and valued.
For Adam Smith, sympathy, as Greiner explains it, can only 
be felt when it is apart from the body, ideational before it affects 
physical feeling, so it requires distance. Something that touches 
your body does not induce sympathetic feeling; rather, an action 
you see whose expressive context you can imagine and share is 
the pretext for sympathy. Trollope asks his readers to sympathize 
with his plot by staging his characters in moral contemplation, 
mentally weighing choices and potential outcomes, responses, and 
moral judgments of their actions; the readers are encouraged not 
38 P r o m i s s o ry  n ot e s
to attribute “good” or “evil” to a specific character but rather to 
reflect with the various characters on the possible implications of 
where their actions might narratively lead. Sympathy asks people 
to share in a fellow feeling with others but restricts access and 
identification to such feeling because you can never know: you can 
“go along with” their sentiments, passions, and sufferings without 
completely knowing the emotions, a type of “mental companion-
ship” (Greiner 16) open to imaginative social interactions, affective 
connections, and virtual projections that cannot be reduced to a 
physical form. Sympathy models a social field of interaction with 
anonymous, distant others with whom we can find in common an 
affective, nonempirical relation with things.
Trollope’s narrator in The Eustace Diamonds personifies this 
tradition. The narrator is not a character yet often behaves like 
one; has no body but seems present in scenes; has a conscious-
ness apart from the characters’ but is able to enter into and rec-
reate the characters’ thoughts even as he is able to stand outside, 
judge, and evaluate these thoughts; moves from one character’s 
thoughts to another; is— in short— a multiplicity of subjects gath-
ered into a mobile and seemingly singular though fictional social 
persona without a body. He is a virtual voice— impersonal, disem-
bodied, changeable, judging, interpenetrating. The “we” that the 
narrative voice sometimes invokes as the storyteller appears as a 
sum of social positions, overlapping interests, and shared feelings. 
Sympathy here appears as a smooth sharing of subjective repre-
sentations, where one subject position easily reflects another. In 
the chapter called “Too Bad for Sympathy,” the narrator gives the 
reader instructions on how to read sympathetically. Do not think, 
he instructs, that literature identifies moral or immoral inten-
tions and teaches moral behavior as does the Romantic and lyri-
cal poetry that Lizzie reads. Romance, he goes on, presents heroes 
and villains whom we can care for because of their clearly readable 
intentions— for example, says the narrator, a “man carried away 
by abnormal appetites” who “may of course commit murder, or 
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forge bills, or become a fraudulent director of a bankrupt com-
pany” (Trollope, Eustace 354). The distinction Trollope makes is 
between bills, for example, that are, like lyric, intentionally falsified 
(what Lucy might call “lies”) and the value that gathers onto an 
object through its sympathies, its multiplying interests. The novel 
of sympathy thus appears, says Trollope’s narrator, like the training 
ground for the financial marketplace.
Lizzie, on the other hand, is a negativity within the sympathetic 
narrative— the narrator cannot decide on her intention, cannot 
find “fellow feeling.” Whereas when Lucy cries, thinks Frank, “a 
tear would sparkle, the smallest drop, a bright liquid diamond 
that never fell” (212), with Lizzie, the tears came too and “he partly 
believed the falsehood” (212). “The guiding motive of her conduct,” 
he concludes, “was the desire to make things seem to be other than 
they were. To be always acting a part rather than living her own 
life was to be everything” (212). Unlike Lucy with her diamond tears 
that create an expressive context through which trust and feeling 
can be shared, Lizzie is inscrutable. The difference between Liz-
zie’s inscrutability and the sympathy of “we” is, though, sometimes 
itself inscrutable, like the difference between Romantic poetry and 
the novel with its information. Like the lyric, debt as diamonds 
looks like a valuable substance but acts like a negative process, chip-
ping away at the certainty, transparency, and intentionality of the 
community “we” that Lizzie may be part of as well as the name 
“Eustace,” just as Lizzie forges feeling intentionally and so may 
contribute to but often disrupts sympathetic exchange.
Linked to literature, the fakeness or fictional quality of money 
as representation has two contradictory repercussions. First, 
Romantic- lyrical or popular literature, lying, debt, and femininity 
might appear as deceits that threaten morality and sympathy, the 
seeming permanence of social hierarchies, and faith in the stability 
of meaning in things. Such intentional artistry allows those who 
did not inherit names and power to act as though they did, mim-
icking the conduct of the landholding and political classes (or even 
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their tears) and so making uncertain and discontinuous what was 
known to be the concrete reality of power. Or, second, representa-
tion itself was unintentionally excessive to the object because the 
object invited multiple sympathies or imaginative projections of 
other people’s emotions that resisted identification. While Trol-
lope defends the opposition between realism and romance, finance 
shared the effects but not the intentions of forgery (attributed to 
romance). In other words, finance stood in as the moral alibi for 
forgery: it could be confused with forgery because it combined a 
sympathetic mixture of intentions, some good and some bad. As I 
show below, colonization shores up such financial value.
DISCIPLINE
For Mary Poovey, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, an expertise in understanding and developing modes for 
analyzing imaginative writing is separated from an expertise in 
quantitative study of the economy— a “fact/fiction continuum” 
(Genres 77) (or divide), where what could be counted as “fact” 
“borrowed features from imaginative writing in order to give 
readers what no numbers could provide” (Genres 274).13 By allud-
ing to representation as a problem, Trollope— as one of Poovey’s 
examples— presents aesthetic and moral narrative sympathies as 
literary checks on the unvirtuous dangers and corruptions that 
money unleashes as it represents value that is not yet there. Such 
novels, says Poovey, “look at how information is conveyed, who 
conveys it, and where it surfaces instead of taking it at face value, 
instead of treating it as information” (Genres 366). In The Eustace 
Diamonds, information connects to the object in a similar way 
that Kant relates reflective judgment to the beautiful object. Liz-
zie’s diamonds are neither heirloom nor paraphernalia nor mov-
able commodity but may be any of these, and we will never know, 
so that the object floats around looking for its definitional con-
cept, which does not exist and needs to be created. Empire in The 
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Eustace Diamonds has a similar pathway through Kant’s reflective 
judgment, where the (beautiful) object does not fit prior categories 
of cognitive representation and understanding and so demands a 
recirculation of the authority of those categories.14
Modernist critics have faulted Victorian literature, and real-
ist novels in particular, for provincialism: an inability of the 
realist form to account for the global turn. Joe Cleary, for exam-
ple, writes that “England and France in the nineteenth century 
produced between them scarcely a handful of major novels that 
directly engaged the business of empire” (259).15 Following Fredric 
Jameson, who sees modernism and postmodernism alike, in con-
trast to realism, as an expansion of culture over “the yet untheo-
rized original space of some new ‘world system’ of multinational 
or late capitalism” (Postmodernism 50), such accounts distinguish 
modernism for developing techniques that could account for impe-
rialist financial expansion, privileging modernism as posing an aes-
thetic demand for Europe’s coming to awareness of its empire’s 
moral predicaments. As Lauren Goodlad responds, however, such 
readings, underscored by such influential scholars as Jameson, set 
“the stage for an interpretation of Modernism as offering a neces-
sary break” (29) in both artistic and political understanding, pat-
ting the twentieth century— and modernism— on the back for its 
more global ethics. Such literary histories, says Goodlad, bury the 
“geopolitical aesthetic” of the nineteenth century under the rubric 
of progress.
In contrast to such modernist triumphalism, Victorian liter-
ary historians want to push backward the modernist transition to 
moments when the nineteenth century became aware of the weak-
ening of the traditional markers of authority, opening the doors 
to linguistic and structural experimentation and signifying play. 
Connecting literary developments to such historical moments as 
the bursting of financial bubbles (e.g., in 1825, 1857, and 1866), the 
1797 Restriction Act that made it possible for the Bank of England 
to issue bank notes without gold backing, the 1867 Reform Bill that 
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expanded the franchise to those without property, and the 1861 
repeal of paper duties that allowed for a greater circulation of mass 
publications and currency, Poovey admits the influence of empire 
on Victorian literature of credit,16 arguing that the Victorian novel 
was the first to put representation on the line because finance 
troubles symbolic codes and authority. Poovey herself does not 
directly address questions of empire, referring instead in a footnote 
to H. V. Bowen’s The Business of Empire: The East India Company 
and Imperial Britain, which does mention the work of novels but 
only their role in transporting information about the colonies back 
to the British metropolis.17 Goodlad’s analysis, on the other hand, 
elaborates the relationship of Victorian modernism to empire by 
focusing on the history of liberalism (in this case, ethical heteroge-
neity): “Imperialism’s spatial disjunction,” she writes, “begins much 
earlier” (30) than modernist critics date it, informing a realist style 
as early as 1788 that becomes fully vital in 1857 with the Indian 
Mutiny. As Anna Kornbluh points out, however, Goodlad’s account 
is mostly concerned with treating novels as informational or data 
driven: “What does a novel bring to the representation of capital-
ist globalization,” Kornbluh asks of Goodlad, “that journalism or 
corporate handbooks cannot?” (“Realism’s Empire” 151). Victorian 
realism does, says Kornbluh, use metonymical displacements to 
reveal spatial expansion and “shifting boundaries of Britishness” 
(152) with a view toward imperial finance.
Such metonymic displacements are already inside of the money 
form even before physical displacements and spatial expansions 
become their markers. For “money,” I borrow Antonio Negri’s defi-
nition in Marx beyond Marx. Money for Negri comes conceptually 
before exchange, as an antagonism or a social crisis that is ontolog-
ical. It is a fiction that masks the exploitation— “the equivalence of 
a social inequality” (Negri 26; original emphasis)— inside of value; 
that is, money hides the content of concrete inequality within the 
form of abstract equality, just as Lizzie is unequal to the social posi-
tion that her money and diamonds allow her to seem equal to. 
43F u t u r e s  A n d  F i c t i o n s
For Negri, even before exchange, necessity struggles against the 
abstract market value of the commodity and its surplus,18 just as 
Lizzie struggles with the Eustace lawyers over the abstraction of 
property as it becomes a category of value that excludes her in its 
universalism. An equalizing legal terminology that ought to have 
depersonalized and abstracted possession in order to include those 
like Lizzie butts heads against the unworthiness of Lizzie’s claim to 
ownership and sameness. Undeserving, Lizzie, we are told, is just 
acting or lying. As Negri understands money as irreducible to its 
representation in universal exchange— that is, as “the primary prac-
tical antagonism within whatever categorical foundation” (23)— we 
see in Lizzie an acknowledgment of unacknowledged inequality. 
As much as Poovey understands conventions of imaginative writ-
ing as emergent at a certain time when money needed to have its 
users believe its value as nonimaginative,19 The Eustace Diamonds 
displays the belief in money’s realism and universalism as troubled 
by Lizzie’s possession of it. Trollope loves money (as the exemplar 
of sympathy and abstract universalizing value and so of his own 
narrative technique) as much as he faults Lizzie for having it.
Leading up to the Peel Banking Act of 1844, when the central 
bank in London started to have exclusive control over monetary 
policy in England and the issuance of paper money over coin, real-
ist form developed inside of a money economy based on financial 
objects: paper, with its absence of metals, and debt, a circulating 
amount without footing in bankable reserves. In many ways, the 
Victorians were obsessed with the imaginary of money and its 
excess of value against an assumed quantifiable value expressed 
in material forms and objects.20 For example, in his classic book 
Lombard Street, founding editor of The Economist Walter Bagehot 
warns of the disaster that would befall the Bank of England if all 
“our debts payable on demand” (30) were actually demanded, since 
the reserves could not meet them. Kornbluh remarks that such 
seeming distrust of the fictional quality of money that critics have 
noted actually belies an acknowledgment and acceptance: “They 
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simply acted as if it did not matter that everyone knew that capital val-
ues were imaginary” (Realizing Capital 8– 9). The metaphysical ques-
tion of capital’s groundlessness, Kornbluh continues, is resolved 
in the development of capital as a character— through the birth 
of psychology, for example, the idea of a psychic economy that 
pervades psychoanalysis or the prevalence of insecure or unstable 
economic actors in panic.21
But what would happen to the realist character if the irreso-
lution of capitalist fictional value were the character of capitalist 
value and could not be resolved psychologically— because money 
could not extricate itself completely from imaginative writing? 
In the wake of the 1866 crisis that saw runs on banks and that made 
the major discount bank Overend, Gurney, and Co. fail, The Eus-
tace Diamonds considers Lizzie’s character, unable to pay her debts, 
as an example of just such financial falseness. The debates over the 
diamonds are irreconcilable with the known categories of prop-
erty: they are an objective, identifiable representation of imma-
terial, floating, indeterminable value, both incredibly solid and 
unquestionably imaginary. The diamonds are deceptive because 
all language is deficient, but particularly when it is intentionally 
false, or fictional. As I show in the next section, capital’s fictitious-
ness and resultant cognitive uncertainty occasion at least partly 
from the diamonds’ connection to imperial speculation. Evoking 
imaginary lands beyond the territorial boundaries of England, the 
diamonds— with their ornamental, exotic, mystical, and aesthetic 
qualities that Trollope hates— are excessive to their objective form 
as determined in the realist language of English law.22
As Poovey has documented, before the disciplines of literature 
and political economy were sharply distinguished through the 
historical emergence of a “fact/fiction continuum,” the tools of 
imaginative writing developed in literary practice— processes 
of evaluation and prediction, for example— were used as well to fos-
ter credibility in credit and neutralize monetary instruments (Mod-
ern Fact). Authors such as Charles Dickens were writing popular 
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articles on economics including recommendations to Parliament, 
building corrupt criminal characters that infused lies into balance 
sheets. The very creation of the “invisible hand” as a concept grew 
alongside the development of literary “character” as an abstract 
actor in an imagined social world. When Henry Sidgwick asked 
the question “What Is Money?” in the Fortnightly Review (which 
had also published The Eustace Diamonds serially), he explained to 
the unaware British public that credit was the extension of coin 
and paper beyond the limits of their material forms and created 
the conditions of Britain’s imperial strength and prosperity as debt; 
he may here have been responding to Dickens. Dickens asked the 
same question thirty years prior in his 1848 novel Dombey and 
Son, which posed the limits of finance capital in moral indebted-
ness: love, charity, duty, and eternal life. “What is money after all?” 
inquires the Dombey son Paul. “If it’s a good thing, and can do 
anything . . . , I wonder why it didn’t save me my Mama” (Dickens 
99), and then Paul himself cannot be saved from sickness. Sidgwick 
claimed that, contra Dombey, money does transcend its material 
presence as a type of sympathetic fictional spirit.
The connection between fiction and finance could go either 
of two ways: money could be thought of as essentially like 
fiction— therefore always potentially losing value and needing 
theoretical modes to distinguish when to trust or not to trust its 
claim on value— or money could be thought of as always in danger 
of being counterfeited by “a few bad apples” or people of malicious 
intent. Lizzie’s character— like Lucy’s “truth”— intersects these two 
possibilities. Though in the eighteenth- century monetary value 
was anchored in reference to the “intrinsick value” of tokens of 
exchange (Poovey, Genres 58), finance was still rife with danger-
ous, roving fictions like Lizzie. Daniel Defoe, for instance, who is 
attributed with the first formulation of what would become the 
British novel in Robinson Crusoe, a book that actively denied its 
own fictionality,23 also penned a tract that appeared in 1719, entitled 
“The Anatomy of Exchange Alley; or, A System of Stock- Jobbing.” 
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In this tract, Defoe rails against those spreaders of fictional tales, 
rumors, and lies who create bubbles in stock prices. Even though 
“every kind of monetary token also relied on some kind of writing 
to enable it to serve the . . . functions that money had to perform,” 
comments Poovey, “as various forms of paper were increasingly 
used to address the scarcity of coins, the theoretical problem pre-
sented by all forms of representative money became increasingly 
clear” (Genres 59). Money is a problem because its deception is not 
always intentional but may be inherent in representational forms.
Even after we have entered a domain governed by the “fact/
fiction continuum,” which Poovey places in the early nineteenth 
century (though she finds traces of it back through the seven-
teenth), practitioners continued to use fiction pedagogically in 
order to make economic theory accessible to a broader public. Fic-
tion could teach nonpractitioners to think of markets and money 
in moral terms and might also extract moral character in relation 
to the money form. Banker George Rae, in his 1885 “Testimony of 
a Balance- Sheet,” for example, displays the balance sheet as the 
outer representation of a man’s concealed inner moral character. 
As a conventionalized, official form that might still cover deceptive 
details with abstractions, columns, and numbers, balance sheets 
unbalance representation itself. Balance sheets might “decoy” you 
by a “spurious” “lure” (Rae 25), asset declarations and values might 
be corrupted, liabilities might be subject to contingencies, ships 
might sink at sea. We learn that the subjectivity of the modern 
man of business is excessive to the terms of its representation 
and always potentially dangerously fictional due to the uncertain-
ties behind quantitative conventions; also, we learn that the bal-
ance sheet is an instrument for character construction and that 
it is subject, in some sense, to linguistic laws of abstraction and 
signification.
Poovey argues that the “problem of representation” for money 
became visible at times of crisis.24 The lack of solidity of value was met 
with attempts to master it in rationalized representations— coins, 
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currency, contracts, and concessions— that failed.25 Victorians 
were trying to figure out and gain control of an economy where the 
“intrinsick value” in things was antagonized by its own moving rep-
resentations.26 One year after the publication of David Copperfield, 
in 1851, Sidney Laman Blanchard, for example, writes “A Biography 
of a Bad Shilling,” where a coin (like David) tells a self- conscious 
story of his own birth, life adventures, and eventual discovery and 
demise. This financial persona, or metal, circulates through vari-
ous exchanges and has feelings, sympathies, and moral judgments 
in crisp, erudite prose, all along teaching the reader how finance 
works. The coin is faceless and cosmopolitan, fitting in socially 
with other pocketed objects, sometimes as their equal.27 He is a 
perennial sympathetic subject, able to feel along with his fellow 
coins in whatever environment or situation they encounter and 
to take on their pain, combining their interests with his own. His 
voice is one of abstract and objective observation as he comes to 
express, like realism or the Trollopian narrator, a Lukacian social 
totality.28 He makes clear that his tradable value depends on the 
artistic expertise— the counterfeiter— that made him worth more 
than he appeared. Like Lizzie Eustace, because of his falseness, 
the coin adopts the guise of abstract equality, comfortable in a 
smelly fortress where fake coins were minted or in an ill- ventilated 
working- class domicile as much as in the hands of a tobacconist 
or a department store manager or in a court of law.29 Because of 
his sympathies— his “we”- ness— the coin raises the question 
of when his falseness is another name for a legitimate creation of 
value, and therefore he is identical with the other coins, or when 
it is intentionally deceptive. In the end, the coin is discovered and 
nailed to the cross.
The Eustace Diamonds similarly revels in money’s ability to accu-
mulate and represent value for the Eustace heir through the dia-
monds’ circulation and displacements. It worries over where the 
diamonds go, as if in a hat trick, and if the law can control their value, 
just as it worries over Lizzie’s lies. Nineteenth- century financiers 
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still had to convince the public to trust in money by directly laud-
ing economic fictions as the key to national prosperity. As Walter 
Bagehot pronounced, “There is no country at present, and there 
never was any country before, in which the ratio of the cash reserve 
to the bank deposits was so small as it is now in England” (18), and 
such a ratio, Henry Sidgwick clarified in his critique, makes the 
banking system that fuels the empire fragile and also infallible.
DEBT
The 1857 Indian Mutiny exposed what Jenny Sharpe has called a 
“crisis in British authority” (4)— the lie behind the legitimacy of 
Britain’s hold on empire. Though Sharpe is concerned with the 
rise of false reports about sexual assaults of native men on white 
women in India, anxieties about the fictionality behind Britain’s 
financial ascendency through fictional money and debt might like-
wise be said to expose “a British failure to command authority” 
(87), where the certainties of supremacy and domination might be 
disclosed as but an empty shell. In fact, in The Moonstone, Wilkie 
Collins’s 1868 sensationalist detective novel— often considered 
“the first” detective novel— on which Trollope bases the plot of 
The Eustace Diamonds (despite Trollope’s well- known distaste for 
sensationalist literature), the diamonds are stolen from an Indian 
temple in Mysore at the tail end of the Indian Mutiny, and their 
British inheritors cannot keep hold of them: no matter what secu-
rity British banks offer to the diamonds, the Indians steal them 
back, seemingly with the help of ritualistic magic. Where the 
excess of value in The Moonstone’s diamonds emanates from their 
provenance in a mystical Hindu religion, the excess of spirit and 
value in the Eustace diamonds is borrowed directly from finance.
As a rewritten plot, The Eustace Diamonds is also borrowed on 
credit, a plot of questionable parentage, name, authority, and pos-
session. Likewise putting under scrutiny how fictional property 
can be owned, Lizzie Eustace’s insistence that the diamonds are 
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hers despite the counterclaims of the Eustace estate after her hus-
band’s death suggests that authority, authorship, and possession 
are not necessarily in the hands of the people to whom they should 
belong according to the traditions of the social order, just as sov-
ereign authority might be wrested from its “rightful” domain, in 
The Moonstone, with a curse. In a similar vein, Trollope’s 1858 novel 
Doctor Thorne tells how an established land- owning family, the 
Greshams, fall increasingly in debt to the industrial stonemason 
and lowly railway magnate Roger Scatcherd and his son, who even-
tually acquire their lands, their houses, and their parliamentary 
seat and even aspire to woo the son’s intended wife, despite the 
Scatcherds’ “intrinsick” tendencies to debauchery, vulgarity, and 
other bad conduct. The shifting character of the diamonds in The 
Eustace Diamonds suggests that their authority— as fiction— could 
be transferred, leveraged, speculated, renamed, and illegitimately 
seized by the likes of Scatcherd or Hindu mystics or Lizzie, just 
like money.
Though authors like Deborah James argue that in post- 
Apartheid South Africa, “debt was justified . . . having enabled the 
expansion of . . . [the] middle class” (4) because “new opportunities 
for credit were suddenly made available” (4), the question of debt, in 
the late nineteenth century as in the late twentieth, is not all about 
acquiring purchasing power, as the Scatcherd case demonstrates. 
Debt foregrounds issues of control, sovereignty, hierarchy, and 
who gets to decide on the future as these issues play out in a class 
society. It also foregrounds issues of how the future will be lived. 
Nineteenth- century fiction like The Eustace Diamonds and Doctor 
Thorne intimates what will become a twentieth- and twenty- first- 
century reality— that debt has replaced armies for imperial control. 
Though what Goodlad calls the “heirloom establishment” (100) of 
parliamentary politics does not seemingly dominate The Eustace 
Diamonds as it does the other Palliser novels,30 on the novel’s mar-
gins, a parliamentary debate does ensue about the fate of an Indian 
prince, the Sawab, in the wake of the Indian Mutiny. A rendition 
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of a historical incident in Mysore, the Sawab wants his adopted 
son to replace him on the throne while the liberals in power want, 
instead, to annex the region and rule directly by extending a “free 
trade” policy.31 The debate in Parliament in The Eustace Diamonds 
poses liberals such as Fawn, who believe in imperial expansion 
through annexation in “free trade policies,” against Tories such as 
Greystock, who, though out of majority power, seeks to establish 
traditional princedoms loyal to Britain that would rule through 
ritual displays of power.32 Fawn’s and Greystock’s contrasting posi-
tions vis- à- vis British rule reflect their opposing views on Lizzie 
and the diamonds. These marginal parliamentary allusions are 
much more central than they seem.
According to Goodlad, Trollope was “at best ambivalent” (87) 
about British dominion in India even as he supported British terri-
torial expansion through settlement in places like Canada, Austra-
lia, Ireland, and the West Indies, where he thought the indigenous 
populations would die out. As with the diamonds, the question of 
the Sawab’s claims is a question of legal representation, whether 
his principality is like a British “heirloom,” an object that can be 
handed down through generations, or a false claim like Lizzie’s or 
Scatcherd’s, with his adopted son a usurper of power. The parlia-
mentary question circled around whether British law can be sym-
pathetic to Indian claims— whether, that is, like the narrator of 
The Eustace Diamonds, British law can imaginatively share fellow 
feeling with its Indian subjects or whether, like Lizzie (maybe), the 
Sawab was an intentional counterfeit, a fraud, as the Conservatives 
professed. Lizzie’s betrothed, the somewhat incompetent and weak 
liberal Lord Fawn, expresses the liberal line when writing to Lizzie, 
begging her to release him from his ill- considered engagement: he 
had, he laments, encouraged her “to place the diamonds in neutral 
hands” just as, he thinks to himself, he “was often called upon to 
be neutral in reference to the condition of outlying Indian princi-
palities” (Trollope, Eustace 647). Lord Fawn recognizes the similar 
legal error in the Sawab’s sovereign claims for his princedom and 
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Lizzie’s for the diamonds, declaring, “As far as I can see, lawyers 
always are wrong. About those nine lacs of rupees for the Sawab, 
Finlay was all wrong. Camperdown [the Eustace lawyer] owns that 
he was wrong. If, after all, the diamonds were hers, I’m sure I don’t 
know what I am to do” (547– 48). As debt, Lizzie’s imposture grants 
her a right to possession of the diamonds (and therefore to belong 
to the propertied classes) that is simultaneously legitimate and ille-
gitimate. The Indian prince’s claim to a right of sovereign power 
over British heirloom possessions is similar, based on the claim that 
he is “like” the British by imitating British “heirloom” elite power 
and advancing their power interests in the name of “free trade.”33
An abstract, universalizing right to property, on which liberal 
trade policies and the expansion of commercial power should rely, 
would be incompatible with a type of property ownership that, like 
the “heirloom,” assumes and reinforces exclusivity and inequali-
ties. As with the debate in the United States over whether Puerto 
Ricans could be assimilated into American citizenship, the British 
parliamentary Conservative idea (represented by Frank Greystock) 
was that the Indian Mutiny proved India to be unassimilable to 
capitalist governance— they were, like Lizzie but because of race, 
exceptional: not fit for either inheriting the “heirloom” of British 
culture or adapting to the dominion of commodities. “On neither 
side,” Trollope tells us, “did the hearers care much for the Sawab’s 
claims” (Eustace 99). There is no sympathy here— that is, no legal 
or economic narrative framework in which “fellow feeling” with 
the Sawab could build into a sharing of interests. Such blocking of 
sympathetic feeling in legislating imperial possession distinguishes 
the moral fabric of the British character, what gives it authority. An 
example of Lucy’s being “good as gold” is in her attitude toward the 
Sawab— she reads Frank’s speech and decides to take the Sawab’s 
side. In response, the narrator judges her as possessing “a great 
power of sympathy” (98). Yet even “good as gold,” Lucy is unsure 
if her sympathies really lie with the Sawab or, romantically, with 
Frank. Is Lucy really so very true?
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In the plot of the Sawab, The Eustace Diamonds makes clear 
that decisions over the management of the empire are fashioned 
according to a logic of financialization. Simultaneously with its 
debates over the Sawab’s fate and the extension of Britain’s sov-
ereign representation, the Parliament is deciding in what sense 
the Bank of England should control representation of its credit 
lines in coin. Mr. Palliser, a liberal member of Parliament (who in 
a later novel becomes prime minister), wants to increase the value 
of the penny, despite its weight in metal, and add in the value of 
two farthings. A comical discussion ensues (and Trollope is not 
known for his sense of humor) as to what might happen to a coin 
whose name referenced a value higher than its worth— that is, 
if the coin itself, like the diamonds and the Sawab, owed a debt. 
The coin is counterfeit, intentionally counterfeit, but still official 
and true, so representation of value itself becomes a means of 
dispossession. 
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is predictable: Frank Greystock marries Lucy Mor-
ris, and Lizzie ends up marrying (predictably) a Jewish preacher, 
Mr. Emilius, an equally hated, greasy imposter, in her own class, 
who in a later novel is discarded as a bigamist and a murderer. Once 
in the hands of the robbers, either the necklace “was to be proved” 
(749) in the hands of a Russian princess according to the lawyers 
or, more likely, as the police believed (like modern- day debts as 
derivatives), its diamonds were cut up and sold on the continent, as 
was predicted but never occurred in The Moonstone, where the dia-
monds stayed intact as ritualistic objects. Outside of the Eustace 
sphere, the diamonds had greater value as exchange objects than 
as ornamental pieces embellishing the domestic establishments 
and status of the great names or as sacred religious pieces around 
which rituals were performed. Afterward, the narrator leaves off 
trying to tell us whose diamonds and what sort of property they 
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were, abandoning this main thread of the novel’s discourse— just 
as he abandoned telling us about the Sawab’s fate or Greystock’s 
speech.
Annie McClanahan faults the nineteenth- century realist novel 
for teaching people to accept the vicissitudes of the credit- based 
economy and humanizing its effects through narrative closures. 
“Literary representations of credit,” she writes, “likewise reassure 
economic actors that the social relationships on which the credit 
contract depends are equitable and stable” (2). On the other hand, 
she continues, twenty- first- century credit narratives, like horror 
movies, refuse “to comfort or humanize . . . because the credibility 
that a few hundred years of capitalist ideology sought to render 
self- evident has suddenly dissolved” (3). Yet, as with the Sawab’s 
sovereign claims, the narrative of The Eustace Diamonds does 
not close down the diamonds’ meanings inside of an “heirloom” 
status— in opposition to heirlooms, the diamonds are constantly 
reset and revalued. The novel still posits a possible success for 
Lizzie’s attempt at class annulment that might have succeeded, 
even when (or especially when) the box is empty, and a warning 
that we— meaning a class of readers of literature or possessors of 
money— should all, even as we indulge in such fictions, still fear 
fictions like hers.
The Victorian realist novel creates characters whose lives and 
situations are caught in the contradictions of money as equal 
exchangeable representation in a context of deep social inequal-
ities. The Eustace Diamonds was particularly concerned with how 
money, as a financial system of nonreferential representation 
based on abstract universal equivalents and future promise, could 
still confer real value in the present, but it did not settle the mat-
ter. At the same time as it reflected on its unfamiliar culture of 
money, the US Congress of the late nineteenth century was pre-
venting Puerto Rico from receiving political representation equal 
to states and from being brought under the legal umbrella of 
equal citizenship. Without the assurance of self- determination and 
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property rights conferred on US citizens, Puerto Rican institutions 
could be sold off to make up for the “loss of earnings” that could not 
be earned without those property rights, basically mortgaging its 
future to be authoritatively controlled by others while it remained 
perennially and essentially in debt. This is surely the fate of the 
Sawab, who could not get Parliament to recognize his sovereign 
rights to govern, and of Lizzie as well. In a sense, through Lizzie’s 
character of class aspirant and imposture, The Eustace Diamonds 
suggests that everyone is in debt because the equal value that 
money promises in its representations and abstract calculations 
is always, like a lyric, false in its present, like Parliament’s penny. 
Trollope opens the question of how value is represented when it 
does not exist in a thing and how to tell the difference between 
such financial representations’ fiction and fact. He does not 
resolve this.
What the twenty- first century teaches us is to see that the lie 
was not Lizzie’s to begin with. While Trollope gives Lizzie the lie in 
order to finally punish her for it, Eustace sacrifices Lizzie to debt. 
Dying, Eustace is the one who lays the lie on Lizzie, clasping it 
around her neck as the visibly defining signature of her difference: 
her fakeness, her unworthiness and moral failing, and her noth-
ingness, justifying the hatred directed toward her by the author, 
the narrator, and the other characters. Defending the rest of the 
Eustace class from the scarlet letter of fictional value, Lizzie’s debt 
is the form taken by the surplus that they need to make them daz-
zle, the surplus or supplement that they can profit from by dis-
paraging, dispossessing, resisting, and undervaluing it on her. By 
fooling the police and almost willingly getting rid of the diamonds, 
Lizzie might be seen to be, for a moment, refusing the control of 
“heirloom” authority or the flattening of time— where the future 
is sold off in the present— that Maurizio Lazzarato posits as debt’s 
life and fallout. Yet to be written is a critical reading of The Eustace 
Diamonds that would commend Lizzie— with her indebtedness, her 
stubbornness, her lies and resistant fictions— as not an antihero 
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but a hero for using the symbols of privilege against themselves 
and thereby confusing the rituals that uphold wealth and ruling- 
class authority or, better yet, a reading where her indebtedness 
would create the conditions that could overcome social and polit-
ical control through debt.
CHAPTER 2
DEBT’S GEOGRAPHIES
Inequality, or Development’s Dance with Dead Capital
It had become his business to get up the subject, and then dis-
cuss with his principal, Lord Cantrip, the expediency of advis-
ing the Government to lend a company five million of money, in 
order that this railway might be made. It was a big subject, and 
the contemplation of it gratified him. It required that he should 
look forward to great events, and exercise the wisdom of a states-
man. What was the chance of these colonies being swallowed up 
by those other regions,— once colonies,— of which the map that 
hung in the corner told so eloquent a tale? And if so, would the five 
million ever be repaid? And if not swallowed up, were the colonies 
worth so great an adventure of national money? Could they repay 
it? Would they do so? Should they be made to do so?
— Anthony Trollope, Phineas Finn (160)
This chapter traces a “Third World” narrative of debt. The pre-
vious chapter investigated literature’s involvement in creating a 
belief in something not there that had value for the incipient world 
of finance; the financialization of the “Third World” also requires 
a set of abstractions, borrowing from literature, where the narra-
tive object of debt appears as “something else” (Clover, “Autumn” 
45) and as somewhere else. In fact, it might be said that the “Third 
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World” comes into appearance as such a negative category of 
representation— a “Third World”— through a sort of debt where 
the object that is not there gets transposed onto a space of negative 
difference. This chapter argues, therefore, that literature creates a 
“Third World” identity as fictional in modes that parallel debt as 
fictional value.
The choice of the term Third World is very deliberate here— I 
don’t intend it to refer to a nonaligned Cold War entity subor-
dinated to a conflict between superpowers or a pretechnologi-
cal region playing catchup in a world of technological progress, 
though I realize that those types of meanings have been granted to 
the term historically and criticized appropriately as monological, 
racist, primitivist, and supremacist. Rather, what I mean by “Third 
World” is a particular structural position within the geopolitical 
globe that, in a world systems sense and because of its continued 
disempowerment through histories of colonial and other geopo-
litical subordinating relationships, is vulnerable to exploitation in 
current schemes of economic accumulation. As such, “Third World” 
does not exist in any other form but by its fictional usage, and yet it 
allows for global power relations to be seen as having similar effects 
in multiple sites— effects worth thinking about in their similari-
ties even as they interact with different local cultures. Because of 
its history, the “Third World” carries activist claims, sympathies, 
and coalitions, as well as a critique of the normative economic 
order.1 As Ella Shohat remarks, “The term ‘Third World’ contains a 
common project of linked resistances to neo- colonialisms. Within 
the North American context, more specifically, it has become a 
term of empowerment for inter- communal coalitions of various 
peoples of color” (111).
This chapter moves from Nobel Prize– winning Nigerian play-
wright Wole Soyinka’s 1965 play The Road to celebrated Kenyan 
novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s 2006 novel Wizard of the Crow, 
detailing how neoliberalism inserts its logics inside the ideologies 
that debt produces. The Road tells of drivers who profit by selling 
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dead people’s possessions after road accidents— the living need to 
borrow from death in order to live, as, for Marx, living labor is 
enthralled to dead capital, and they then “owe” time back to the 
gods as work. Wizard of the Crow is a comedy of errors telling of 
a fictional “Third World” nation with the name Aburiria2 whose 
entire state apparatus is wrapped up in debt as the Ruler’s sover-
eignty is financed out to foreign investors. As, in its metaphysi-
cal logic, The Road locates the ideology of debt in the relationship 
between commodities and gods of the dead, Wizard of the Crow 
is about antiproduction:3 the displacement of the worker and the 
commodity, the breakdown of the machine, the destruction of its 
made world, the death of the social.
Wizard of the Crow foregrounds a very basic problematic in 
the relationship between neoliberalism and economies of debt. 
Liberalism envisions debt as part of a contract. In classical lib-
eralism, the contract is assumed to be political between citizens 
and states, where the citizen gives up its freedom in exchange for 
security. This configuration of the contract translates into an eco-
nomic arrangement: equal parties enter into an agreement where 
something is handed over from one to the other with the under-
standing of an eventual return. If a rich nation or bank grants a 
loan to a “Third World” country, the idea behind it should be that 
the money will be used to build up productive infrastructure that 
would enable the debtor to pay back the debt even while expand-
ing economic potential. However, debt is instead an agreement 
between unequal partners or, as Wizard foregrounds, a situation 
where the partners are so unequal that the contract is forced by 
one party onto another for the benefit of only one side. Neoliberal 
debt restructuring has required debtor countries to divest from 
developmental initiatives and infrastructure, thereby reducing or 
even destroying the productive capacities of the “Third World” 
country to deliver on the debt. Debt under neoliberalism is there-
fore in the service of power, destroying cultures by destroying 
work and workers’ lives. Wizard demonstrates this nexus between 
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increasing debt and the shrinking credibility of the promise of the 
material world.
Wizard emphasizes literature’s place in exhibiting this destruc-
tion of the material world enacted through debt because it brings 
up the question of who controls the relationship between lan-
guages and realities. Remember that the story of Babel is also a 
story about the potential to challenge God the creator by giving 
humans language— building, diversifying, and extending language 
and its power to signify, to create worlds of meaning in competi-
tion with supreme power. But the project fails. As soon as the Ruler 
and his cronies start negotiations for the grand construction proj-
ect of the Tower (or even before), the coherence of the territory, 
the state, the economy, and the literary trajectory all come apart 
simultaneously. The streets in the business zone are filled with 
“flies, worms, and the stench of rot” (Ngugi, Wizard 36) caused by 
“mountains of uncollected garbage, the factories in the industrial 
area, or simply from human sweat” (48), and Kamiti, soon to be the 
Wizard, detaches in spirit form from this territory and from his 
working body due to hunger and unemployment, “the wounds of 
fruitless quests” (47). National industry here is reduced to excret-
ing death, and labor is immersed in the waste of past production, 
with no employment openings available even for cleaning toilets: 
“Are there any toilets left . . . ?” (51). Here the instruments of pro-
duction make waste, death, and rot and as such are disconnected 
from living processes, and the machine does not need the worker 
even for accumulating more shit.
This death of production affects even the creative powers 
of language: “no vacancy” publicizes the situation of worker obso-
lescence while at the same time explaining that language can no 
longer do its work in an antiproductive, dead region. For exam-
ple, Tajirika (soon to be in charge of the Tower project and then 
to be the future Ruler) questions Kamiti’s use of modern English, 
particularly his ability to read, understand, and interpret the sign 
“No Vacancy” (59). Tajirika reminds Kamiti that, as the East India 
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Company’s control has been handed over to the modern construc-
tion and real estate company for which he works, the standards of 
acceptable English since the seventeenth century, which he learned 
during colonization, are no longer relevant. Whereas meaning- 
making had been grounded in old forms of slavery, conquest, and 
domination, it was now grounded in new forms of exploitation, 
most prevalently debt (negative value, or waste). The destruction 
of standard literary English and the destruction of national pro-
duction are thereby linked.
The Road is a story about the relationship between dead capital 
and living labor on the road to progress in a floundering devel-
oping state. The state comes across as comical in the form of the 
Professor with out- of- place habits who preaches spiritualism in 
the Word while turned away from those in his immediate service, 
an absurd idealist with his eyes to the sky. Dressed in Victorian 
tails and bearing old newspapers and garbage, the Professor comes 
on stage bearing a sign that says “BEND” that he stole from off the 
road. “BEND” is a spiritual descriptor of the road— the material 
apparatus underlying productive motion and progress. Once the 
sign is removed from the road, commuters no longer are certain 
of their way— they roll straight forward, toward death. The sign 
“BEND” divides living labor from dead capital— those workers 
inside the productive machine, licensed to work by the Professor 
(who issues counterfeit work licenses for a fee), from those bodies 
piled up by the side of the road. The mythological spirit of death, 
Ogun, dances around the players in a mask. The Professor oversees 
the collection of commodities from the strewn bodies on the road 
and resells them, so their dead bodies are the machines of profit. 
The word “BEND” thus pivots, opening up a spiritual communica-
tion with the gods as a sign of technological advancement, devel-
opment, and rising worker well- being— or reproduction— which 
its removal closes down in sacrifice and death. The Road raises the 
question of the corrupt misappropriation of the sign of progress, 
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a misappropriation that stymies development with its hopes and 
promises.
Reading The Road and Wizard of the Crow together— two works 
that take up debt in its relationship to colonialism— reveals that 
neoliberalism intensifies the postcolonial capture of dead capital 
through debt by sacrificing productive living economies of the 
commodity. Each work takes up the narrative of a development 
project— the road in The Road and the Tower in Wizard— as the 
physical form of power, but the relation of the project to the space 
of development is different in each case. In Wizard, the Tower is a 
false promise, never to materialize and so alienating the possibil-
ities offered by controlling the material construction of meaning. 
Though Wizard is steeped in mythological and religious codes, as 
the centrality of the Tower of Babel would suggest, the idea of 
transcendence or material transformation that the biblical Tower 
might offer in the word of God has no possibility of connecting 
with the situation described for “Third World” citizens on the 
ground— it is, in fact, comic. In contrast, with the road open to 
death- inducing corruption and appropriation, The Road is con-
cerned with a metaphysics of debt, where the inequalities that 
seem steeped in religious ritual second as identities politicized in 
relation to the postcolony. Whereas in The Road, debt reignites 
tradition, local culture, rituals, and relations with the gods to 
merge with modern work- related inequalities and techniques of 
dispossession, in Wizard, debt has the power to transform culture 
in its totality by replacing work. The two texts also recognize 
that debt’s territorial alienations, where the ends of finance are 
to turn profits somewhere else, are caught in a similar relation-
ship to that which the literary word has with the object of its 
representation. The Road shows the postcolonial elite and the 
workers struggling over the power to signify, while Wizard dis-
plays signification as disassociated from the needs and concerns 
of the national body as it, like finance, turns toward geopolitical 
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power centers and away from communities, commodities, and 
productive employment.
SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE
Literary scholarship has taken account of financialization’s 
encounters with “Third World” narratives, but not debt per se. 
Alison Shonkwiler uses the word financial rather than “neoliberal” 
or postcolonial because financial exposes the “process of creating 
value” (xxviii), securing abstract value in real things by securing 
imaginary power relations as real. This insight certainly applies 
to Wizard of the Crow, where the Tower never exists except as an 
unlikely plan and a vulture fund, as it only serves to gouge the 
economic base: financial power seeks to surrender all social rela-
tions before its own version of imaginary social relations. Most 
famously, Ian Baucom, citing Arrighi, notes the importance of the 
realist novel’s character typologies for the forms of risk and insur-
ance adjustments fueling the Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The protagonist in the realist novel is a 
quantity, an accumulation of experience and adventure that turns 
into a “type,” or an object identifiable within a range of social posi-
tions. Like the English novel, the practice of insurance invents an 
“average” type and situation based in similar generalized abstrac-
tions. According to Baucom, insurance and its calculations of risk, 
like the novel, require that “the particular object which it consid-
ers and which it has placed within its determinate moment, is, 
to some extent, typical of that moment” and that “the situation 
itself will then be taken (at least in part) to define the objects it 
circumscribes” (44). Ericka Beckman likewise notices how “novels 
highlight finance capital as an illusory and indeed fictive form of 
wealth” (97) in late nineteenth- through twentieth- century literary 
narratives. Latin American financial narratives, she says, register 
economic imbalances showing the psychological damage done by 
the failure of the economy to sustain equivalences between these 
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characters and their commodity contexts. The system of equiva-
lences will “fail to accurately represent value, leading to all kinds 
of disruptions and short- circuits in exchange” (85) that reflect 
in the characters’ psychologies. For Beckman, these failures are 
often personal and subjective, marked by nervous and psycholog-
ical crises.4 Beckman acknowledges that money’s abstractions are 
constituted intentionally as unstable, even failing, by imposing 
inequalities of the creditor- debtor relationship into the structure 
of character.
Much of this new scholarship on literature and finance has fol-
lowed Derrida in addressing literature’s role in producing equiv-
alencies in value that tend toward balance, even if precariously, 
or at least suggest that catharsis would lead toward equilibrium 
rather than projecting disequilibrium as, ultimately, the norm. 
In line with deconstruction’s reliance on structural linguistics, 
which understands signifiers of meaning to be referring to other 
signifiers of meaning, such criticism generally envisions symbolic 
exchange, similarly to ideologies of market exchange, as operat-
ing within a system of made equivalencies in language: “What 
must be interrogated, it seems,” explains Derrida in his analysis 
of the gift, “is precisely this being- together, the at- the- same- time, 
the synthesis, the symmetry, the syntax, or the system, the syn that 
joins together two processes as incompatible as that of the gift 
and that of exchange” (37– 38). This partial story does not take into 
account Bakhtin’s analysis of the centrifugal forces that tie litera-
ture to its social milieu, its expression of disequilibrium and dis-
tance,5 the impasse in the exchange between the call to alliance 
and the body- to- be- allied.6 Whereas Derrida’s analysis is based on 
de- emphasizing and dismantling the essential differences between 
a gift and an exchange, as both need to be answered with an equal 
but impossible return, debt triggers types of narrative that extend 
indefinitely the time in which returns are not returned because the 
indebted are denied access to the means of return, making them 
unequal to the exchange.7
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This chapter argues that adding the “Third World” into the 
mix undoes the ideology of exchange through equivalence. If, 
as Derrida proposes, the system of equivalencies is based on the 
erasure of the object of signification (e.g., the signified), then 
the “Third World” is that object— the irreconcilable nonequiv-
alent (or indebtedness) in the exchange that calls out the lie in 
the system. Though for Derrida, every empirical object is erased 
in the signifying economy of exchange so that symbolic equiva-
lence empties the materiality of human suffering of its distinct 
importance and ethical claims, Theodor Adorno, in contrast, poses 
human suffering as an actuality that disrupts subjective comfort 
and accommodations of the subject within the objective world. As 
Adorno declares, “Suffering remains foreign to knowledge; though 
knowledge can subordinate it conceptually and provide means for 
its amelioration, knowledge can scarcely express it through its own 
means of experience without itself becoming irrational” (18).8
The “Third World” has a privileged relation to Derridian apo-
rias, the remainder that symbolization cannot equalize, because of 
its history as the victim of organized expropriation. The history 
of the “Third World” attests that the system of exchange was never 
an outcome of equivalencies but instead constructed on top of 
radical inequalities hidden under the appearances of equality. A 
“Third World” literature of debt, then, would show how literature’s 
role in producing representations of objects referring to other rep-
resentations of objects to create equal value breaks down in the 
context of global exchange. Foregrounding the destruction of real 
and potential productive capacities, a “Third World” narrative of 
debt shows the “Third World” as an object that has been displaced, 
destabilized, or disappeared: its tendency not to conform to sym-
bolic exchange in equal representation dovetails with the reality 
that it has been coerced into its circuits of exchange on unequal 
footing.
One important element of such “Third World” literatures 
of debt is a critical temporality.9 As Joshua Clover remarks, this 
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aspect of financialization colonizes future time “as if it were space” 
(“Autumn” 45),10 ensuring “that all profit is realized finally through 
the disequilibrium between geographical regions” (42). As Clover 
adds, “The apparent M-M´ situation of financialization . . . is thus 
characterized by the subtraction of time” (ibid.), meaning that the 
worth of M´ is simultaneous to M because the change of profit 
occurs across geographical space. Just as Marx described capital 
as the struggle over the time of the working day, neoliberalism 
can be described as a struggle for the domination of geographical 
space as a method of gaining time. In fact, neoliberalism can be 
said to expand the distance between regions that spend time in 
production (where time is subtracted) from regions that take time 
in profits.
Financialization demands different narrative structures than 
commodity culture because it no longer relies on progressive 
accumulation in object production but rather on an avoidance of 
objects that decelerate the speed of accumulation with stoppages, 
transportation, breakdowns, conflicts, and the limits of worker 
productivities. Clover here follows Giovanni Arrighi, who under-
stands Marx’s profit formula M-M´ (money gets more money, as in 
finance) as always in the process of overcoming M-C- M´, or profit 
through commodity production, progress through the object. 
The tendency of history, says Arrighi, is to move away from the 
commodity because it slows down the flow of profit. For exam-
ple, financial profiteering depends on the destruction of the state’s 
redistributive capacities— that is, on austerity policies such as cuts 
to public services like education and health care as well as on the 
promotion of market- based remedies for all social problems. These 
techniques speed up the transfer of wealth upward, killing produc-
tive capacities by denying workers the means to work and repro-
duce themselves for the next day of work and the next generation. 
For Arrighi, capital’s preferred push is toward monetary flexibiliza-
tion, or “phases of financial rebirth and expansion” (6). Just as Der-
rida’s referential object is erased to shore up equivalencies between 
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symbolic representations of meaning, Arrighi’s view is that money 
also tends to crush out the commodity object in order to create 
abstract equivalencies in finance.
INEQUALITIES AND THE ACCUMULATION 
OF DEAD CAPITAL
Literary realism, as critics have observed, is historically imbri-
cated in the development of political economy, money, and the 
credit economy. Realism does not just teach the tenets of political 
economy to its reading public; it also performs an epistemological 
function of creating abstract, imaginative categories of identity or 
character, general composites of experience or “types” in which a 
broad range of readers may see themselves reflected. As well, real-
ism builds a critique of representations of value alienated from 
objects and territories, as discussed in the prior chapter. Such real-
ism, notes Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty- First Century, 
links nineteenth- century literary writing with the twenty- first- 
century economy, both periods marked by increasing inequalities 
produced by capital’s pressure— outlined by Arrighi— to be always 
extracting itself from the commodity and its temporalities.
Piketty’s main concern is with growing inequality or, rather, 
with how the twentieth century’s wars and Great Depression con-
stituted a time when the ratio between capital (private/industrial/
corporate profits) and national income (workers’ wages) lessened 
(because of commodity production, industrialization, and the wel-
fare state) in contrast to most times of history, when that ratio 
remained more or less constant (workers got a lesser share).11 
Piketty believes that inequality results from a growing disparity 
in the ratio between dead capital (i.e., past surplus labor, usually 
stored up in productive machines and infrastructure) and living 
labor. Throughout most of history, this ratio has been level and 
constant, but the two world wars and the Depression depleted cap-
ital’s holdings, reducing its share for the purpose of progress and 
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redevelopment, only to be re- elevated at the end of the twentieth 
century and into the twenty- first, making the twenty- first more 
like the nineteenth.
This view of the economy and of the causes of inequality is, 
in Piketty’s own assessment, attributable at least in part to liter-
ary form and to realism in particular. Taking on a tone of Soc-
ratean irony, perhaps, Piketty tells us not to ask economists to 
explain the nineteenth century’s economic inequality (which we 
are again experiencing now) but rather to turn to other fields, 
literature most prominently. “Indeed,” he begins, “the distribu-
tion of wealth is too important an issue to be left to economists,” 
whereas “film and literature, nineteenth- century novels especially, 
are full of detailed information about the relative wealth and liv-
ing standards of different social groups, and especially about the 
deep structure of inequality” (2).12 Though Trollope is not directly 
referenced (Austen and Balzac are the reference points here), Piket-
ty’s explanations do describe Trollope’s plots, where characters’ 
identities (e.g., their positions in career and marriage ambitions 
or the likelihood of their receiving invitations to important din-
ner parties, hunting parties, or country houses) are reflected in 
the price of their inheritance, income, and assets, while there is 
very little discussion of where the sums come from and how they 
are promised. The social world seems stable when characters can 
be known through their assets, holdings, and annuities. Though 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “money had meaning, 
and novelists did not fail to exploit it, explore it, and turn it into a 
literary subject” (Piketty 106), in the twentieth century, such focus 
ceased, says Piketty: “It is surely no accident that money— at least 
in the form of specific amounts— virtually disappeared from lit-
erature after the shocks of 1914– 1945” (109). The evidence Piketty 
gives for this is Orhan Pamuk’s Snow, which, even though writ-
ten at a time of skyrocketing inflation in his native Turkey, does 
not mention “any specific sums” (109). Piketty attributes the lack 
of direct reference to monetary sums in Snow (as representative 
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of all twentieth- and twenty- first- century literatures) to the eve-
ning out of the ratio resulting from the destruction of capital in 
the two world wars and the Depression as well as investments 
in the worker via the welfare state, unions, and wages: the ratio of 
past surplus and machinery to the working wage had decreased, 
but only for a short historical time.
Surely, as we may learn here, literature is also too important 
an issue to be left to economists.13 For example, Piketty notes, a 
nineteenth- century culture of accumulation links individual char-
acter and personality to certain sums that are transparent to moral 
standing. Characters are often identified, recognized, positioned, 
and characterized through the sum of their annual incomes. “When 
Honoré de Balzac and Jane Austen wrote their novels at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, the nature of wealth was relatively 
clear to all readers” (113), Piketty explains. “For nineteenth- century 
novelists and their readers, the relation between capital and annual 
rent was self- evident” (53– 45). Whether or not we believe Piketty’s 
allegations of simplicity in nineteenth- century economies and rep-
resentations (on the contrary, nineteenth- century texts profess any-
thing but easy and universal comprehension or even coherence), 
twenty- first- century culture might, rather, detect accumulation 
appearing in other social forms besides directly in inheritance, fam-
ily name, or estates— in, for example, urban geographies, nation, 
class, systems of circulation, and financialized social relations, to 
follow the example of Snow. As the novelist John Lanchester jokes in 
his nonfiction narrative about the 2008 financial crisis, I.O.U., “The 
whole idea that a banker looks a borrower in the eye and makes 
a decision on whether he can trust him came to seem laughably 
nineteenth century” (74). Nevertheless, we should take seriously 
Piketty’s own allegation that inequality results from European 
nations’ disinvesting from sites of production and that its narra-
tive structures must, in parallel, mobilize symbolic structures that 
disassociate from industrialization’s realisms. Financial capital prof-
its through abstracting value from worlds it destroys by draining 
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productive capacities and taking away not just the surplus but also 
investments in the reproduction of capital. Piketty’s faith in litera-
ture’s relation to the transparent and direct representation of value 
cannot account for a regime of financial capital that accumulates 
value by doing away with its relation to (living) things in the world.
The disconnect between capital and living things (or the social 
relations of the commodity) in colonial and postcolonial places 
can indeed find a correspondence in literature, though not in the 
way that Piketty assumes. Theorists have begun to think about 
how language— particularly in its literary forms— creates symbolic 
value by disassociating from commodities and material things. 
Arjun Appadurai, for example, argues that finance depends on the 
promissory language of the contract, which is performative in 
the sense that it creates the conditions that the contract needs 
in order to come into existence. Appadurai terms this “retro- 
performativity” (from J.  L. Austen and Judith Butler) and com-
pares it to the work of rituals “bringing about the possibilities 
that will have led to it” (87). Derivatives are promissory con-
tracts piled up on each other, each one further away from 
a direct connection to the asset. Crises like the one in 2008 
occur, thinks Appadurai, because the promise has been so far 
removed from the asset that it runs a risk over “whether or not 
an agreement will emerge at all” (94), whether the offerer will 
find someone with whom to make a deal or, rather, whether the 
offer of an agreement will make a market. In addition, Appadurai 
argues, the logic of the derivative follows the logic of metonymy, 
where personhood is divided up into traits and potentials that can 
be combined and bundled up with other contiguous traits and 
potentials: “It is a logic of dividuation [he borrows this term from 
Gilles Deleuze], in which personhood rests not in the stable crys-
tallization of body, soul, intention, and affect in a single bodily 
envelope with a name [or, in Trollope’s sense, an inheritance], but 
in the highly volatile relationship between those substances (flesh, 
blood, vitality, energy, essence, and effluvia) that are always in the 
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process of interacting and recombining to produce temporary 
assemblages of sociality, identity, and affect” (112). In Appadurai’s 
view, because finance depends on contracts and is therefore lin-
guistically oriented, it necessarily erodes and transforms the mate-
rial conditions on which it rests.
Yet the contract works inside of liberalism’s assumption of 
abstract equality, where the negotiating partners are free to decide. 
Appadurai does not see how language’s abilities to divide things 
up and erode its original references through a series of partial 
replacements can be appropriated by power as a tool for produc-
ing inequalities by destroying and devaluing the value- producing 
means of others. In contrast to Piketty and to Appadurai, Franco 
“Bifo” Berardi has described capitalism as a series of steps of dis-
connection between the body and language/representation lead-
ing ultimately to “liquidating both the living body of the planet and 
the social body” (112): the European financial class no longer has 
an attachment to territory or its particular lived histories.14 This 
“dereferentialization” of capital is prefigured in experiments of 
Symbolist poetry to forget the referent, as a “semio- economy” 
of capital allows for symbols of value to generate value in other 
symbols rather than in things: “As symbolism experimented with 
the separation of the linguistic signifier from its denotational and 
referential function, so financial capitalism, after internalizing 
linguistic potencies, has separated the monetary signifier from its 
function of denotation and reference to physical goods” (Berardi 
19).15 In twentieth- century poetry, “Bifo” maintains, “signs pro-
duce signs without any longer passing through flesh” (17), just as, 
in Arrighi’s scheme, money seeks to make money without passing 
through physical substance, where its process of accumulation 
slows down.
At the core, Berardi sees “dereferentialization” as a form of 
“antiproduction” (destruction) where personal responsibility for 
capital’s effects are seemingly erased— in fact, where the symbols 
of value can destroy the territories from which they are abstracted 
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and removed. Through debt, Berardi is saying, capital destroys 
the correspondence between language and reality by destroy-
ing reality, setting signification free in its own fictions of value: 
“The accumulation of abstract value is made possible through the 
subjection of human beings to debt, and through predation on 
existing resources. The destruction of the real world starts from 
this emancipation of valorization from the production of use-
ful things. The emancipation of value from the referent leads to 
the destruction of the existing world” (104– 5). Debt has replaced 
production as the site of abstraction not because, as with pro-
duction, exchange value no longer relates to concrete needs but 
rather because debt destroys the world of real needs. In neoliberal 
Europe under austerity (and by extension, in the neoliberalized 
“Third World,” though that is not his focus), finance in Berar-
di’s view has been divorced from attachments to the territory of 
the living. Debt finally realizes what Theodor Adorno predicted 
of the artwork in a commodity culture, that its symbols are 
“opposed to the empirical world” (1), a “realized materialism [that] 
would at the same time be the abolition of materialism” (29), a 
“manifest annihilation of reality” (31).
WIZARD OF THE CROW
For Marx, “capital is dead labour, that, vampire- like, only lives by 
sucking living labour, and lives more, the more labour it sucks” 
(Capital 224). The production machine consists of the stored work-
ing time of past workers that feeds off the life breath of the living. 
Marx’s gothic descriptions of nineteenth- century industrialization 
pose a fundamental relation between the living and the dead. The 
worker transforms organic nature by using up the time of his or 
her working life in production, handing it over to the machine: 
“Living labour must seize upon these things and rouse them from 
their death- sleep, change them from mere possible use- values into 
real and effective ones” (178).
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Wizard of the Crow narrates a dismantling of this symbiosis 
between work and the machine. “Why does needy Africa,” asks 
one of its many narrators, “continue to let its wealth meet the needs 
of those outside its borders and then follow behind with hands out-
stretched for a loan of the very wealth it let go?” (681). Wizard dis-
plays the effects on language and culture of the financialization of 
the economy or the splitting off of productive investment (repro-
duction) from the aim of profit, where money has a life of its own 
away from the lives of things. By money, I mean a system of rep-
resenting value that, because it circulates through the production 
of things, has traditionally also been expressive of social antago-
nisms. When this form of money turns away from the production 
of things, Wizard shows, the social is expressed as negative value, or 
debt. Debt culture inhabits Wizard not only as content but also as a 
reflection of this crisis of representation in literary technique. In line 
with “Bifo” ’s insights, debt writing in Wizard severs representational 
values that circulate through living cultures, bodies, time, work-
ing institutions, and politics and replaces them with reified objects 
or empty, deathlike forms: institutional powerlessness, sovereign 
vacancy, temporal blockages, valueless money, deteriorating body 
parts replaced by dead and imported machines, waste, and other 
types of inorganicity, meaninglessness, and obsolescence. Within 
the novel’s debt culture, former producers are unemployed— called 
“daemons,” after the dead— gathering in lines extending in all direc-
tions from the “No Vacancy” sign outside the construction com-
pany, for miles and miles, without the authorities able to stop new 
arrivals or disperse the crowd. Wizard depicts the growing disparity 
and distancing between the profit machine and work, where debt’s 
profits do not accumulate in the lifetime or identity of the worker 
(contra Piketty). As “antiproduction,” finance means that capital 
is accumulating in one place while workers in another place are 
deprived of identity, of the wage (their share of productive income), 
and thereby of their participation in the construction of their sur-
rounding reality, meaningfulness, and conditions of life.
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This detachment of value production from the living under-
lies the temporal structure of Wizard of the Crow. If, as Mathias 
Nilges claims, the literary narrative is better at examining the 
temporality of finance than the instruments that finance has pro-
duced to understand its own operations, Wizard of the Crow is an 
exemplary novel for thinking about how temporality is managed 
in the financialized world. The commodity represented by C (com-
modity), Nilges observes, “which once mediated the process of 
monetary production and accumulation, has been removed from 
the equation” (32). With its tendencies to reduce the time of profit 
extraction (friction) to zero by bypassing the commodity, finance 
witnesses a “narratological crisis connected to a crisis of temporal 
epistemology: the future is increasingly drawn into the present” 
(33). Nilges is particularly concerned with finance’s ability to wipe 
out the utopian edge of the future by erasing the future’s radi-
calism under a nostalgia for the endless repetitions of the past’s 
futures, whereas Wizard also plays on foreclosures to the liberal, 
progressive future’s promises of equality. In liberal societies like 
ours, equality is mostly production’s progressive promise, or the 
promise that jobs or salaries will bring everyone who works hard 
enough to the same level at some point in the future. Reflecting 
the temporalities of a debt economy, the present in Wizard traps 
future life in the present’s repetitions, just as the Ruler locks his 
wife in a house where the clocks do not move and where the cal-
endars flip to the same date over and over, where everything— even 
the clothing— extends eternally the moment of her defiance. The 
promise is over.
Similarly, the plot itself does not follow a course of develop-
ment based in a model of accumulation such as in the bildungs-
roman, where the end follows from the beginning as accumulated 
experience feeds the character’s moral and intellectual maturation. 
Rather, in Wizard, the end of the story brackets the beginning, dis-
placing it to another point in the narrative that is uncertain and 
unmarked, making the productive line of story development all but 
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obsolete, circular, backward, and self- annihilating. (I have followed 
a similar course in this chapter, putting the later literary work first 
to limit possible readings of the former, so that the past is already 
constrained by its future.) The dominance of the end (placed at the 
beginning) destroys what comes before the end, covering it with 
a fantastic but ungrounded speculation of what must have hap-
pened to ensure this end. The novel opens as the Ruler contracts 
a sickness of which nobody knows the cause but many speculate.16 
Projected backward in retrospect, five different stories are told of 
the illness’s origins, and each of these simultaneous narrative lines 
ends up depositing concrete details in the subsequent unfolding 
of the plot, all five mixing haphazardly as though all were equally 
true, happening in five different potential time zones that never-
theless impossibly overlap.
With symptoms of body enlargement and lightness, the illness, 
we learn, may have resulted from the Ruler’s anger; the anger is 
caused because the Global Network News fails to interview him 
during his trip to New York, an event recounted some 460 pages 
later. Page 471 announces the cause of the Ruler’s neurosis that 
happens on page 1, whereas that neurosis, as well as serious phys-
ical ailments, is the effect of the future unknown, of uncertainty 
(the effect precedes the cause). In New York, the Ruler’s unrelent-
ingly inflating body— “further bodily expansion, lightness of the 
body, and bellyache” (652)— is examined by medical professionals. 
“The Ruler’s body, now more passive [and massive!] than ever, 
seemed impossibly light; only the ceiling prevented it from float-
ing away” (650). With national sovereignty literally up in the air,17 
the unemployed population at home consults the supernatural to 
deal with the overwhelming uncertainties of future time when the 
institutions are already all but defunct. The Ruler is ineffectual 
because of his hyperinflation: useless, ungrounded, unproductive 
accumulated matter. “But what to do about the Ruler’s unrelenting 
inflation?” the narrator asks of the fruitless yet unremitting activity 
of his doctors. “How to stop it, how to slow it down?”
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The Ruler’s illness turns out to be a pregnancy, where he gives 
birth to little Baby D: democracy. Yet this little democracy is not 
the rule of the people, as its nomenclature might suggest; rather, 
it is a financial plutocracy: “It is unnatural for money to give birth 
to money,” reflects the Wizard with irritation. “Banks alone know 
the secret of money producing money. They hide the secret in led-
ger books and computer screens” (660). Whereas pregnancy usu-
ally marks time, this pregnancy is about avoiding time by floating, 
unbound by things. The placement of the Ruler’s pregnancy in 
the United States implies that the profits from African things are 
floating away from their imputed origins, disassociated. As Berardi 
elaborates, “Financial signs have led to a parthenogenesis of value, 
creating money through money without the generative interven-
tion of physical matter and muscular work” (19). Meanwhile, the 
productive and reproductive capacities of Aburiria contained in 
the Ruler’s body are growing empty, with the emptiness named 
“Democracy”— Baby D. The Ruler no longer represents a territory 
but rather floats, pregnant with an uncertain democracy born out-
side of the nation, outside of political control, without citizens.
Wizard of the Crow is a novel about authoritarianism in a “Third 
World” nation even while the Ruler’s authority is treated as a joke.18 
The authoritarianism is the cover through which the financial 
project is managed. Yet underneath the Ruler’s ruse of authority 
to keep order as the Tower project is negotiated and planned, the 
social totality increasingly unravels in disorder. Instead of going to 
work, the citizens of Aburiria line up in front of offices in queues 
that go for miles in many directions; police are sent out to stop 
the rumors that jobs and cash are available19 that compel people 
to line up (jobs and cash are unavailable, so the lines are intermi-
nable), but the police do not return. An unemployed man’s soul 
flies over the city and lands in a garbage heap, and he is taken for 
dead; he ends up (as wizard) able to read minds, able to see the 
future in the present by holding the present up to a mirror. In 
the fourth book, the Global Bank ends the project of the Tower: 
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“After reviewing the entire project, the Global Bank did not see 
any economic benefits to Marching to Heaven. To argue that 
the project would create jobs, as the Aburirian government had 
claimed, was a case of outdated Keynesian economics” (485). Since 
the bank’s cancellation of the loan happens during the Ruler’s ill-
ness, and the illness is how the novel starts, the canceling of the 
loan can be said to precede the original promise of the advance. 
The end precedes the beginning; the future is consumed in the 
present; book 4 occurs before book 1, the beginning is treated as 
a listing of the past possibilities that the future demands, and the 
present has been sold off to a false promise. The shifting of the story 
line’s sequencing makes it difficult even to determine if Aburiria 
exists or has existed at all or if it came to be at the convenience 
of the loaning body, projecting back what must have happened 
(as the beginning is projecting back what must have happened to 
make the Ruler ill) as an afterimage or after its death. As a landed 
territory, Aburiria functions like the diamonds in The Eustace 
Diamonds— very much there, concrete and touchable inasmuch as 
it is in the process of disappearing as a physical object, made unreal 
by its financial representation.
What finance means for Wizard is a relinquishing of freedom, 
where instead of temporality opening up to the unpredictable, the 
accidental, and the undetermined, the future already captures and 
determines what might happen next or what happened last or even 
what happens now— the future happens first, closing down pos-
sibility. “He, the Ruler,” he wants his wife to believe, “had power, 
real power over everything including . . . yes . . . Time” (7). Instead 
of granting trust and confidence in the credibility of the world 
described in the nation of Aburiria, Wizard insists that objects can 
only be secured as real by future acts, as backward reflections of 
future time. Like the loan, the Ruler’s life is a temporal reversal 
where his birth origin is established only later by a parliamentary 
act that flows backward, as though he did not exist before the cel-
ebration in book 4:
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Now everybody in the country knew something or other about the 
Ruler’s birthday because, before it was firmly set in the national 
calendar, the date of his birth and the manner of its celebration 
had been the subject of a heated debate in Parliament that went 
on for seven months, seven days, seven hours, and seven minutes, 
and even then the honorable members could not arrive at a con-
sensus mainly because nobody knew for sure the actual date of 
the Ruler’s birth, and when they failed to break the impasse, the 
honorable members sent a formal delegation to the very seat of 
power to seek wise guidance, after which they passed a motion  
of gratitude to the Ruler for helping the chamber find a solution 
to a problem that had completely defeated their combined knowl-
edge and experience. (12)
As in the last chapter, the abstract categories of the law here are 
alienated from the objects to which they are to be applied. The 
supposedly sovereign, legislative body is without the means to rep-
resent to the public the national entity over which it legislates and 
also without the procedures to set up rules on which to base that 
communication. Trying to determine its concrete origin through 
an act of power many years later, legislative sovereign power is 
lost and useless in its comic attempts to bring temporality to heel 
in legislative code. The sentence is both too long and too short. It 
turns to comic precision for temporal specificity while insisting on 
the vagueness of distinguishing historical markers and dates. Even 
after Parliament adopts the conventions of decision- making and 
law- confirming deliberations, the beginning of the sentence con-
tradicts the end of the sentence: the subject “everybody” defined 
by knowing cannot logically lead into a predicate where knowledge 
is defeated: knowledge is defeated first. The passage is about the 
emptiness of symbolization even though historical and political 
currents are rallying for securing its certainty.20 Challenging sov-
ereignty and certainty, debt breaks apart the narrative conven-
tions and time that the political regime shares with its citizens 
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even while the Ruler’s body is increasingly distorted and unmoored 
through its contaminations, travels, and distresses.
Critics have remarked on the experimental temporalities of 
Wizard. Simon Gikandi, for example, talks about the novel as “a 
place where time itself is forced to stop” (98), while Ian Mac-
donald foregrounds its “destabilizing [of] the linear aggregation 
of Western time” (59). Generally, the temporal disjunctures are 
read as significant for incorporating the “local folklore and the 
rhythms of traditional orature” (57), as Macdonald offers, or, as 
Robert Colson interprets it, the temporal play points to a “future 
of the nation, a future beyond authoritarian rule” (134), where 
spoken stories and rumors from multiple narrators weaken the 
authoritarian grip.21 Such analysis has followed Ngugi’s own 
framing of global culture as caught in a conflict between oral-
ity and writing, with orality as the site where “different forms 
of being change into each other” (Globalectics 76), composed of 
a mixture between nature and nurture, environmental, human, 
mythological, and linguistic interchange. The future of the 
nation in this case, however, rather than leading beyond author-
itarian rule, is trapped by always having to pay back its past. The 
Ruler is replaced by another ruler just like him and then dies, 
and the story, we assume, repeats— the Global Bank again offers 
a loan.22
Less critical attention has been paid to the story of debt and 
its relation to time and representation. Yet the novel undoubtedly 
lends itself to debt’s temporality. “Debt is actually future time” (84), 
says Berardi— the securing of the future’s unknowable enigma with 
a measurement and a calculation where “you take my (future) time” 
(84) and therefore “the future is no longer conceived as promise, 
but as threat” (108). Wizard takes the classic form of the realist 
novel, with the story advancing in stages across a vast social tab-
leau that connects numerous characters across geographical space. 
Noting nineteenth- century realism’s “shift from the diachronic 
to the synchronic” (Antinomies 222), Jameson has attributed to 
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realism a new sense of time that substitutes its linear progressivity 
with a simultaneity (Middlemarch is the main reference point here), 
where the future is made coterminous with the present (even, as 
Jameson remarks, if the occurrences of the same moment in differ-
ent locations do not always adequately correspond), and certainly 
Ngugi inherits this tradition. The event of the People’s Assembly, 
for example, is cut between the Aburirian capital and a foreign 
hotel in the United States, where the Ruler is watching the cele-
bration on TV with his foreign doctors, ministers, and ambassa-
dors while recovering from his illness, losing control of his body, 
his country, and his narrative at the same time even while at a 
distance. The Ruler’s illness is happening before the beginning of 
the novel and across the sea, where the national opposition to the 
crisis of the Tower is being shown as news on TV. The Ruler knows 
himself and his country only as a virtual image captured and medi-
ated by and for the West.
Whereas Jameson attributes realism’s synchronicity to the “cash 
nexus” indicating “the synchronic role of money in the role of these 
individual destinies” (Antinomies 223), Wizard links it to a crisis in 
commodity culture as it comes to inhabit the body of the unpro-
ductive and the unemployed. In Marx, the profit of the commodity 
is measured in the productive time units of the working body over 
the time units needed to reproduce the worker— the commodity 
absorbs and alienates the time of the worker’s life. In Wizard, the 
lifetime of the organic body appears simultaneously as machine 
death: body parts are replaced with European surrogate technolo-
gies and machines, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Machokali, 
flying to Europe to have his eyes surgically enlarged; the Minister 
of State, Sikiokuu, having his ears enlarged; and the Minister of 
Information, Mambo, having his lips and tongue enlarged. “I tell 
you,” says a surgeon charged with treating a linguistic ailment, “it 
is not just one or two on whom I have operated and removed bits 
of iron buried deep in their bellies or their joints— their knees, for 
instance” (624). The body is here made of broken, dysfunctional, 
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fragmented machine parts bought from the West, or deadened 
future time.
Though Marx theorized alienation in the context of commodity 
production, Wizard treats alienation as devoid of production and 
so also devoid of working or productive language. Just as in The 
Eustace Diamonds, the available classifications of property in legal 
language are out of sync with the type of property represented in 
the diamonds, Kamiti the Wizard cannot recognize the storyteller 
A. G.’s version of his own life story as he himself wrote it. A. G. 
is a former police officer who left policing because he was told 
to read an omen in a car accident and became a wandering sto-
ryteller who repeats the story of the Wizard before audiences in 
bars.23 Aloud, Kamiti challenges the storyteller, but the storyteller 
does not recognize him, and the bar- goers are immersed in the 
storyteller’s performance of Kamiti’s story, thinking Kamiti is but 
a drunk: “He [Kamiti] felt like a writer whose work had been lifted 
by another only to skew its form and content” (594). As with the 
Ruler watching his own country on the TV news of a distant coun-
try, this detachment is no longer the “cash nexus” as much as the 
worker’s life being taken from him by the machine of dead capital.
Antiproduction thus introduces a crisis in representation. As 
with work in Marx’s descriptions, language loses its ability to 
bring worlds into existence or transform nature. This may explain 
Wizard’s frequent recurrence of language- objects that cannot be 
exchanged or made to signify. The chairman of the Marching to 
Heaven project and CEO of Eldares Modern Construction and 
Real Estate, Tajirika, for example— a businessman who in the end 
becomes defense minister and then the new ruler by having the 
other one killed— suffers from a rare but contagious linguistic 
disease where he can only say the words “If” and “If only”24 over 
and over. This disease is eventually diagnosed to be caused by the 
stinking money bills he collects from the unemployed as bribery. 
Similarly, money can only exist in its concrete materiality, as an 
object rather than an abstract representation, signifier, or universal 
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value against which all other objects can be compared. It is horded 
rather than traded; it has solid weight, is subject to gravity, and 
gets in the way as an encumbrance and an obstruction, like an old, 
out- of- place piece of machinery. Money bags shift hands, causing 
mishaps; money is buried in the earth; money stinks unquench-
ably; cash grows on trees and is harvested; an unlimited abundance 
of bills is meant to be dropped from a helicopter to confuse and 
distract the protesting crowds as well as fake fiscal largesse, but the 
helicopter burns and the bills were counterfeit anyway, burning 
and blowing away as ash.25 If, as Marx says, money is a univer-
sal equivalent that measures and abstracts units of time spent by 
workers in production, here money is a technical mishap or out- of- 
place annoyance, inaccessible to desire or exchange, blowing away 
as ashes in the wind.
Piketty tells us that the growing ratio between accumulated 
dead capital in productive machines, on the one hand, and living 
labor’s share (wages, reproduction) on the other is what reproduces 
inequality on a global level. In Wizard, this disproportion appears 
as a detachment, shown to be destructive to the worlds of living 
labor, a dissipation of their material worlds— finance’s disinvest-
ments in the reproductive capacities of productive workers. Wizard 
foregrounds the gothic comedy of dead labor in debt culture not 
as surplus or fixed capital but rather as productive obsolescence. 
Yet it also shows not only capital in flight but also new imagina-
tions taking hold in its absence: the Wizard and the Voice of the 
People suggest a future of unleashed creativity in a dance that, 
like Lizzie Eustace, temporarily falls outside of power’s controls. 
The women, defiant dancers and disruptive of the national rituals 
meant to commemorate foreign investments and local rule, are 
unidentifiable and unapprehended by the Ruler’s many spies and 
officers of repression; the Wizard— able to change shape, form, 
and gender— displays, in his mirror, glimpses of images and nar-
ratives read on the fringes of reality, dreams of cracks in power’s 
seemingly stable realities. Berardi, on the other hand, understands 
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financial abstraction as the “ ‘No future’ culture” (51) and dead lan-
guage of capitalist nihilism, “liquidating the living body of the 
planet and the social body of the workers’ community” (52) by turn-
ing away from physical attachments (“No Vacancy” announces that 
the working body is no longer welcome here). Whereas power and 
property are reinstated in The Eustace Diamonds almost as though 
they were never challenged, Wizard’s warning is that the promise 
in the mirror will float up, away, and elsewhere or rot and that 
the dancers will surrender under repression, leaving behind empty 
boxes, valueless currencies, dead landscapes, and vacancies: pro-
ductive potential with nowhere to go.
THE ROAD
The world of dead capital in Wizard marks a transition from post-
colonial critique. Instead of developing a rational critique of the 
postcolonial state, Wizard declares the comical emptiness of its sov-
ereign claims in the face of even more comical financialization and 
debt. The state in Wizard is not only inefficient, perverse, corrupt, 
cruel, vain, and nonsensical but also a floating figure, devoid of sub-
stance and unable to belong to, represent, or act effectually inside of 
a particular territory, culture, nation, or population. Dead capital has 
become so momentous that it overpowers the representational value 
of democratic sovereignty, dismantling its function of redistributing 
some of the surplus toward producers and the reproduction of life. In 
fact, dead capital is so disproportional that it makes the life and needs 
of producers insignificant, out of sight, vaporized, and inexpressible.
Ngugi’s depiction of debt’s challenge to democratic governance 
both borrows from and surpasses a critique of the postcolonial 
state. Postcolonial critique is still concerned with understanding 
the agency available to individuals in the face of imperialist cultures 
to make demands on their representative states, whereas Wizard 
witnesses an incommunicability, where the state is unanswerable 
to local cultures because its role in motivating and reproducing 
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laborers has been eclipsed by its role in managing the machinery 
of indebtedness at the expense of laborers. Marking this transi-
tion, Wole Soyinka’s The Road, I argue, is a play still concerned with 
workers and their reproduction. The play is critical of the postco-
lonial state for its failure to deliver on the road to prosperity, and 
at the same time, it presents the coming- apart of old paradigms 
of progress through work and gives a sense of their replacement 
by a metaphysics of indebtedness, or sacrifice to the gods. Just as 
Wizard recognizes the distance between the Ruler and the territory 
he is meant to rule, The Road recognizes, as Phillips observes, “the 
gods’ incompletion and loneliness without humans” (150), a lone-
liness to be met with a project “to build a road between gods and 
humans” (150). The invitation to communicate becomes a sacrificial 
debt, a terrifying obligation. Soyinka’s plot of debt to development 
contrasts with Ngugi’s version of neoliberal debt as nonprogressive 
time invested in building a Tower of Babel even though no such 
communication can be established or even imagined. I argue that 
the framing of Soyinka’s critique of the postcolonial state points 
toward the beginning of a global unraveling of the conditions that 
make possible the reproduction of work in modernity, an unraveling 
that sits at the center of Ngugi’s debt narrative. In today’s regimes of 
austerity, where the role of the state in development has been chal-
lenged by policies of deregulation and public- sector dismantling 
demanded by global loaning institutions, worker reproduction has 
little interest for capital, and the commute, threatening as a horror 
film or absurd like a comedy, appears as the site of its collapse.
Wole Soyinka’s The Road can be considered within a shift in 
the tendencies of Soyinka’s oeuvre: this change becomes particu-
larly pronounced during the Nigerian Civil War (also known as the 
Biafran War, 1967– 70) and Soyinka’s consequent incarceration,26 
but already in The Road, Soyinka surrenders the guarded opti-
mism about decolonization evident in his earlier plays to a skep-
ticism about the postcolonial moment.27 Unlike some of his later 
and better- known plays, The Road is not a cross section of village 
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life as it intersects directly with colonial or modern culture, for-
eign impositions, or systems of domination; it also does not pose 
an African spiritual unity against the compartmentalism demanded 
by Western technology and rationality, as Geoffrey Hunt alleges is 
characteristic of Soyinka’s “nostalgia for the security of traditional 
values” (71) as a “response to the loss of a well- ordered universe” 
(70) before neocolonialism.28 The mythological, ritualistic universe 
of the African gods is, in The Road, anything but a sweet ordering 
that suggests a longing for a disappearing past; rather, at the crux 
between local and global culture, as well as between traditionalism 
and modernity’s accelerations, it is replete with constant mechan-
ical accidents that cause disorder and rupture at every turn. The 
Road is an urban play that takes place at a traffic intersection where 
modern technology and local mythological figures quite literally 
dance around each other.
I argue here that The Road is a play about debt. It is, more or less, 
a rewriting of Christopher Marlowe’s The Tragical History of the Life 
and Death of Doctor Faustus (c. 1592– 93) through Samuel Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot (c. 1953) in the context of Africa. It thereby unites 
the metaphysics of Marlowe’s devilish contract with Vladimir and 
Estragon’s anticipation of death’s arrival in a bleak and miserable 
deindustrializing landscape. It takes place in two acts, each one 
anticipating work to begin again while expecting an arrival that 
will change everything through redemption. Entering in Victorian 
tails and top hat, the Professor, like Lucky in Godot with a chair 
and bundles on his back, announces, like Pozzo, the dawn and the 
passage of time. The long- awaited visitor, the speechless mask of 
death (or false head in Faustus),29 finally does arrive, only to create 
even more celebration, drumbeats, and mayhem by introducing 
the “power . . . [of] the knowledge of death” (228). Just as Mephis-
topheles collects Lucifer’s debt, the Professor collects the debt 
to the road.30 While Faustus presents Faustus’s death as a repay-
ment to the gods for his enjoyment of a life on credit— “I writ 
them a bill with mine own blood,” admits Faustus. “The date is 
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expired; this time is the time, and he will fetch me” (Marlowe 55)— 
The Road ends with an insistence that one owes one’s life to the 
road: “Breathe like the road, be even like the road itself” (229), says 
the Professor before the mask of death, Ogun, spirals and spasms 
wildly, possessed, over the Professor’s bleeding corpse.31
The plotline of owing a debt to the devil has a varied history, 
and of course Soyinka is not the first writer to weave it through an 
economic narrative and a political critique. In his conclusion to 
The Consumer Society, Jean Baudrillard treats the devil’s debt as 
central to understanding the social alienation induced in mod-
ern commodity culture. For Baudrillard, the Faustus story imag-
ines the subject or soul who has lost his image “hounded to his 
death by it in real life” (189). In the modern experience of alien-
ation, the image “takes its revenge” (189): it “haunts us” (189) just 
as “social labour power, which, once sold, returns, through the 
whole social cycle of the commodity, to dispossess us of the mean-
ing of labour itself” (190). The modern devil reflects us back to our-
selves antagonistically as the social need that constantly troubles. 
Haunted and pursued by the image that we have sold of ourselves, 
we are absorbed in the signs of an impossible Affluence, the prom-
ise of progress. Written a bit earlier, Soyinka’s road is strewn with 
the ruins of Affluence’s promised construction.
I read The Road as constructing the preliminary contours of a 
“Third World” literature of global debt, of an understanding of the 
world in debt’s terms where the reproductive end of the produc-
tive cycle has fallen outside of capital’s purview and concern. Yet 
the criticism on Soyinka has not been particularly concerned with 
how his work sits at the crux of a new phase of global capitalism 
or how he recognizes the fallout of productive disinvestment and 
the failing redistributive, reproductive, and infrastructure policies 
of the postcolonial state.
Much of the criticism on Soyinka instead debates whether he 
is “authentically” African on the one hand or, on the other, echo-
ing imperialist sensibilities. This debate dovetails with a debate 
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about whether Soyinka’s treatment of the gods is a glorification 
of a precolonial or premodern past to answer present problems or 
whether it is a projection of a more equitable future, a future of 
renewal. Geoffrey Hunt is most vituperative in his dismissal: “Soy-
inka’s readership is largely a dispirited foreign bourgeoisie either 
seeking the exotic or displaying guilt feelings for colonialism and 
racism. The irony that Soyinka’s readership is precisely his tar-
get of attack is merely the reflection of the greater irony that his 
class is dependent economically on the foreign bourgeoisie which 
nationalism demands that it rebels against” (74). Some of this con-
troversy arises out of Soyinka’s response to the Négritude move-
ment initiated by Léopold Sédar Senghor in Senegal in the 1930s. 
Rejecting any diagnosis of African inferiority, the project of Négri-
tude was to create a unity of African culture based in emotion and 
sensibility that would contrast with European reason though not 
be subordinated to it. Though Soyinka was at first partial to Négri-
tude, he soon changed his mind, famously quipping, “A tiger does 
not proclaim his tigritude, he pounces” (as cited in Feuser 557). Yet 
even with his rejection of Négritude, Soyinka has himself declared 
that “the artist labors from an inbuilt, intuitive responsibility not 
only to himself, but to his roots” (“Writer” 353) and that the “artist 
has always functioned in African society as the recorder of mores 
and experience of his society and as the voice of vision in his own 
time” (356). Indeed, Soyinka was at the forefront of bringing Afri-
can literatures into the curricula of African universities along with 
revitalizing African religions in the face of Christian and Muslim 
dominance. Soyinka also very clearly insists that the construction 
of Africanness can be wielded against power: “When ideological 
relations begin to deny, both theoretically and in action, the real-
ity of a cultural entity which we define as the African world while 
asserting theirs even to the extent of inviting the African world to 
sublimate its existence in theirs, we must begin to look seriously 
into their political motivation” (Myth xi). The problem for the crit-
icism, especially that which takes Négritude as its guidepost, might 
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be in trying to define “Africa” singularly and essentially and so not 
to recognize that Soyinka is interpreting the sign “Africa” as some-
thing, temporally charged, to be struggled over.
Other critics have understood Soyinka’s focus on African iden-
tity as progressive rather than regressive, oriented toward teas-
ing out mythological elements in African cultures that may offer 
political alternatives. Critics such as Odun Balogun read Soyinka 
as turning away from the regressiveness of a nationalism based in 
race, as he saw in Négritude, and embracing in its stead a vision 
of socialism specific to the context (207). Willfried F. Feuser con-
tests that “there is early evidence . . . of his grappling with a value 
system in which the main criterion is Africanness” (563), and he 
shows the closeness of Soyinka’s cultural references to the cul-
tural, artistic, linguistic, religious, and sociopolitical trajectories 
of the Yoruba. Whereas Hunt understands Soyinka’s romanticism 
as a response to his “class alliance, class- ambivalence and severe 
cultural dislocation” (65) due to the uncertain allegiances of his 
compromised middle- class position, Biodun Jeyifro reads the 
metaphysical violence of Soyinka’s plays as eruptions of “an unde-
clared, ‘hidden’ class warfare, the more bitter because it is uncon-
scious and implosive” (13). The class conflict, he proposes, is due 
to a rapid urbanization devoid of an accompanying acceleration in 
industrialization, leading to the rise of a population left behind by 
development— an “ ‘uprooted’ ‘reserve army of labour’ ” (14)— that 
The Road showcases.
Indeed, The Road can be said to take place in the wreckage of 
industrialization. Whereas Wizard saturates its settings in rot, pol-
lution, and waste, the set of The Road is awash in the broken refuse 
of past production, in the “rubble of worn tyres, hubs, twisted 
bumpers etc.” (152). In fact, not only the debris but also the drivers 
themselves are remainders of production’s past. Though some of 
the critics mentioned above attribute inauthenticity to Soyinka’s 
work in that he stages village life, pantheism, and superstition as 
proving the regressive character of African culture, industrialism 
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is here what really parades as the outmoded and irrecoverable 
recent past. Not only the props but also the stage characters them-
selves are relics remaining in the dustbin of history, the refuse of 
progress at the crossroads of globalization. In Nigeria, “touts,” 
explains Enoch Okpara, “can be defined as free- lance workers at 
railway stations, airports, ferry points, and especially motor- parks, 
who undertake the self- imposed responsibility of recruiting and 
organizing passengers who wish to travel by road, and for this work 
they receive a fee, or more appropriately, a ‘commission’, that is 
generally paid by the drivers of the vehicles just before their depar-
ture. All the owners are private entrepreneurs, who both compete 
and collaborate with one another to provide road transport for the 
public” (327). Okpara goes on to talk about the rise in this form of 
labor as resulting from a lack of investment in public transporta-
tion and a privatization, deunionization, and deregulation of such 
services (329). The popularity of such employment is the result of 
the “non- existent opportunities of employment in manufacturing” 
(331). The Road is a satire taking place on the wreckage of “Third 
World” industrial capitalism. Living at the usually unremarkable 
side of the collapsing road of development, its characters are the 
precursors of what will become neoliberalism’s dispossessed.
Indeed, the gods serve not as a sign of cultural regression but 
rather as the spirit of the dying machine. The Road is a reenactment 
of an African death ritual over the corpse of Western technology. 
The play starts in a roadside shack, under the sign “AKSIDENT 
STORE— ALL PART AVAILEBUL” (151) and next to a church with a 
graveyard. It is six o’clock in the morning, and the touts are waking 
up, talking about work. There is an everydayness here, suggesting 
that the process of waking up for work is cyclical, daily, ceremonial, 
even sacred. Though the direct reference to restarting the day is 
clearly to the endless return to the work that awaits the drivers— 
“Every self- respecting tout is already in the motor park badgering 
passengers,” says Samson, one of the touts (153)— the tempo-
ral cyclicality is also ritualized through biblical citations, elegiac 
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proverbs, Yoruba incantations, imitations of church oratory, mys-
tical allusions, and call- and- response rhythms. Such ritualistic 
language and the modern language of transport, work, and profit 
intertwine: “If I go chop the life so tey God so jealous me, And if he 
take jealousy kill me I will go start bus service between heaven and 
hell,” says Samson, and his companion Salubi rejoins, “Sometimes 
na aeroplane or helicopter den go take travel for Paradise” (155). As 
spirit- characters of technological progress at an impasse, the gods 
get power in their proximity to the wreckage.
The inequality between the dead machines and the drivers is 
overwhelming, made visible on stage by the machine destruction 
mounting up in piles in the shop. In line with Piketty, the demise 
of industrialization is the physical sign of social polarization and 
inequality in The Road. The industrial ruins physically take over the 
stage. The roadside shack is the collection point for the junk left 
behind by those who die on the road, never getting to work. The 
play’s action weaves between the broken and abandoned parts that 
had once crushed travelers: “As his grumbling gets in stride,” read the 
stage directions for his defecation, “Kotonu returns with an armful of 
motor parts, an old shoe, a cap etc. Goes into the mammy- waggon stall 
through hidden entrance upstage. He can be heard occasionally but he 
tries to move silently. Occasionally he lifts up the top- half tarpaulin 
covering and pushes out an object” (165). Kotonu shits out broken 
technologies, as though his body is made of parts. The question for 
the drivers is not if they will be killed but what kind of machine will 
run them down and sell their parts: “If you gonna be killed by a car, 
you don’t wanna be killed by a Volkswagen. You wanra Limousine, 
a Ponriac or something like that” (172). The gods’ celebratory dance 
of death, their profiting from offerings and sacrifice, depends on 
modernity’s technological mishaps. Productive machines— like the 
gods— demand the life of the worker in exchange for the promise 
of an affluent future in the gods’ benevolence.
The Road thus recognizes, within the symbolic context of Afri-
can religion, a population that is coming to be at the ultimate end 
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of a beleaguered modernity. It spiritualizes the afterlife of a set of 
working conditions connected to the manufacturing class; it spir-
itualizes debt. While the death dirge mounts over the ruins of a 
prior industrial age, the touts are the dead space of industrial labor. 
“How can anyone buy a uniform when he hasn’t got a job?” asks 
Samson, and Salubi responds, “Go mind your own business you 
jobless tout” (152). Work licenses are negotiated as debt, even when 
forged. “Do you think not enough people die here that you must 
come and threaten me with death?” Professor asks Salubi, who 
beseeches him for a license. “You spurious spew. You instrument of 
mortgage. You unlicensed appendage of the steering wheel” (184). 
The touts go into debt to the Professor to pay for the right to work: 
“So the dead are now your bank managers?” (182) asks Professor 
when he learns that Samson has promised to pay the fees for his 
counterfeit license from the money buried in the churchyard.
Not only does the Professor control the issuance of work per-
mits, albeit forged ones. Also, the Professor enters the stage bear-
ing the road sign “BEND,” with which he can alter the physical 
territory, the terrain of production and reproduction. By plucking 
the word out of the earth, the Professor can change what travelers 
see when they come around the curve, causing them to lose their 
way or change course, just as the erection of the Tower of Babel 
changes the terrain of Paradise in Wizard. “I have a new wonder 
to show you,” boasts the Professor, “a madness where a motor- car 
throws itself against a tree— Gbram! And showers of crystal flying 
on broken souls . . . They died, all three of them, crucified on rigid 
branches” (158). Here, the sign has the power to induce the sacrifice 
to the gods by causing the mechanical failures and also by simul-
taneously changing the touts’ certain knowledge of the objective 
world where workers lives are reproduced. The sacrificial bodies 
of former commuters are turned into corrupted, nonproductive 
machines and dead communication, or dead labor for exchange. 
Progress morbidly sucks out their lives.
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The Road expresses an awareness that national production is 
unable to fuel the forward movement of progress: indebted to the 
future through progress, the postcolonial state came upon a curve 
on the road to progress and crashed, surrendering its remains to 
thieves and thugs. Instead of taking up solely a political critique 
or allegory, The Road submits that the power of antiproduction 
is mythological— that is, unidentifiable within human scale, 
unreachable, overwhelming, sublime. The sacredness of the word 
demands a permanent dispossession. By removing the sign, the 
Professor also usurps the drivers’ ability to confer meaning on 
the future through participating in the building up of the social and 
semiotic world in production.
The Road previews what will become a culture devoted to debt, 
where the road to production has come to an end, buried in its 
own wreckage. It provides a critique of the postcolonial state that 
is prescient— in fact, a critique of the postcolonial state that offers 
an intimation that it is nudging toward the throes of neoliberal 
antiproduction. The sign “BEND” abolishes reality by opposing the 
material world. The material world, in fact, has become irrelevant 
to the sign’s circulation, unequal to it, something else.32 As Berardi 
elaborates, “Capitalism is no longer able to semiotize and to organize 
the social potency of cognitive productivity, because value can no 
longer be defined in terms of the average necessary time of labor, 
and therefore the old forms of private property and salary are no lon-
ger able to semiotize and organize the deterritorialized existence of 
capital and social labor” (74). The Road interprets the new life of the 
sign as metaphysical, conferred by the call of the dead, telling a story 
of play, pleasure, and jest in the nonconforming merriment of the 
African gods. Wizard of the Crow, meanwhile, critiques the distanc-
ing of semiotic and productive power and accumulation as political. 
The gods have been replaced by the distant bankers, financiers, and 
power elite who strip the unemployed of their infrastructure the way 
the Professor commands that the drivers strip the dead for his profit.
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CONCLUSION
Zygmunt Bauman locates a new type of human waste in refugee 
and immigrant camps in Europe and racialized inner- city ghettos 
in the United States, the “dumping ground [for those for whom] 
the surrounding society has no economic or political use” (81) and 
are abandoned to “the nowhere- land of non- humanity” (80). The 
unemployed here are, as Bauman says, warnings about the unrav-
eling of the institutional power through which citizens in a democ-
racy have historically demanded redress and recognition. They are 
the present manifestations of a future exposed to economic global-
ization but devoid of political globalization, an eventuality where 
multinational financial power can force us, without protections, 
to sell future savings and accumulation to pay for others’ pres-
ent enrichment and empowerment. Like the indebted, Bauman’s 
immigrants, because they are stateless, are outside of the scope of 
effective institutional action, as state institutions are beyond the 
reach of their demands and outside of the touch of their suffering.
In fact, neoliberal debt ensures that the state is unreactive to 
citizens’ demands because it requires the state to sell off its means 
of command, its means of redistributing national income as well 
as its means of building productivities— its infrastructure— to dis-
tant and disinterested investors and stakeholders. The indebted 
compel an awareness of the sinister outcome of infrastructural 
collapse. As Ivan Ascher inquires, “What should we make of the 
fact that even our promises are now being made only to be ‘sold’ or 
otherwise exchanged, as if the mere buying and selling of financial 
assets were sufficient to turn an uncertain future into a source of 
security in the present?” (14). For Ascher as for Ngugi, debt is in the 
process of replacing the commodity. Because it is replacing the com-
modity, debt is also replacing and even destroying the commodi-
ty’s apparatus: the mechanisms of social reproduction at the state, 
technical, ideological, and institutional levels. Therefore, the kinds 
of infrastructural divestment that Bauman identifies as leading to 
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mass population upheavals, immigrant crises, and zones of precar-
ious, volatile, and unregulated employment (when employment 
exists) have become sources of profit: places where destructive 
liens on the infrastructure can be cut up and recombined to be 
sold as securities and bonds, as in Puerto Rico.
In the wake of the 2017 hurricanes Irma and Maria, which hit 
Puerto Rico directly, the status of Puerto Rico and its debt is up 
in the air. Both the federal and local governments have had inef-
fectual responses because the island has run out of money to pay 
for repairs and reconstruction after the massive devastation, par-
ticularly to its energy infrastructure. Six weeks after the hurricane 
hit, a large majority of the island still lacked electricity; roads were 
impassible; and the island’s schools reopened with only 9 percent 
of the students returning. As a result, Puerto Rico was turned 
into a police state. Four months later, more than half of Puerto 
Ricans were still without electricity, celebrating Christmas in the 
dark, and estimations were that energy would not be completely 
restored for another five months (another power outage occurred 
in April 2018 due to a downed transmission line, causing a total 
blackout and putting recovery efforts behind once again). Eleven 
months after the storm, in August 2018, energy company PREPA 
finally announced that all its power grids were restored, even as 
critics have noted they are still vulnerable to future storms, which 
are likely. After Irma and Maria, 167 schools were closed, while 
nine months later, plans were put in place to close 265 more. 
The Jones Act was temporarily suspended for ten days and then 
re instated, while trucks were not able to distribute goods because 
of inoperable roads. A quarter of a million people lost their homes. 
Even though the government reported officially only sixty- four 
deaths (allowing President Trump to boast about how his own 
administration’s recovery efforts excelled over the Obama admin-
istration’s), Arelis R. Hernández and Laurie McGinley reported in 
the Washington Post that 4,645 died as a result of Hurricane Maria 
(within a small margin of error). According to a study done by 
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Harvard University and the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center 
(Kishore et al.) to which they refer, 14.3 deaths occurred for every 
1,000 residents through December 31, 2017 (70 percent above the 
official number; after that time, the data became unavailable to 
the researchers), with $90 billion in damages (the second costliest 
storm in US history). The deaths were attributed to lack of access 
to medical services, slow recovery, telecommunications failures, 
lack of water and essential services, unsafe and unhealthy condi-
tions, and an incapacitated power grid. Many left the island.
The federal response and recovery efforts did not considerably 
improve Puerto Rico’s ability to maintain the distribution of basic 
needs: water, energy, food, transportation, housing, health care, 
education, and medications. At first, PREPA signed a $300 million 
contract with a small Montana firm, Whitefish Energy, that had 
only two employees. Whitefish was the only company bidding for 
the contract that did not demand payment upfront, as other com-
panies presumably would not trust Puerto Rico’s ability to meet 
the increase in debt obligation. The contract had to be canceled by 
the governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló, because of corrup-
tion in the contract bidding (but the canceled contract still had to 
be paid for, as FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] 
refused to cover the costs).33 The CEO of PREPA, Ricardo Ramos, 
canceled numerous congressional appearances. FEMA denied 
responsibility even though the contract explicitly says that FEMA 
is responsible.34 An emergency manager appointed by PROMESA’s 
board to oversee any further contracts then resigned on Novem-
ber 10. Even after the Army Corps of Engineers and other con-
tractors reached the island, supplies and equipment for the repairs 
were slow in arriving, with fifty thousand power poles still needing 
to be replaced four months in. One year after the storm, a ware-
house was found stacked with bottled water, which never made it 
to the storm’s victims.
In January 2018, armed federal agents from FEMA and the US 
Army Corps of Engineers stormed a PREPA warehouse to retrieve 
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equipment essential for Puerto Rican recovery and the restoration 
of power. Kate Aronoff of The Intercept reported that the workers 
brought in from the mainland were finding it virtually impossible 
to do the necessary work because of the lack of equipment. Aronoff 
attributed PREPA’s mismanagement to deregulation, which, under 
the guise of cost savings, was actually causing the reduction of tax 
revenues by encouraging Puerto Ricans to leave the island, fed up 
with the outage. Though the Puerto Rico Energy Commission had 
started to pass some reforms between 2013 and 2016— including 
some that moved the island toward renewable energy, allowed for 
the development of microgrids at the local level, controlled rates 
with an eye to affordability, and established the Independent Office 
for Consumer Protection— the new governor appointments under 
the Fiscal Oversight Board believe that structural adjustment is 
necessary for Puerto Rico to solve “the crisis” and propose con-
solidation of five of the regulatory agencies (including energy) to 
keep down public expenses, even though the Energy Commission 
had been totally funded by ratepayers (Aronoff, “Armed Federal 
Agents”). This move will result in the rollback of the Energy Com-
mission’s regulatory framework.
The press coverage is divided on the status of the debt in the 
wake of the hurricane and recovery. The owners of the debt are 
growing worried, as the government will soon be out of money. 
Noting that none of Puerto Rico’s creditors offered anything but 
thoughts and prayers to assist in recovery, Aronoff raises the possi-
bility that the PROMESA board could block collection on the debt 
obligations, either by repackaging the remaining debt and holding 
onto it until the economy gets back on track or through a federal 
bailout. On the flip side, the creditors could manage to overturn 
PROMESA’s board and the bankruptcy process, giving creditors the 
go- ahead to extract repayments before Puerto Rico’s infrastructure 
and production have been restored (Aronoff, “Puerto Rico”).
Yet as Elizabeth Yeampierre and Naomi Klein also point out 
in The Intercept, hurricane aid, given to Florida and Texas in the 
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form of grants, was given to Puerto Rico as a House- approved relief 
package in the form of $5 billion in loans. Though $81 billion was 
pledged by Congress for hurricane recovery relief, that amount 
was shared with affected zones in Texas and Florida as well as with 
areas in California hit by wildfires. The governor of Puerto Rico 
said that $90 billion were needed for Puerto Rico alone. Mean-
while, President Trump’s signature tax bill will deepen Puerto 
Rico’s burden by increasing taxes on goods manufactured on the 
island and going to the US mainland, even as businesses are leav-
ing due to the difficulties of operating without electricity, reducing 
treasury collections further. The federal government is initiating 
policies that will thrust Puerto Rico deeper into debt while still 
angering the creditors. Puerto Ricans are left in the care of a weak-
ened managerial control board with fewer resources to fend off the 
debt collectors.35 It is highly likely that Puerto Rico’s infrastructure 
will be mortgaged further.
The case of Puerto Rico demonstrates that the metaphor of 
progress that Soyinka invokes through the road is no longer oper-
able. The idea of even semiemployed, temporary contractors 
who can turn the refused surplus or waste of old production into 
amassed capital for producing augmented future profit is defunct. 
Soyinka foresaw the morbid degradation of industrial infrastruc-
ture in Nigeria and the dance of death that ensued, but he saw 
this as a continuous process reproducing inequality as a constant, 
caused by postcolonial corruption: the workday was still an end-
less repetition, returning like a ritual. Soyinka treated debt as a 
metaphysics, a compromise that linked the local gods with tech-
nological progress, rather than as the death of production alto-
gether, the emancipation of value from the things that sustained it, 
and the worldly destruction that follows. Soyinka did not foresee 
what Ngugi observed: that the pathway to progress was mortgaged 
out as a false promise before it ever came to be. Ngugi understands 
debt as a governing force that imposes inequality, unemployment, 
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and unproductivity as a mechanism of financial extraction at the 
origin point of “Third World” identities.
The shift in thinking about debt in the “Third World” from Soy-
inka to Ngugi supplements a divide in their thinking about literary 
representation. In the previous chapter, I showed how Trollope 
used Lizzie’s diamonds as an object lesson in finance: the diamond 
necklace was an object that, despite its anticipated solidity as rock, 
did not consistently remain solid or substantial and could not be 
identified in relation to an extension of a particular space, law, 
or placement. As such, the existing categories of value, property, 
and ownership could not apply to the necklace, despite attempts 
by lawyers, nobility, jewelers, robbers, and various stakeholders 
to clarify their essential character. The meaning of the diamonds 
within the financial system that they were supposed to bring into 
view and comprehension was dependent on the diamonds also 
appearing within literary realism as a failure of the real, a symbol 
that at once has a concrete presence but, in its circulation, could 
not hold that presence intact.
Soyinka and Ngugi differ in their response to the challenge of 
the literary symbol as it substantiates social relations inside of sys-
tems of finance in the twenty- first- century “Third World.” Soy-
inka, like Trollope, sees the sign taken away from the ground that 
it created, confusing those with expectations of its once- credible 
certainty. When it is taken away, those without the sign experience 
its absence as a confusion and a travesty. The absence causes mass 
fatalities because it reintroduces uncertainty, and the uncertainty 
encourages negotiations and sacrifices to the gods in a search for 
certainty. The play suggests that the balance that the sign upheld 
has been troubled; without it, the road is made unpassable and 
even unreal. For Ngugi, on the other hand, language is the first 
casualty of debt. In fact, debt exposes that language never secured 
what it referenced but also that language never belonged in the 
first place— that its referentiality was a trick, a false promise of 
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security in things in living time, a destructive impulse sold under 
a sunny but cynical slogan of plenty. With debt divorcing capi-
tal from the territory of the living, just as when value is eman-
cipated from referring to things, words also no longer touch on 
living flesh, and value is created without investments in working 
bodies. Unlike in Soyinka, where the sign circulates, is stolen, and 
is struggled over (like the diamonds) on a road in perpetual decline, 
in Wizard of the Crow, the financial system devastates the exchange 
of signs before its Tower is even built. As debt forces disinvest-
ments from areas of production, Wizard reminds us, it destroys the 
correspondence between language and reality through an “annihi-
lation of reality,” with both production and reproduction brought 
to a standstill.
Ironically, perhaps, the destruction of the material world that 
Wizard envisions corresponds with a return of the supernatural, 
now in the hands of political opposition to power and domination. 
The Wizard can heal the catastrophe of postcolonial modernity 
by holding up a mirror and thus restoring living time, giving back 
life to the world of real people flashing up behind the fake image of 
Paradise basking in the financial largess of the Global Bank. “Here, 
in the new venture,” Wizard concludes, “the extraordinary, the 
magical, the wonderful, and even the strange came out of the ordi-
nary and the familiar . . . Knowledge is the discovery of the magic 
of the ordinary. Like words put into song” (758– 59). Lodged here in 
a romantic fantasy with the flare of magical realism, the everyday 
world of material practices, both productive and reproductive, as 
Ngugi recognizes them, is vanishing behind a veneer of power and 
can only be accessed as a magical desire appearing in fragments 
of reflective glass. The mirror suggests glimpses, moments that 
have escaped from debt’s capture of time where the future has 
been sold elsewhere, but these moments exist in evanescent and 
ephemeral reflections only. As Simon Morgan Wortham specifies, 
“Debt itself aggresses against temporal continuity in general. If 
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this is true, then debt’s supposed commitment to the unstinting 
continuity and continuation of the present for all future time 
to come (as an unbreakable expression of power) itself becomes 
questionable and resistible, not just as an idea but in terms of the 
practical possibilities suggested by the limit or deficit between 
what debt wants and what it is.” Here, supposedly, resistance can 
be worked into the break between debt’s golden promises for the 
future and debt’s present exploitative practices.
The strategy of suggesting possibilities and pointing out lim-
its or of revealing that everyday practices of production and 
reproduction still exist as fantastical projections in magical mir-
rors seems unsatisfactory, or maybe just a beginning. Within the 
current organization of economic, political, and military power, 
resisting debt by pointing out its contradictions— even in the form 
of refusing payment or defaulting— will be punitive. The reality 
is that debt itself is the fantasy; it is a struggle over the means 
of representing what counts as value. Since the financial system 
required a reorientation in economic thinking, where belief in rep-
resentational values substituted for assuming the intrinsic value 
in things— finance’s “dereferentialization”— much of what counts 
as financial value is manipulations of the imaginary, representa-
tions of credibility, and the symbolic production of trust. In prac-
tice, debt attributes obligations to producers who have to borrow 
back the profits they have made for others. Debt’s systems blame 
inequality on unequal people rather than understanding inequality 
as intrinsic to capital’s representations of itself and its histories of 
exploitation, as antagonistic and irreconcilable. Extending politi-
cal globalization in parallel to economic globalization would mean 
not assuming that some are unequal by nature of their identities 
or their geographies and then faulting them financially, setting 
them up as originally disadvantaged in order to prove that they 
cannot meet the standards of democratic citizenship and pro-
ductive vitality and, as such, extracting surplus by charging them 
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still more. Extending political globalization would perhaps allow 
broader participation in deciding how the goods of the earth 
might be more equitably and justly shared. Debt needs not only an 
emancipation of its temporalities but also, more fundamentally, a 
reorientation of the semiotics of value toward territory, respon-
sibility, and global citizenship— a reorientation that should lead, 
ultimately, to debt’s cancellation.
Notes
INTRODUCTION
 1. As social and political scientist Geoffrey Ingham explains it, “By the late twen-
tieth century, it has become clear to the monetary authorities of all major 
capitalist economies that central banks have very little choice, in the short 
term, but to supply funds to enable the commercial banks to balance their 
books and to augment their reserves after they have met the demand for 
loans. Apart from any other considerations, not to accede to these requests 
would jeopardize the liquidity of the payments system” (137). What he is say-
ing is that the banks essentially took over the monetary system of money 
creation. I find his emphasis on “the short term” to be puzzling. The evidence 
he uses for the necessity of the transfer of monetary policy to the banks is a 
justificatory quote from the Bank of England.
 2. Geoffrey Ingham also wants to establish that creditworthiness, and thus the 
supply of credit (or money), is socially constructed. What he understands as 
creditworthiness, however, is the social conditions of what makes a person cred-
itworthy: “Loans by the banking system are priced in accordance with a profit- 
making strategy that includes a calculation of the degree of risk of default. First, 
risk is taken to increase with the length of the term of the loan; second, it is 
considered to vary with the purpose of the loan . . . ; and third, the borrow-
ers’ ability to repay— creditworthiness— is assessed” (137). From what we saw 
in 2008, this type of assessment, if it is meant to have an empirical reference, 
seems but an academic pipe dream. He goes on to say, “Apart from the higher 
levels of capitalist finance, credit rating is now a formal and almost completely 
depersonalized procedure, based on computer database information” (137).
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 3. Ironically, J. P. Morgan was surprised at the surge of collateralized debt obli-
gations (CDOs). As John Lanchester goes on to tell, though they invented the 
instrument, they could not envision it without in- depth research into 
the business: “They could see how profitable the new– mortgage- backed 
versions of their CDOs were. But after taking a long, hard look at the new 
business, they took a pass. They simply didn’t see how the risks were being 
engineered down to a safe level . . . Blythe Masters, the woman in charge of 
the Exxon Valdez deal .  .  .  , and thus one of the creators of the entire CDS 
[credit default swap] industry, was baffled by the CDO boom. ‘How are the 
other banks doing it?’ she asked. ‘How are they making so much money?’ 
According to Gillian Tett in Fool’s Gold, ‘she was so steeped in the ways of 
J. P. Morgan that it never occurred to her that the other banks might simply 
ignore all the risk controls J. P. Morgan had adhered to’ ” (121). Lanchester is 
using this example to argue against the bankers who claimed that they had to 
use these methods to be competitive. J. P. Morgan, according to Andrew Ross 
Sorkin of the New York Times, is currently, however, projecting large losses 
in the face of the new tax bill. Sorkin suggests that the fall in profits has to 
do with new regulations in fixed- income trading, what he calls a “keystone 
product,” which had declined about a quarter of its income in the past five 
years. This would seem to imply, contra Sorkin’s own assessment, that Wall 
Street’s huge profits were contingent on J. P. Morgan’s practices being made 
unprofitable and obsolete.
 4. Thanks are due to Robin D. G. Kelley for recommending this text to me.
 5. This goes against any goal of global well- being or even efficiency. As Samir 
Amin (among many others) notes, “History shows that the gains brought 
about by increases in productivity are greatly superior to those that can be 
obtained through competitive advantage in the best of cases. History also 
shows that relative prices are not determined by the market, but by the social 
conditions, beyond supply and demand, in which production operates” (27).
CHAPTER 1
 1. “The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority” was founded in 1941 with the 
mission “to provide electric energy services to our customers in the most effi-
cient, cost- effective and reliable manner in harmony with the environment.” 
PREPA advertises itself as “one of the major public electric power corpora-
tions in the United States” and is directed by a government board that has 
seven members appointed by the governor of Puerto Rico and two members 
elected by the company’s clients. See http:// www .prepa .com/ aeees _eng .asp.
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 2. The Eustace Diamonds has recently attracted the attention of “thing the-
ory.” Stephanie Markovits, for example, discusses it in relation to neofor-
malism, as together they challenge genre. Describing Trollope’s diamonds 
as “sliding uncannily between literal and figurative manifestations” (608), 
Markovits, however, does not link this finding to finance or even to com-
modification. The Eustace Diamonds comes from a time, as Jonathan Plotz 
depicts it, when portable property was beginning to merge the sentimental 
values of the subject with the impersonal value of objects in the market-
place that the eighteenth century had separated out, where there would be 
no choice between “the world of true value and the world of fluid exchange” 
(337). Though this insight is certainly valuable for thinking of the transition 
toward a commodity- based economy, it does not explain the times when 
the diamonds are both physically present and absent at the same time or 
represented as present even without physical presence, a tendency that hints 
toward the rise of a financialized or speculative economy that the diamonds 
are meant, in my argument, to help figure out.
 3. John Lanchester wrote I.O.U. while doing research for his 2013 Capital: A 
Novel. This novel is very aware of its nineteenth- century antecedents. It takes 
place in a London city street that is the contemporary version of a Trollopian 
village. Instead of mingling in and about aristocratic properties, the plot takes 
place as the global middle- class inhabitants of the houses on that street inter-
act, whether or not their lifelines and social activities cross paths. The year 
2008 ushers in a fall in the value of the houses that affects these modes of 
interaction; like the diamonds, the houses carry the effects of financial crisis.
 4. As Patrick Brantlinger has indicated, in the nineteenth century, “there is a 
symbiosis between money and novelistic realism that seems especially sig-
nificant in making it also the era of high nationalism and imperialism” (143). 
John Reed reads the mid- nineteenth century as a time when money took a 
new guise in literature, on the one hand, because of the 1866 crash and 1873 
panic, where the economy did not recover as expected so there was a loss of 
confidence, and, on the other, because of an enlarged middle class, where 
“more people sought to acquire their share of the nation’s wealth” (181).
 5. “The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act” 
establishes an oversight board and provides for debt restructuring and infra-
structure projects.
 6. Kathy Alexis Posmiades reads The Eustace Diamonds as marking a moment 
when “heirloom culture,” or inalienability and inheritance, is being replaced 
by the culture of the contract, or commodification. The idea that diamonds 
are heirlooms, passed down through the generations along the male line, 
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or the idea that women are traded to create alliances between their patriar-
chal families, harkens back to a time before commodification, and Trollope’s 
novel shows the new looking back on a culture that no longer makes sense: 
“Trollope’s novel thus goes out of its way to create a world in which actual 
economic relations and activities run counter to metaphorical economic rela-
tions and activities” (98).
 7. As Jeff Nunokawa writes, “If capital assumes the forms of the novel, so does 
the property that eludes it . . . When property is released from the mortal coils 
of capital in the fiction I will scrutinize here, it does so as fiction, as a rhetor-
ical afterlife that arises from the ashes of exchange, as a fragment of literary 
fantasy .  .  .  , and as a narrative whose always anticipated conclusion never 
comes” (14). Elsie Michie also remarks, “Wealth, after midcentury, ceased to 
be defined as a substance and instead began to be regarded as an intangible 
force” (108). Both these critics understand Trollope’s novels as working out 
this transition. Mary Poovey identifies political economists in the eighteenth- 
century writing on this issue: “Tories like Lord Bolingbroke and Edmund 
Burke insisted that all credit money was pernicious because it undermined 
the hegemony of property, which was the true, because natural, ground of 
value” (Genres 64). By the mid- nineteenth century, she says, political econo-
mists were referring back to what was a controversy in the eighteenth cen-
tury as outside of debate, only acknowledging the pro- money side, because 
the issue of money had become settled, more or less.
 8. For example, “Why,” asks John Sutherland in the introduction to the Penguin 
edition, “is Lizzie Eustace so consistently and embarrassingly in debt?” (24).
 9. The analogy to the word citizen in the first part of the chapter should be clear. 
Citizen is an abstraction, a fiction to which rights are attached. Its reference 
ought to be general, meaning certain formal properties that would poten-
tially apply to anyone within the given territory. Yet because the application 
to particular (racial) threatened qualities of the formal generality of citizen-
ship, manipulations had to be made to impose moral badness on certain of 
its referents— in this case by establishing race as a moral category in contrast 
to citizenship, making them nonreferents and therefore rightsless.
 10. As Lady Glencora— the wife of the future prime minister— laments to Lizzy, 
“All is not gold that glistens, Lady Eustace” (Trollope, Eustace 535).
 11. Andrew Miller writes, “The most remarkable thing about the titular diamonds 
themselves is how rarely we see them” (160). Miller understands The Eustace 
Diamonds as communicating within a transition to possessive commodity 
culture, where, nevertheless, “the representation of material culture .  .  . is 
extraordinarily thin” (160).
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 12. This question of the economy’s relation to substance— questions unleashed 
by the diamonds— surfaces still in debates about the current economic crises. 
Joshua Clover, for example, analyzes the value theory of labor as understand-
ing a clear production basis for the economy, where the limits to growth can 
be found in the actual limits of the laborer’s life and exertion, as opposed 
to autonomista perspectives, where production has been taken over by pure 
circulation, and the real economy has been superseded. This “changed char-
acter” (Clover, “Value/Theory/Crisis” 110) of capitalism would warrant a cap-
italism without physical referents, which would coincide historically with the 
“linguistic turn” of the humanities in the 1970s and beyond. Clover sees this 
as an error in Marxism, as early as Marx’s own writings, which insisted that 
profits had to be made from labor (surplus value) and could not be made in the 
disparity of value and price in commodity circulation: “The rise in finance is 
correlated with the rise of both speculative value and immaterial labor— but 
this indicates a problem in production, not a new source or mode. Finance 
is neither cause nor solution for this problem but its veil” (ibid., 112). Includ-
ing the disparity of price and value in the analysis would mean, for Clover, 
that the immateriality of production that interested the autonomistas like 
Antonio Negri and Christian Marazzi was always part of accumulation 
through production and not evidence of a historical transformation.
 13. According to Poovey, “Today’s general reader, who likes these novels because 
they are ‘realistic’ (true to life), keeps alive the informational function (they 
remind us of how things used to be), whose renunciation enabled nineteenth- 
century writers to elevate the genre” (Genres 356). Given a novelist like Trol-
lope, it is difficult to agree that he had renounced completely the informational 
aspect of imaginative writing, considering the material aspects of writing, 
such as bills, checks, letters, and legal opinions, that frequently surface in 
the work. Rather, Trollope in The Eustace Diamonds reveals the connections 
between conveying information and the narrative conventions of the novel.
 14. “If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be 
found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting” (Kant 67). Another 
term of Kant’s that might be useful here is imagination: “The powers of cog-
nition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, 
since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” 
(102). The difference is that “reflecting judgment” is linked to an experience 
of nature as nature herself gives order, whereas the “imagination” is linked 
to representations inside intuition.
 15. According to Stephen Ross, it is modernism’s interest in aestheticism and 
spiritualism that gives it, in distinction to prior tendencies, “the incitement 
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to speculate as the locus of value” (143), and speculation— the expansion of 
money value across material borders by means of the imaginary— allows the 
experience of the future, the ethical, and the unknown to be read inside 
the present.
 16. “Every credit economy is also an economy of debt, and, during these centuries 
in particular, English investors’ extraordinary rate of return on their capital 
was largely obtained through overseas investment. As a consequence, to omit 
all discussion of India and the West Indies, in particular, is to present an 
admittedly one- sided picture of the global system of credit and debt whose 
legacy still casts such a long shadow across the world” (Poovey, Genres 23).
 17. Bowen, without citing particular texts, describes “the central importance 
of written communication to the domestic management of the Company’s 
overseas affairs” (151), including literature (153), as part of the excessive com-
municational bureaucracy developed to govern the company’s affairs inter-
continentally and earn the consensus of the British public.
 18. “This oscillation is at once a law of movement and the possibility of crisis. This 
oscillation is the form of existence of value, the continuous commutation 
and the essential duality of value [between use and exchange]. This oscilla-
tion is the revelation of the social relation which in reality extends itself, the 
mode in which is consolidated exchangeability as an exclusive social relation 
[exchangeability wins as abstraction and alienation]. This oscillation is thus, 
still and always, the possibility of crisis” (Negri 29; original emphasis). For 
Negri, use value never settles down and surrenders.
 19. “In the realm of fiction, the negative connotations associated with invalid 
money were neutralized by the claim that imaginative writing did not have 
to refer to anything in the actual world . . . Fiction, which was not held to 
a standard of referential accuracy, [helped] readers practice trust, tolerate 
deferral, evaluate character, and, in a general sense, believe in things that 
were immaterial” (Poovey, Genres 89).
 20. The overlapping of the thinking on currency and credit with a hatred of aes-
thetics can be seen in a comparison of the first pages of some of Trollope’s 
other major novels chronologically on either side of The Eustace Diamonds. 
The Last Chronicle of Barset, for example— Trollope’s 1867 finale to his Barset-
shire series— is the story of a county priest, Mr. Crawley, who accidentally 
uses a check that is not his to pay a debt to the local butcher. “I can never 
bring myself to believe it” (7), begins the novel. What the attorney’s daughter 
could not believe was that Mr. Crawley purposely paid a bill with somebody 
else’s check, claiming that the check had been signed to him, a statement that 
turned out to be false. Meanwhile, The Way We Live Now, Trollope’s 1875 satire 
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about financial failure, begins with Lady Carbury, thought by critics to be a 
“female literary charlatan” (12), trying to use her beauty as a woman to win 
good reviews from a respected newspaper editor and a literary journal for her 
less- than- valuable work of “Literature” that Trollope sarcastically crowns with 
a capital L. In both instances, instead of measuring the real value contained 
in real things, financial value is derided in terms of its affiliations with the 
uncertainties introduced by the aesthetics of writing in a market society.
 21. “Between the 1850s and the 1860s, the charge of fictitiousness lost its force, 
and attention turned to the subjective experience of financial unground-
edness. I have been arguing that this shift, from probing financial logics 
to pursuing psychological perspectives, comprises a problematic psychol-
ogism: systematic analysis of the ‘case of metaphysics’ was displaced by 
impressionistic exploration of affect. Where fictitious capital made the 
financial economy inexplicably complex, defiantly elusive of exposition, 
the psychic economy realized capital, domesticating the economy as the 
natural issue of interiority . . . Psychology lent a ground to economic rela-
tions” (Kornbluh, Realizing Capital 39– 43). Ericka Beckman also notices the 
intersections among financial representations, psychological imbalance, 
and character construction in nineteenth- and early twentieth- century 
fiction, but in Latin America “the realist novel ultimately rests on foun-
dations of credit and belief that are  .  .  . shaky and illusory,” highlighting 
“finance capital as an illusory and indeed fictive form of wealth” (97). For 
Beckman, the unstable psychologies of such realist characters reflect “the 
invisible and abstract forces through which [national] wealth is generated 
and destroyed” (92). “I am interested,” she notes, “in exploring the strik-
ing similarities between . . . [the] imbalanced psyche and the imbalance of 
peripheral economy, which instead of reaching balance or surplus, runs in 
the other direction, toward crisis and bankruptcy” (132– 33).
 22. Until 1867, when diamonds were discovered in South Africa and other 
colonies, all diamonds— including, most prominently, Queen Victoria’s 
own— came from India and involved exploitative extraction. The discovery 
of more mines meant that the precious jewels might find themselves in hands 
other than royal ones.
 23. As Jeff Nunokawa writes, “If capital assumes the forms of the novel, so does 
the property that eludes it .  .  . When property is released from the mortal 
coils of capital in the fiction I will scrutinize here, it does so as fiction, as a 
rhetorical afterlife that arises from the ashes of exchange, as a fragment of 
literary fantasy . . . , and as a narrative whose always anticipated conclusion 
never comes” (14).
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 24. For example, “Events like the collapse of the South Sea Bubble not only 
exposed the existence of the fact/fiction continuum in a monetary instru-
ment; they also fueled public intolerance for this continuum” (Genres 83).
 25. Poovey elucidates, “The breakup of the fact/fiction continuum was mod-
eled on the distinction between valid and invalid monetary tokens; this dis-
tinction, in turn, was the necessary precondition for making representative 
money seem to be rather than simply to represent value” (Genres 61). The abun-
dance of cases of counterfeit and fraud point to the insufficiencies in this 
economy of trust.
 26. An 1876 article in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine tells of a joint- stock com-
pany that exists as a personage. The document travels in the pockets of var-
ious men of business. The “sham prospectus” (Oliphant 98) was originally 
written and promoted by a crafty army officer who was also a member of 
Parliament, whose job it was to build a story that would, in time, make some-
thing that is nothing seem as something of value. The company, duping the 
public, eventually succumbs to its own swindle.
 27. “My long career upon town— ” the counterfeit coin confesses, “in the course 
of which I have been bitten, and run, and subjected to the most humiliating 
tests— has blunted my sensibilities, while it has taken off the sharpness of 
my edges; and, like the counterfeits of humanity, whose lead may be seen 
emulating silver at every turn, my only desire is— not to be worthy of passing, 
but simply— to pass” (Blanchard 421).
 28. “If literature is a particular form by means of which objective reality is 
reflected, then it becomes of crucial importance for it to grasp that reality 
as it truly is, and not merely to confine itself to reproducing whatever man-
ifests itself immediately and on the surface. If a writer strives to represent 
reality as it truly is, i.e. if he is an authentic realist, then the question of totality 
plays a decisive role, no matter how the writer actually conceives the problem 
intellectually . . . The literary practice of every true realist demonstrates the 
importance of the overall objective social context, and the ‘insistence on all- 
round knowledge’ required to do it justice” (1037). Lukacs is citing Lenin here.
 29. I am reliant here on Deidre Shauna Lynch’s descriptions of narratives of talking 
money in the late eighteenth century / early nineteenth century in The Economy 
of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner Meaning. Lynch 
is interested in the facelessness of the eighteenth- century “gentleman” who is 
sympathetic to all experience that he encounters, as it gives way in the nine-
teenth century to the particularity of character: “The coin’s or banknote’s adven-
tures closely resemble those of the gentleman who knows what it is to enter 
into sociable exchanges with all and sundry. (Conversely, it is the possession of 
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these coins and banknotes that expedites the gentleman’s exemplary mobility.) 
Money is, after all, an appropriate vehicle for a narrative form organized to 
enable readers to collect the characters of experience by collecting characters 
in the other sense of the term” (96). The circulation of money reflects the career 
of the “gentleman” as an abstraction that can be universally exchanged; the 
counterfeit coin is similarly abstract but also exhibits particularities.
 30. The six Palliser novels compose Trollope’s second series after his famous 
series, the Chronicles of Barsetshire (1855– 67). They span from Can You For-
give Her? in 1864 to The Duke’s Children in 1879. Whereas the Barsetshire nov-
els deal with politics among the clergy in villages, the Palliser novels focus on 
parliamentary politics, mostly in London but also in the country homes of 
the elite. The Eustace Diamonds is the third in the Palliser series.
 31. Parliament would decide “as to whether the Sawab of Mygawb should have 
twenty millions of rupees paid to him and be placed upon the throne, or 
whether he should be kept in prison all his life” (Trollope, Eustace 63).
 32. Goodlad reads the ritual displays of power as expressing Trollope’s idea that 
the British Empire would grow through the spread of these Barsetshire- type 
“heirlooms” (7) (replicating the forms of British class power in India), though 
he did not think India suitable.
 33. Lizzie’s debt is similar to what Richard Sennett describes as “the ‘mystifi-
cation’ of material life in public, especially in the matter of clothes, caused 
by mass production and distribution” (19), where, within the urban chaos 
of nineteenth- century social life, “public markings were losing distinctive 
forms” (20). Though everyone could appear the same and equal, says Sennett, 
nobody really believed that people were the same, and so the presence of 
strangers dressed up in familiar attire was unsettling to the codes by which 
people recognized each other.
CHAPTER 2
 1. Shohat uses the term Third World as clearing the space for active critique: 
“Coined in the fifties in France by analogy to the third estate (the common-
ers, all those who were neither the nobility nor the clergy), the term ‘Third 
World’ gained international currency in both academic and political contexts, 
particularly in reference to anticolonial nationalist movements of the fifties 
through the seventies as well as to the political- economic analysis of depen-
dency theory and world system theory” (100).
 2. Simon Gikandi calls this an “unnamed African country” in the first part of 
his review (158) but later does return to the name (159). The ambiguity is 
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unexplained. Since names of things and people are often changing in Wizard 
of the Crow, one wonders if this discrepancy is a mistake or part of the point 
of Gikandi’s critique.
 3. “The death instinct,” remark Deleuze and Guattari, “that is its name, and 
death is not without a model. For desire desires death also, because the full 
body of death is its motor, just as it desires life . . . Desiring- machines work 
only when they break down, and by continually breaking down” (8).
 4. For Beckman, Latin American novels register a distrust in financial invest-
ments as a road to development or prosperity, given the instabilities caused 
by swindles, fraud, and massive withdrawals of European speculation and the 
ensuing crises. “Imbalance and anomaly,” she observes, “express the contra-
dictions of peripheral capitalist development” (132) in Latin American novels 
of financialization, revealing economic instabilities as endemic for peripheral 
economies by linking them to mental instabilities and debilitating nervous 
crises. This description resonates for Wizard.
 5. Bakhtin writes, “But the centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in 
‘unitary language,’ operate in the midst of heteroglossia. At any given moment 
of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the 
strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic markers, especially 
phonetic) but also— and for us this is the essential point— into languages that 
are socio- ideological: languages of social groups . . . Alongside the centripetal 
forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; 
alongside verbal- ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted 
processes of decentralization and disunification go forward. Every concrete 
utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as 
centripetal forces are brought to bear” (271– 72).
 6. In response to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Deleuze and Guattari write, “It 
is not because everyone is suspected, in advance, of being a future bad debtor; 
the contrary would be closer to the truth. It is the bad debtor who must be 
understood as if the marks had not sufficiently ‘taken’ on him, as if he were 
or had been unmarked [by the technologies of debt]. He has merely widened, 
beyond the limits allowed, the gap that separated the voice of alliance and 
the body of filiation, to such a degree that it is necessary to re- establish the 
equilibrium through an increase in pain” (191). In another place they add, 
“Is the instability derived in relation to an ideal of exchange, or is it already 
given in the preconditions, included in the heterogeneity of the terms that 
compose the prestations and counter- prestations?” (187).
 7. In “What Is Global Literature?” the editors of World Lite read Wizard as 
being about the identity of exile or recognizing and retrieving a “forsaken 
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community” by reinvigorating its language (in connection with a depoliti-
cized poststructuralism). Focusing on debt, however, complicates identity 
inside instruments of finance, showing how unequal identities are structur-
ally created.
 8. As Robert Hullot- Kentor notes in his “Translator’s Introduction” to Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory, “Aesthetic concepts would become the memory of nature 
sedimented in art, which for Adorno takes shape in Aesthetic Theory as the 
unconscious, mimetically written history of human suffering against which 
enlightenment elsewhere seals itself off” (xiii). Adorno knew that suffering 
is also subsumable in the concept and is difficult to disassociate from other 
topoi, as we recognize it in sentimental, criminal, or victimization narratives, 
for example. However, for Adorno, there is a part of human suffering that 
cannot be reduced to its administered, calculable, predictable form.
 9. Linked to the money economy, realism, says Fredric Jameson, is identified 
in “the shift from the diachronic to the synchronic” (Antinomies 222), a sense 
that instead of progressively accumulating experience in time, society would 
be spread out in “independent tokens of narration” (226) that intersect in 
chance meetings and momentary exchanges, “interweaving of a host of such 
lots or fates” (222). In realism, Jameson observes, protagonists are replaced 
by a slew of secondary characters, tidbits of everyday life, and unnamable 
feelings that occur simultaneously, thus turning chronological time into 
geographical space. Realism for Jameson (not a different classification from 
modernism but rather a different methodology) is thus the outgrowth of the 
“irreconcilable divorce between lived experience and the intelligible which 
characterizes modernity” (33), “the radical distinction between naming and 
representational construction” (35).
 10. As Clover is interested in how financialization renders time as space, he is 
less attentive to how the “Third World” is the particular space where debt 
replaces the worker for the extrapolation of maximum value. Others have 
talked about the time of the “Third World” as the time of the Other, where 
the primitive is used to prove the temporal superiority and domination of 
Western modernity and its modes of power. As discussed by Johannes Fabian, 
among others, modern secular science “spatialized Time” (15): “Anthropolo-
gy’s efforts to construct relations with its Other by means of temporal devices 
implied affirmation of differences as distance” (16). Anthropological represen-
tations of different cultural and ethnic populations coexisting simultaneously 
yet scientifically categorized as in different historical stages speak to evolu-
tionism or a Newtonian physicalism. Processes of growth and progress, says 
Fabian, are thereby mapped onto existing geographical terrain: “In the study 
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of ‘unchanging’ primitive culture, temporal relations can be disregarded in 
favor of spatial relations” (18). According to the views that Fabian criticizes, 
juxtaposed cultural and social examples of prior evolutionary moments coex-
ist in the present so that “the civilized” can actually see the signs of modern 
advancement across space.
 11. Mostly focused on Europe, Piketty’s analysis of inequality concentrates for the 
most part on domestic inequalities inside of rich nations, which he sees as of 
greater consequence than inequalities between such nations. Contrasting his 
views to David Ricardo’s, Piketty maintains that the main cause of inequality 
is a change in the capital return (inherited wealth: e.g., savings, machinery, 
housing, real estate, financial assets such as incomes from profits, dividends, 
rents, interest) / national income (wages, benefits, social supports) ratio within 
a country. Piketty argues that the income from capital, adjusted for spending 
levels and including earnings from foreign investments, has been steady in 
relation to the aggregate of individual earnings, except for in the twentieth 
century, when capital’s share was diminished due to the destruction of the 
world wars and the Depression. As a consequence, in the time period between 
the world wars and lingering on until the early seventies, inequality decreased. 
The twenty- first century, then, is most likely to look more like the nineteenth 
than the twentieth in terms of inequality levels. Piketty feels comfortable in 
concluding, “Inequality is not necessarily bad in itself: the key question is to 
decide whether it is justified, whether there are reasons for it” (19). Partly, this 
conclusion can be said to emerge from the way Piketty describes inequality 
as natural within the economy. This means he cannot consider the idea of 
inequality between specific ethnic, national, or cultural populations or inequal-
ity as imposed by some because they hold political and/or economic power over 
others and can collect from the productivity of others.
 12. I thank Peter Hitchcock for pointing out Piketty’s statements about literary 
realism.
 13. The two- hundred- to three- hundred- year span that Piketty analyzes might 
have witnessed vast transformations in how capital accumulation is repre-
sented even within European crises, which are Piketty’s focus. As Piketty 
admits, “Clearly, the structure of wealth has been utterly transformed since 
the time of Mansfield Park” (120).
 14. “It is not easy to identify capitalists as persons” (Berardi 79)— a person is not 
the physical counterpart to a sum but rather, he notes, an effect: “Statistics, 
figures, indexes, fears, and expectations are not linguistic representations of 
some referent that can be found somewhere in the physical world” (79). These 
neoliberal rubrics show numbers as positive and real, while their referents 
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have vanished, thus participating in “the destruction of the existing world” 
(105).
 15. The first step of “dereferentializaton” is the classical Marxist abstraction, 
which separates the worker’s body from the usefulness of the things he 
makes. In the second phase, information replaces things, and the body is 
exiled from the field of communication. The third level is neoliberal finan-
cial abstraction, where valuation does not even pass through signs or things. 
“When the referent is cancelled,” Berardi writes, “when profit is made pos-
sible by the mere circulation of money, the production of cars, books, and 
bread become [sic] superfluous” (104).
 16. “There were many theories about the strange illness of the second Ruler of 
the Free Republic,” the opening line runs, “but the most frequent on people’s 
lips were five” (3).
 17. The doctors remark on the fear in the Ruler’s eyes, “like the eyes of a child 
stricken with the unexpected and the unknown” (471).
 18. Wizard has been seen to draw a legacy from Latin American dictator novels. 
The “literary response in the wake of dictatorship on both continents shares 
certain important similarities” (Colson 136), including a recourse to parody, 
a humanization of the dictatorial character, and a demystification of author-
itarian power.
 19. In large part, in the history of realism, synchronicities are established, says 
Jameson, through rumor, “which enlarges the facts of interrelationship and 
transmits them onward to a circulation through the collectivity” (Antinomies 
228). Rumor runs rampant in Wizard, outside of the control of the nation’s 
institutions that spread their own rumors. Colson understands the multiplic-
ity of rumors in Wizard as fracturing the Ruler’s power, bringing “into relief 
that the regime’s claims to complete control are unfounded” (137) and ending 
“the Ruler’s efforts to arrest time” (138) by pluralizing contributing narrators, 
each with a different take on the events and the workings of power. Brady 
Smith agrees that the “multiple voices certainly work against the Ruler and 
the hegemony toward which he aspires” (178). I find this reading difficult 
to concur with. As I discuss later on, the hegemony is not weakened by the 
onslaught of rumors. I, rather, follow Jameson in thinking that the simulta-
neity of different events in different time registers introduces social conflict.
 20. The temporal sequencing, facts surrounding events, and founding mytholo-
gies, just as the names of ministers, often change.
 21. Critics have interpreted the burgeoning of petit récits in the text as challenging 
the top- down administration of dictatorial rule. Colson, for example, main-
tains that the Ruler’s power hinges on his claims to be able to arrest time— “to 
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make the past and the present frozen and timeless” (139)— and that the pro-
liferation of narrators, rumors, and storytellers wrests the control of time 
into independent frames, each presaging the Ruler’s “failed attempt to halt 
the march of time and indefinitely postpone the future on a national scale” 
(143). Gikandi agrees that “the phantasmal allegory of the dictator who sets 
out to control time and desire” (164) comes up against “the incompleteness or 
incommensurability of the narratives that arise out of . . . incomplete journeys 
and by the series of strategies that the novelist deploys as he tries to encom-
pass fragmentation” (168). Macdonald construes the multiple sources of nar-
ration as envisioning an internationalized populism no longer bound to the 
nation: “The populism the Movement of the Voice of the People advocates,” 
he explains, “stretches beyond continental borders as well as beyond national 
and ethnic ones,” adopting “the diasporic interests and transnational tenor” 
(62) of Ngugi’s political writings. In addition, some critics have noted that the 
multiple narrators highlight themes of self- construction and performance in 
the text: Nyawira, for example, “could change itself into any character, some-
times so realistically that even those who thought they knew her well because 
of seeing her on platforms in many student political events were often unable 
to say whether it was really Nyawira on the stage” (80). Smith observes that 
“the text of the novel .  .  . is presented throughout as a kind of oral perfor-
mance” (177). McLaren proposes that Wizard “suggests a writing method akin 
to the way jazz artists develop their solos through reinventing the melodies 
over recurring choruses” (153). John Updike adds that readers “would do well 
to remember that [Wizard] is a translation from a language whose narrative 
traditions are mostly oral and heavy on performance.” He cites Ngugi say-
ing of the book, “The characters are engaged in the constant performance of 
their own being for the narrative. You never quite know who they are. Often 
they reinvent themselves through performance.” As Colson concludes, “The 
satirical- allegorical distance created by the world of Wizard of the Crow serves 
to heighten the actual critique of authoritarian government because it brings 
into relief that the regime’s claims to complete control are unfounded. The 
tenuous position of the dictator underlies all his acts of violence and perfor-
mances of power” (137). There is no doubt that performance and orality are 
predominant themes in the text that lend themselves to interpreting the text 
in terms of postcolonial identity construction. Yet such readings also mar-
ginalize what I think is the more original contribution that Wizard makes to 
literature by teasing out a narrative structure particular to debt.
 22. Tajirika— known now as the Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus 
Whitehead— takes control of the armed forces in order to implement “a new 
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era of imperial democracy” with the “construction of a modern coliseum 
on the site once earmarked for Marching to Heaven” (754), the “TALLEST 
BUILDING IN AFRICA; A REAL MARCHING TO HEAVEN” (762) now under 
the auspices of the Global Insurance Corporation.
 23. A. G. fails in his police job and leaves in response to a car accident, which he 
interprets as a divine sign. After a women’s protest at the gates of Paradise, 
where the Marching to Heaven tower is planned to be built, A. G. chases the 
wizard and Nyawira, who are dressed as beggars that keep changing shape and 
location, when he comes across a sign warning “TOUCH THIS HOUSE AT 
YOUR PERIL” (77) and turns back. Later he returns to get treatment from the 
wizard. He tells the wizard that he is sure he has enemies who are causing him 
not to get a promotion at work. Though he does not know the identity of his 
enemy, the wizard tells him to check the accident reports involving matatus 
(privately owned minibuses used for communal commuting in Kenya), and he 
will see there that his enemy has been fatally injured. Sure enough, an accident 
happens killing fifteen people. Convinced that his enemy has been sacrificed 
in the accident, A. G. quits his job and becomes a wandering storyteller.
 24. The symptoms include an inability to look away from the mirror while 
scratching his skin and occasionally jumping in the bathtub. His response 
when confronted is as though “his mind [were] in another world and distrust-
ful of the one he now inhabited” (172). The loss of language is later diagnosed 
by the wizard as “white ache,” a depression caused by his inability to turn 
white no matter how wealthy he became.
 25. Berardi sees this transformation of language away from signification as a 
result of language learning no longer being the reproductive and affective 
duty of solely the mother but increasingly the effect of informational and 
media technologies: “The separation of language learning from the body of 
the mother and from the body in general is changing language itself, and is 
changing the relation between the body and language” (101).
 26. Balogun writes, “Soyinka’s evolution from a nationalist writer espousing 
the bourgeois philosophy of ‘pure art’ into a committed writer inspired by 
socialist ideals occurred in the second half of the 1960s and was generously 
commented upon by liberal and radical critics alike” (507).
 27. Impersonating the Professor mockingly, Samson imitates postcolonial power 
by spewing petty insults on Salubi, joking that his physical depravity, his fart-
ing and bad breath, make him most suitable for promotion. “One of these 
days,” says Salubi, “I will find out where he hides the money” (164), but he 
never does. “Go on, you are sacked” (158), returns Samson. The postcolonial 
state is thus mocked as an absurd imitation of production’s promise.
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 28. “For Soyinka Western science constricts and compartmentalizes reality 
whereas ‘African metaphysics’ sees no contradiction between modern tech-
nology and the gods” (Hunt 78).
 29. The connection between capital and death monsters was noted by Marx. 
The new forms the death monsters have taken in finance culture have been 
analyzed by critics. See, for example, not only Annie McClanahan’s analysis 
of the horror film (143– 83) but also Fred Botting: “Zombie debt is a debt that 
will not die, that cannot be repaid; it signals an almost total absorption into a 
world financial market carrying on without thought or concern for anything 
other than accumulation. Hence the horror: one can neither kill nor escape 
the global network that circumscribes planetary existence and the zombie 
effects of producing so many debt- bound automatons.”
 30. As K. J. Phillips remarks, “Soyinka criticizes the Faustian drive in order to 
exorcise the Western Faustus from Africa. But then, surprisingly, he salvages 
a portion of that drive by insisting it has always characterized his favorite god 
of the Yoruba pantheon, Ogun” (140), the god of death and taxi drivers.
 31. Soyinka’s interpretation of the god Ogun, of death and taxi drivers, is more 
complicated than my own metaphoric use. I am taking Ogun to represent the 
source of indebtedness, in some ways linked to economies of imperialism and 
dead capital. On the other hand, Soyinka admires Ogun for his status as a god 
who became embodied, descended to the human world, and was engaged in 
human interactions: 
He came down decked in palm fronds and was crowned king. In war 
after war he led his men to victory. Then, .  .  .  the trickster god left a 
gourd of palm wine for the thirsty deity. Ogun found it exceptionally 
delicious and drained the gourd to the dregs . . . Ogun is the embodiment 
of challenge, the Promethean instinct in man, constantly at the service 
of society for its full self- realisation . . . Ogun’s action did not take place 
in a vacuum. His venture was necessarily a drama of individual stress, yet 
even his moment of individuation was communicant, one which enabled 
the other gods to share, whose end- in- view was no less than a strength-
ening of the communal psyche. (Myth 29– 30) 
Here one hears echoes not only of Jesus and obviously Prometheus but also, 
perhaps more fundamentally, of Zarathustra. For Soyinka, Ogun is not only 
between the spiritual and the physical, not only between gods and humans, 
but also a type of cultural bridge, a sign of the complementary that exists 
between mythologies and cultures, where each culture is unique and also 
possesses shared features with “a common humanity” (Myth xii).
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 32. Berardi observes, “Finance is an effect of the virtualization of reality, acting 
on the psycho- cognitive sphere of the economy. But at the same time, finance 
is an effect of the deterritorialization of wealth . . . Finance is the transversal 
function of immaterialization, and the performative action of indexicality. 
Statistics, figures, indexes, fears, and expectations are not linguistic repre-
sentations of some economic referent that can be found somewhere in the 
physical world, signifiers referring to a signified” (79).
 33. Whitefish Energy is located in the hometown of Secretary of the Interior 
Ryan Zinke. The head of the private equity firm that backs Whitefish, Joe 
Colonnetta, was a major donor to Donald Trump’s presidential campaign.
 34. As vice mayor of San Juan Rafael Jaume reports on Democracy Now!, “FEMA’s 
statement of this morning says clearly, ‘The decision to award a contract to 
Whitefish Energy was made exclusively by Puerto Rico Electric Power Author-
ity, PREPA. FEMA was not involved in the selection. Questions regarding 
the awarding of this contract should be directed to PREPA.’ The following 
says, ‘Any language in any contract between PREPA and Whitefish that states 
FEMA approved that contract is inaccurate.’ Strong words.” Meanwhile, he 
says, Article 68 of the contract specifies, “ ‘By executing this contract, PREPA 
hereby represents and warrants that FEMA has reviewed and approved of this 
contract and confirmed that the contract is an acceptable form to qualify for 
funding from FEMA and other U.S. government agencies.’ Totally the oppo-
site in contrast to what FEMA is saying” (Goodman and González).
 35. Nevertheless, Yeampierre and Klein witness efforts on the part of Puerto 
Ricans to use the resources of the community to build back up the infra-
structure in sustainable ways. With the assistance of Puerto Ricans living 
on the US mainland, Puerto Ricans are avoiding helplessness provoked by 
the devastation of the power grid by distributing and sharing solar- powered 
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